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"The reader that I expect something of must have three 
qualities: he must be calm and without haste, he must not always 
put himself and his own "education" in between, finally he must 
not at the end of the lecture expect tables as a result.() [I] 
admire those who are in possession of such a superhuman nature 
that they are capable of overseeing it all, from the depth of the 
observable to the real heights of the cultural problems and down 
again to the swamp of the driest regulations and the most refined 
tables. () This book is assigned to calm readers, people who still 
have not let themselves be torn away by our time's dizzly hurry 
() [They] can, without getting a guilty conscience, allow 
themselves to select and collect the good moments of the day and 
their fertile and powerful moments to reflect on the future of our 
education, they can themselves believe in a useful and worthy way 
of spending the days, namely in meditatio generis futuri."  
  
 
Friedrich Nietzsche: Om våre dannelsesinstitusjoners fremtid, pp.29-30. (my translation) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
"We recognize the historic battle of the Salvadoran people, who, with enormous efforts, have used 
the different legal and pacific means within its reach to obtain justice, the inalienable right to be the 
master of its own destiny and to organize its society in the manner it deemed most convenient, making 
effective the right to self-determination. However, a privileged minority always made use of force to 
impede these wishes, the inevitable consequence being that the Salvadoran population resorted to 
military means, making use of a right universally recognized as legitimate. 
The Salvadoran population's decision to raise arms permits us to affirm that it inevitably will triumph, 
but we understand that the triumph will be attained at elevated costs imposed by the same minority; 
and that the fight  next to the very grave loss of human lives  causes the national patrimony's 
immense destruction, which, evidently, will make the reconstruction of the country more difficult for the 
entire Salvadoran population. 
It is evident that the political and military intervention of the government of the United States is a 
fundamental cause of the prolongation of the Salvadoran conflict, and that it inhibits our people from 
freely determining its social and political destiny; moreover, the present North-American administration 
has increased its involvement in the internal affairs of the Central American States and peoples, 
gravely injuring the sovereignty of these and impeding the exercise of the right of our self-
determination. Therefore, the present conduct of the government of the United States is seriously 
threatening the peace of the region and the world. 
We consider priceless for the peoples of the region, and particularly the Salvadoran, the possibility of 
finding a way by which we can achieve more rapidly the construction of peace, democracy and social 
justice. We have studied with attention the calls of political leaders from the region and the world, as 
well as from religious leaders and international bodies (United Nations, etc.), which, preoccupied by 
the magnitude of the suffering of our people, and aware that it jeopardizes the peace of the region and 
the world, have suggested to search for ways to establish peace and social justice. 
(...)....  despite the systematic rejections received, we maintain the disposition to effectuate a direct 
dialogue because we know that ample national sectors () are in favour of conversations to achieve 
peace. 
In order to find the most efficient way that can lead to the solution of the conflict, through dialogue, it is 
necessary that this is done between the parties directly involved in the conflict; but equally, we believe 
it is necessary that other national sectors - political, religious, labour and academic  participate to 
provide their precious contribution. 
According to the preceding, animated by a sincere patriotism, honouring our political responsibility and 
based on the will to peace expressed by different sectors of our people, and by the other Central 
American populations, we propose: 
1. That FDR [Revolutionary Democratic Front] and the FMLN [Farabundo Martí Front for National 
Liberation] on one side, and, on the other, the Executive, the National Assembly and the Armed 
Forces of El Salvador, speedily initiate a direct dialogue without conditions, oriented to find ways that 
lead to the establishment of peace and social justice in El Salvador  " 
 
 
(Extract from a FDR-FMLN proposal to enter a dialogue to solve the conflict, 5 October 1982 At: 
http://www.cepaz.org.sv/CEPAZ2000/marco_dialogo.htm. My translation from Spanish)
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
         "My country is a small country, 
         tiny, so infinitesimal 
         that I don't know where they fit 
         all the dead." 
         - Unknown Salvadoran  
 
 
1.1 The inspiration for writing this dissertation has come from several sources. First of 
all, knowledge gained by courses on Latin America (STV837), Local Politics and 
Democratization in Developing Countries (STV842), International Negotiations 
(STV908) and Game Theory, Debate Theory and Negotiation Theory (STV603) at the 
University of Oslo. Second of all I have always taken a particular interest in Latin 
America because I speak Spanish, and because I have had the privilege to meet and 
make friends with people from such diverse countries as Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras 
and Peru. Thirdly, as a student of political science and a member of Amnesty 
International, I have gained a special interest for democratization processes in general. 
Fourthly, it is my opinion that there has been very little interest in Latin American 
politics. In Norway, there are just a few social scientists dedicated to the study of Latin 
America, although students have been paying increasing attention in the last few years.  
 
The main purpose of this introductory chapter is twofold: to set out the questions 
(problems) that are to be addressed throughout the dissertation (1.2), and describe how 
I shall proceed to best answer the questions raised by means of data (1.3) and 
methodology (1.4). I will, however, also include a few paragraphs at the end of this 
chapter on why I consider a study of the UN-mediated peace process in El Salvador to 
be highly relevant from a scholarly point of view (1.5). 
The civil war in El Salvador lasted for more than a decade (1980-1992). Most 
sources (UN, Amnesty, and other observers) have estimated that 75.000 persons were 
killed1, but Torres-Rivas2 believes the higher numbers indicated by the Central 
                                                 
1 Out of a total population of some 5.5 million in a country whose area is limited to 21,040 km2 (slightly smaller 
than the state of Massachussetts!). By July 2000 the estimated population was 6.1 million. 
(http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/es.html#People) This makes El Salvador the most densely 
populated country in Latin America, with some 290 people per square kilometre. 
2 Torres-Rivas, E.: "Insurrection and civil war in El Salvador". Chapter 9 in Doyle/Johnstone/Orr (eds.) (1997): 
Keeping the Peace  Multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Cambridge University 
Press, p. 226. 
 2
American University's El Salvador Proceso  i.e. that at least 100.000 were killed - are 
more likely. Over 8.000 simply "disappeared" and at least one million Salvadorans had 
to seek refuge, the majority in the United States. Civil war erupted when the FMLN-
guerrilla (Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation) challenged the armed forces 
and the rightist government of El Salvador, headed by the ARENA party (National 
Republican Alliance). FMLN demanded a fair distribution of land and a reform of 
state organs. El Salvador's mythical "fourteen families", the coffee oligarchy, had 
traditionally run the country using the armed forces to stall social disorder. The 
majority of the elite did not see any connection between social discontent and the civil 
war. Rather they believed the war had been caused by a small group of terrorists 
because there was no reason for people "who wanted the country to move ahead" to 
resort to revolutionary war.3 With such obvious diverging positions, a negotiated 
settlement seemed very unlikely indeed. The United States supported the government 
with extensive amounts of money, military equipment and training to confront 
"communism". The overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979 made the US eager to 
stop "the rebels" in El Salvador as soon as possible.4 The FMLN, however, was strong 
and well organized, highly motivated and was helped by the mountainous landscape. 
The way the situation was, neither side could win. They had reached a mutually 
hurting stalemate and needed help from a third party to negotiate the terms of 
settlement.  
 
1.2. PROBLEMS 
The focus of this study will be on the role of the United Nations as a peacemaker in 
El Salvador between 1990-1992. El Salvador (literally meaning "The Saviour") is the 
only country in the world named after Christ, and probably one of the Latin American 
countries most in need of "salvation". It is the smallest and most densely populated 
country in the hemisphere, and was for a long time the most centralized and repressive 
                                                 
3 Paige (1993): "Coffee and Power in El Salvador", Latin American Research Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, p.29. 
4 Disclosure of US government documents in 1994 confirmed the UN Truth Commission's impression that 75% 
of the Salvadoran Army officers directly involved in eight massacres of civilians were graduates of the School of 
the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia. Nineteen of them - including Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, one of the 
founders both of El Salvador's death squads and of ARENA  were also involved in the killing of six Jesuit 
Priests in 1989. Vilas, C. (1996): "Prospects for Democratisation in a Post-revolutionary Setting: Central 
America", Journal of Latin American Studies, 28, p.479. 
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state in Latin America. The Salvadoran civil war had several malignant characteristics. 
To understand why peace nevertheless was achieved, we shall have to discuss and 
analyze the mediation process. More specifically, three main problems (questions) are 
to be addressed:  
I. How (by what means) did the UN contribute to a peaceful settlement?  
II. Why was agreement between the parties in conflict achieved?  
III.  a) How are we to measure and define the "success" of a peacemaking 
phase? An answer to this question is necessary for analyzing and 
evaluating the UN's behaviour in the peace process and give 
prescriptions for its improvement. As a natural continuation of this 
question, therefore, I shall finally seek to answer the following question: 
b) Was the peacemaking phase really a success? 
 
The first two questions are of an empirical nature, whereas the latter is normative and 
analytical. Some readers, however, might react to the order in which these questions 
are put. Logically, the third problem has to be answered first. For it to be meaningful 
to analyze and evaluate something, certain normative criteria will have to be outlined 
so that we can discuss the "facts" against certain ideal standards. Practically, however, 
I find it useful and necessary to start with the empirical part. I believe viewing what 
was done to settle the war furthers our understanding and makes us more cognizant of 
necessary measures of "successfulness". In other words, we are probably better-
equipped or more able to set up criteria after having scrutinized a particular case. 
Moreover, to see first what the UN did to resolve the conflict, and then discuss 
whether or not this particular mediation outcome actually was successful might be 
more enlightening than vice versa. This is so because there seems to be, among most 
scholars and practitioners, an already agreed upon fact that the Salvadoran peace 
process was very successful. It might therefore be more educational to take a closer 
look at what was actually done before judging whether or not a mediation outcome  
and the Salvadoran in particular - should be regarded a success.  
The first question (How did the UN contribute to a peaceful settlement?) can be 
interpreted in two ways: When referring to the UN, do we mean its actions or its 
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actors? By focusing on the former we accentuate the effects; by focusing on the latter 
we emphasize actor characteristics. For my purpose I shall include both meanings 
when talking about the UN's role since actor characteristics are likely to influence the 
actions taken. 
The second question (why agreement between the parties was reached) will be 
addressed by referring to the likely conditions for an agreement to be achieved. The 
variables influencing the mediation process - and thus indirectly the outcome - and 
their expected effect (how they influence) will be discussed in chapter 3. The two 
empirical questions are overlapping, the first one being narrower (more specific) than 
the second, since  in order to answer the latter one  we shall have to refer to other 
factors in addition to the UN. 
The third question is briefly touched upon in section 1.4, but as mentioned 
above the normative discussion will be put on hold until chapter 6. 
 
1.3. DATA   
There are obvious difficulties in obtaining information about a negotiation process that 
one has not been able to observe. To analyze the dynamic nature of a negotiation, 
especially when more than two parties are involved, is thus no easy task. Then one has 
to try to reconstruct the essentials of the process by being a kind of detective, critically 
assessing the validity and reliability of the information obtained and putting the pieces 
together in a logical and coherent manner. Being in Norway, geographical distance has 
made access to relevant empirical material more difficult and time consuming than had 
I chosen to study something that was both closer to me and easier to obtain 
information about. Even if I had been in El Salvador or New York (UN Headquarters), 
getting my hands on primary information would have been hard. As David Holiday, 
Professor of political science residing in San Salvador, told me: "I don't mean to 
discourage, but a lot of the primary materials are in the hands of a few."5 Also, 
Archives and Records Centre in New York has a declassification timetable that allows 
automatic release of "confidential" materials only at the end of twenty years. 
                                                 
5 Holiday, David (2001, March 15). Re.: The UN as peacemaker in El Salvador [E-mail to Rune Baklien] 
[Online]  Available by e-mail at: runeba@student.sv.uio.no. 
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Difficulties cannot, however, make us shun the challenges of acquiring more 
information about an overlooked topic.  
I had originally pinned my faith in Centro de Documentación e Investigación 
Histórica in San Salvador (the capital of El Salvador) which, according to their 
website (http://www.cepaz.org.sv), gathered some 15.000 documents in 1998 
regarding the entire peace process from 1981-1992. I tried to get in touch with this 
centre since September 2000 - when I was still in my second term of "hovedfag" - both 
personally (writing in Spanish) as well as through the Nobel Institute in Oslo (twice) 
and through the Salvadoran consulate in Porto Alegre, Brazil (where a friend of mine 
lives). Unfortunately, I received no reply as to how many - if any - of the documents 
that may relate to the role of the UN in the peace process, neither what kind of 
documents these may be. I finally got in touch with Professor William Stanley and 
Professor David Holiday (the latter residing in San Salvador) who told me they had no 
knowledge of this centre. Thanks to the wonder of e-mail, however, I got in touch with 
Mr. Alvaro de Soto, chief UN negotiator and personal representative of the United 
Nations Secretary General. He was kind enough to provide me with some answers. 
Washington Office on Latin America has published some reports that are more critical 
to the UN's role than mainstream literature. I acquired their most relevant publications 
in order to get a more balanced view of the "most successfully negotiated settlement in 
recent history" (Juhn 1998).  
 Most of the literature I could get hold of was in English, although some articles 
and documents available on the Internet were in Spanish. My dissertation largely 
depends on secondary literature, already published UN documents (in United Nations 
(1995): The United Nations and El Salvador 1990-1995), the collection of peace 
accords as well as articles written by Salvadoran scholars available in Spanish at: 
www.cepaz.org.sv/CEPAZ2000/biblioteca_mar.htm. 
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1.4. METHODOLOGY:  
What kind of methodological approach shall we, then, adopt in order to examine how 
the UN contributed to a peace settlement in El Salvador and why the negotiations came 
out the way they did? How do we utilize our data?  
According to Yin (1994:6), "how" and "why" questions are explanatory and are 
likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the preferred 
research strategies. This is because such questions deal with "operational links needing 
to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence" (ibid.) Experiments, 
however, require control over behavioural events and are in practice an unrealistic 
research strategy for the social sciences. In turn, history does not deal much with 
contemporary events. Thus, we are left with the case study as the most suited research 
approach  although, in this case, history as a method certainly lies close. In contrast to 
an experiment it requires no control over behavioural events. Yin (p.13) defines a case 
study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident. It  
 
• "copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result  
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis." (ibid.).  
 
"In other words," Yin continues, "the case study as a research strategy comprises an 
all-encompassing method  with the logic of design incorporating specific approaches 
to data collection and to data analysis. In this sense, the case study is not either a data 
collection tactic or merely a design feature alone, but a comprehensive research 
strategy." (ibid.)  
 As the definition of a case study makes clear, a problem that has to be dealt 
with is that of defining what the "case" is. What is the unit of analysis? It is essential 
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for any study to clarify this from the outset, to analytically separate the unit 
(phenomenon) from its surroundings (context) in order to limit the scope of data 
collection. If one does not clarify precisely from the outset what it is that one wishes to 
study, the report risks having little or no structure, no clear guiding stars. Not only will 
the investigator make her task hard(er) for herself, but the readers of the final case 
study report will have a hard time manoeuvring through it without a clear red thread. 
In this single-case study, the unit of analysis, as stated in the beginning, is the role  
direct or indirect - of UN-mediators in making peace in El Salvador between 1990 and 
1992.6 Since the peace process was dynamic, however, with the UN being only one of 
several actors, making proposals, interacting and responding to the conflicting parties' 
actions, drawing a too rigid line between the unit of analysis and its surroundings is 
impossible. Rather, we shall have to adopt a kind of flexible rigidity because we cannot 
close our eyes to the context within which the UN operated (cf. figure 3.2). If we are to 
understand and analyze the "phenomenon", we shall have to use contextual factors as 
auxiliary variables when trying to answer our how's and why's.  
 
According to Yin, there are three typical purposes that may justify a single-case design 
(pp.38-40):  
1. "One rationale for a single case is when it represents the critical case in testing a 
well-formulated theory". This rationale shall not be a main one in this thesis. I have no 
well-formulated theory, only exploratory analytical questions. (See Hellevik, 1997:37, 
on the three ways - theme, question or hypothesis - of explicitly formulating the 
phenomenon to be addressed).  
2. The main reason for our single case, however, coincides with Yin's second 
rationale, i.e. that a case is unique. Several observers regard the Salvadoran peace 
process as a remarkable success story in comparison with e.g. third party efforts to 
negotiate a political settlement in Cyprus or Angola (see Hampson, 1996). Internal 
conflicts  civil wars  are the most difficult of conflicts to negotiate. Only a quarter to 
a third of modern civil wars (including anticolonial wars) have found their way to 
negotiation, whereas more than half of modern interstate wars have done so (see Pillar, 
                                                 
6 Some might say the unit of analysis is not the role of the UN but the "events" that unfolded.  
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1983). Frequently, the issue is "whether or not one side or the other shall control the 
country () Each side in a civil war is a traitor in the eyes of the other and can never 
expect the enemy to let it live in peace." (ibid.:24). Pillar even concludes that if the 
war is a civil war, "expect it to end with the extermination or expulsion of one side" 
(ibid.:245). True, most civil wars in the twentieth century have ended in elimination or 
capitulation. Some examples are Spain (1936-39), Paraguay (1947), China (1927-
1949), Bolivia (1946-1952), Sri Lanka (1971) and Nicaragua (1978-1979). In the 
period from 1900 to 1989, out of a total of sixty-five cases, only 15% were resolved 
through negotiation, and of these eleven cases of negotiated settlement, six were 
terminated through international mediation.7 Consequently, the Salvadoran 
negotiations belong to a rare category and merit further examination. The uniqueness 
of the Salvadoran case can, perhaps, be thought of as an "outlier" in a multiple 
regression analysis of the correlations between several independent variables 
(characteristics) of civil war and a peaceful outcome as the dependent variable. Why is 
El Salvador seemingly such a deviant case? Not only is the Salvadoran case unique 
because of its negotiated settlement of a bloody civil war, but because of the 
"unprecedented, activist role of the United Nations as mediator" (Juhn, 1998:45). In a 
deviant case analysis, the investigator "takes the instance or instances that are 
exceptions to the general trend and attempts to locate independent variables that set 
them off from the general trend" (Smelser, 1973:56).8 According to Smelser, deviant 
case analysis is explicitly one type of comparative analysis, because it can be 
understood only in relation to a more general statistical or comparative analysis in 
which some association has been established. "The method of deviant case analysis is 
also a method of "reading backwards" to approximate the experimental situation. () 
[The] starting point is the different outcomes themselves (as between the deviant case 
and the majority of cases)." (ibid.)  
                                                 
7 Stephen Stedman, (1988); Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980. Cited 
in Hampson, F.O. (1996): Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, p.5. (If 11 out of 65 cases 
were negotiated, this is 16.9% and not 15%. The six cases terminated through international mediation are then 
9%.) 
8 On different types of case studies, also see Collier's synopsis of Lijphart's categorization of methods; Collier 
(1993): "The Comparative Method", in Finifter, A.W. (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, II.   
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Social scientists increasingly argue that one cannot understand any case without a 
fairly extensive comparative perspective, e.g. by means of a most similar or most 
dissimilar research design. I hope that the preceding paragraphs have answered to any 
such criticism since my case is not just any isolated single case, but a deviant one in 
which I  as stated  compare the idiosyncratic Salvadoran mediation outcome to the 
general statistical trend and aim to explain the deviancy. (Many authors seem to prefer 
to compare El Salvador with one of its neighbours, Guatemala, employing a most 
similar design. My approach is implicitly a more extensive comparison.) 
3. The third rationale, according to Yin, for a single case study is the revelatory 
case. "This situation exists when an investigator has an opportunity to observe and 
analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation" (p.40). Since 
not so many social scientists have been interested in the uniqueness of the Salvadoran 
case, a case study has the potential of revealing "something" previously unknown 
about peacemaking and its conditions. For reasons already pointed out, however, I had 
to base my analysis on much secondary literature. Thus, the potential of "extracting" 
new knowledge  at least empirically  may be little. (On criteria for the "exemplary" 
case study, see Yin:147-152). An examination of existing literature should come to the 
same conclusion as that of independent observers, i.e. "a success story". If, however, 
when critically revisiting the literature, and by asking key persons, we can demonstrate 
by logic that this is hardly so, it is my opinion that the case then may become 
revelatory. 
Contrary to the traditional view that case studies provide little basis for scientific 
generalization, I agree with Yin that they, in fact, can be used to generalize a finding. 
Of course, one cannot talk about statistical generalization (requiring a large number of 
units to generalize the findings of a population to the universe), but rather analytical 
generalization. In an analytical generalization, "the investigator is striving to 
generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory" (p.36, italics added). The 
investigator's goal is to "expand and generalize theories" (p.10). Case studies are 
needed in order to "generate insights and observations that can be used inductively to 
produce applicable concepts and theory" (Zartman, 1995:4). A case study will 
normally bring about hypotheses on the conditions for e.g. a peaceful settlement to 
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armed conflict. The hypotheses engendered by the main findings can then be tested in 
other studies, thus constituting a kind of data. 
 The case study is, according to Yin (pp.54-55), among the hardest types of 
research to do:9 
Preparing for data collection can be complex and difficult. If not done well, the entire case study 
investigation can be jeopardized, and all of the earlier work  in defining the problem and designing the 
case study  will have been for naught () In actuality, the demands of a case study on a person's 
intellect, ego, and emotions are far greater than those of any other research strategy. This is because the 
data collection procedures are not routinized. 
 
It goes without saying that when interpreting the empirical material, one has to 
distinguish between the various ways that sources can be employed. Like historians 
(see Dahl, 1997:31-48), we may regard a source of evidence or information in terms of 
its performative aspect10 (as if it were an action; what was X's motives?), its 
"tradition"11  i.e. we take for granted what is being told, provided that certain criteria 
for credibility are fulfilled12, or as effects of conditions in the past (the source's causal 
connection). All kinds of information and data obtained during the investigation 
process have to be interpreted and used with sceptical criticism so as to obtain results 
as "objective", reliable and valid as possible. For case study analysis, one of the most 
desirable strategies, according to Yin (1994:106), is to use a pattern-matching logic. 
Such a logic "compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one. () If the 
patterns coincide, the results can help a case study strengthen its internal validity". I 
will follow this strategy by first outlining a set of assumptions (chapter 3), and then 
proceed to see whether or not the empirical findings support or weaken the predictions 
(chapters 4 and 5). 
 To answer the posed questions, a normative discussion will follow the case 
study (questions 1 and 2). As set forth in section 1.3, my thesis is mainly dependent on 
English literature because going to El Salvador was ruled out and Spanish literature on 
                                                 
9 A basic list of essentials, however, can be given (p.56): When interviewing, a person should ask "good" 
questions - and interpret the answers, be a good "listener" (i.e. not be trapped by his or her own preconceptions), 
be adaptive and flexible, have a firm grasp of the issues being studied and be sensitive and responsive to 
contradictory evidence. 
10 Dahl calls this kind of employment "levning". Confer also Austin (1962): How to do things with words  (on 
performative utterances). 
11 Dahl calls this "beretning". 
12 Credibility has to do with e.g. ability and will to tell the truth, and that "traditions" shall have to be internally 
consistent and not subject to reciprocal influence. 
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the subject is scarce in Norway. Some articles and documents, however, were 
available in Spanish on the Internet. Some (if not all) of the literature, of course, must 
be regarded as subjective. Trying to give a balanced analysis and assessment of the 
UN-mediated peace process is thus one methodological objective so that we can draw 
as reliable conclusions as possible. The information I obtained stems from "elite 
persons". When trying to assess and evaluate the "successfulness" of the mediation 
process, therefore, we must ask ourselves in whose eyes/by whose definition the 
outcome was successful. Among many factors, we must combine and weigh against 
each other people's knowledge about the peace process, their subjective preferences 
regarding the outcome, the time used, and  of course  the substance of the peace 
accords. Did they de facto intend to improve the conditions for all Salvadorans or just 
an exclusive elite? How do most Salvadorans view the peace accords? In measuring 
Success - with capital S  we must also consider the implementation of the peace 
accords, the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases, whether or not democracy has 
been consolidated, etc. Several scholars have evaluated the implementation of the 
peace accords and the democratic development (e.g. Salvesen 1998; Popkin 2000).13 
As pointed out in the beginning, this thesis shall analyze and evaluate the success 
(with minuscule) of the mediated peacemaking phase only. In my opinion this is the 
most important phase because if this is not done properly, failure is guaranteed in 
consecutive phases, although Success (capital S) is not guaranteed even if 
peacemaking is a success. In other words, peacemaking is a necessary condition for 
Success, but not a sufficient one. As we are all aware of, mediation outcomes may be 
considered successful at one point only to be deemed unsuccessful a few years later 
(confer the Oslo Agreement). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 In relation to the democratic development, I have, in a previous article, written about the decentralization and 
development of social capital in El Salvador; Baklien, 2000b.  
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1.5. RELEVANCE: 
What reasons, from a scholarly point of view, can be given for studying the 
Salvadoran peace process and summing up the main findings in a report? Some points 
have already been mentioned, but let us do so more explicitly.  
Bercovitch & Houston (1995:11) say: "Systematic analyses, let alone empirical 
studies, of third-party intervention in general and mediation in particular have been 
very rare. The phenomenon has for too long remained little studied and poorly 
understood. () What factors and conditions determine the success or failure of 
mediation?" (emphasis added). Furthermore they claim (p.16) that a "great many 
quantitative studies describe the occurrence and analyze important patterns of 
international disputes. () None of these studies, however, addresses itself specifically 
to the question of how disputes are managed or terminated" (italics added). 
International organizations such as the United Nations have "a poor record in the area 
of mediation"14, but seemingly managed to mediate the Salvadoran conflict quite well. 
An empirical study of third party mediation in El Salvador thus has the potential of 
contributing, however marginally, to increase the amount of attention given to this 
subject. Moreover, such an analysis is in concordance with the criteria of investigation 
outlined by King, Keohane & Verba (1994:15-17), i.e., a research project should: 
1) "pose a question that is important in the real world" and  
2) "make a specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our 
collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the 
world. Our second criterion for choosing research design () means explicitly 
locating a research design within the framework of the existing social scientific 
literature. This ensures that the investigator understand [sic] "the state of the art" and 
minimizes the chance of duplicating what has already been done. It also guarantees 
that the work done will be important to others, thus improving the success of the 
community of scholars taken as a whole." Making an explicit contribution can be done 
in many ways, but one is arguing that an "important topic has been overlooked in the 
literature and then proceed to contribute a systematic study to the area" (emphasis 
added). 
                                                 
14 Analysis of international disputes from 1945-1990; in Bercovitch and Houston (1995:27). 
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I will argue that the case of El Salvador satisfies these criteria. When I contacted 
Professor William Stanley (University of New Mexico), author of books and articles on 
Central America, to hear if he knew anything about the alleged collection of unpublished 
documents at Centro de Paz, he wrote: "I'm happy to hear that someone out there is still 
interested in this time period."15 Examining the Salvadoran peace process is relevant not only 
because there are few studies on third party mediation or because it has been given relatively 
little attention. (The peace negotiations took place in the shadows of the Gulf War.) The peace 
talks ended one of the bloodiest wars in Latin America and made the conflicting parties bury 
the past and move on. The negotiations culminated in a widely acclaimed peace accord. UN-
mediator Alvaro de Soto has defined the peace process as a "negotiated revolution". If the 
outcome really merits such a term, this should be sufficient reason to study the process by 
itself and hence justifies this thesis. Can anything be learned from the Salvadoran peace 
process and used in other conflict situations?  
 Among the books and articles written about the UN's role in El Salvador, Tricia 
Juhn's work from 1998 (Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations and the 
Conspiracy to End the War) gives, as far as I know, the most detailed account of what 
happened during the 22 months of UN-mediated negotiations in El Salvador to end the civil 
war. Juhn has described the accords as the most successfully negotiated settlement in recent 
history. In Juhn's own words (p.45), her work "introduces the unprecedented, activist role of 
the United Nations as mediator, a process which must someday be documented in its own 
right" (italics in original). In a footnote (p.133) she says: "Given that the UN is under constant 
pressure to prove its investment worthiness, a microexamination of its role in brokering peace 
in El Salvador () would go a long way to starting a record of the potential uses of the UN as 
a global instrument for peace-building". Her work is based on official documents, personal 
interviews and hundreds of personal notes, internal memos and minutes of meetings handed 
by key decision-makers. Like most of the literature I have read, though, her work is mainly 
descriptive, and the time is now ripe for a further analysis of the negotiations. Before we can 
do that, however, it is necessary to give a short historical background and synopsis of the 
Salvadoran civil war to better understand the challenges of mediation. What factors did the 
UN have to take into consideration when assessing strategies for conflict resolution? 
 
                                                 
15 Stanley, William (2001, March 15). Re.: The UN as peacemaker/mediator in El Salvador [E-mail to Rune 
Baklien] [Online]  Available by e-mail at: runeba@student.sv.uio.no. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
The Salvadoran Civil War - Origins, Parties and Synopsis of Events 
        War would end if the dead could return 
          Stanley Baldwin 
 
2.1. ORIGINS 
In the introduction I very briefly indicated the nucleus of the conflict, but its origin and 
course of direction must be described more adequately to understand the limits and 
possibilities of peacemaking. 
 The Salvadoran history is a story of exclusion. Socio-economic polarization 
was extreme, based on the concentration of land in the hands of a very few, beginning 
in the nineteenth century with the creation of a primary-export economy. The core of 
the Salvadoran economy was  and is - agriculture and at the centre of the agrarian 
system is coffee. Since coffee overtook indigo as El Salvador's leading export in the 
1880s, it has been the country's leading source of foreign exchange, government tax 
revenues, rural employment and economic activity. Between 1859 and 1875 coffee 
rose from 1% to 33% of exports. By 1978 it accounted for 53.2% of all exports (Byrne 
1996:18). The state played a major role in encouraging coffee growing by reducing 
production taxes, exempting the coffee labour force from military service, granting 
land to those who agreed to grow coffee, and even finding landowners who refused to 
plant coffee. The country thus became a monoculture with dramatic impacts on the 
rural economy and social relations. Lands that had been communal property (ejidos, 
municipal commons; and comunidades, communal lands) were transferred to private 
ownership through laws of 1879, 1881 and 1882 that abolished collective property 
(ibid.). Peasants were forced to choose between working on coffee plantations for 
extremely low wages or migrating to neighbouring countries, such as Honduras. After 
the 1969 "soccer war" with Honduras, however, the already critical situation was 
exacerbated by the return from Honduras of approximately 300.000 Salvadoran 
peasants. With a rapidly increasing population and a steady concentration of land 
ownership for export crops, the social conditions kept worsening. By the 1970s, El 
Salvador had become the most efficient coffee producer in the world  at the expense 
of the general population - and the third or fourth leading exporter, competing with 
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giants like Brazil and Colombia.16 The Salvadoran elite's success with coffee gave it 
the economic power to dominate the rest of the economy. While exports soared by 
more than 1000% in the 1960s, Salvadorans ranked among the world's five most 
malnourished peoples.17 Coffee families controlled even the leading banks until they 
were nationalized in 1980, at the outset of the war. Some figures are illustrative of the 
skewed distribution of land and income: In 1961, almost 20% of families were without 
land; in 1970, 41.1 % were landless. In 1970 the poorest fifth of the population earned 
3.7 % and the richest fifth 50.8% of national income; by 1980 the poorest fifth earned 
just 2% and the richest fifth 66% of national income (Byrne 1996:20). By 1980-81 just 
fifteen firms, twelve of them controlled by families of immigrant origin, were 
processing four-fifths of all Salvadoran coffee18  without distributing the incomes to 
the population. A mere 0.1% of the population controlled 26.5% of the land.19 
 The Salvadoran elite originated in capitalist export agriculture. From the 
beginning, the elite was both capitalist and agrarian, landholding as well as industrial. 
According to the well-known theories of Barrington Moore Jr., the persistence of a 
landed class dependent on agriculture that is labour intensive or labour-repressive is a 
significant barrier to democracy, and defeat of the landlords by a rising industrial 
bourgeoisie is essential for a successful democratic transition. The case of El Salvador, 
however, does not fit that nicely to his theory. The country lacks the clear division 
between a landed aristocracy and an industrial bourgeoisie. Thus "democratic 
developments have been inhibited by the persistence of landed power but also by the 
close economic and familial ties linking landlords and capitalists".20 (El Salvador does, 
however, fall into Moore's categorization of the conditions for the route to fascism, as 
distinguished from the roads leading to communism and parliamentary democracy.) 
Evelyne Huber Stephens21 shows that, in South America, "progress toward democracy  
                                                 
16 Paige 1993: "Coffee and Power in El Salvador", Latin American Research Review, vol.28, no.3, p.10. 
17 Coleman (1993): The Salvadoran Peace Process: A Preliminary Inquiry. Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, Research Report No. 173.p.9. 
18 Paige 1993: "Coffee and Power in El Salvador", Latin American Research Review, vol.28, no.3, p.11. 
19 Torres-Rivas, E.: "Insurrection and civil war in El Salvador". Chapter 9 in Doyle, MW/ Johnstone, I. / Orr, RC 
(eds.). (1997): Keeping the Peace  Multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. p. 212. 
20 Paige 1993: "Coffee and Power in El Salvador", Latin American Research Review, vol.28, no.3, p. 8. 
21 Stephens (1996): "Capitalist Development and Democracy in South America", Politics & Society 17, no 3, pp. 
286-288. 
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only occurred under the crucial precondition of an absence of labor-intensive 
agriculture. In fact, in no case where (1) labor-intensive agriculture predominated and 
(2) agriculture was the crucial export sector was unrestricted democracy established. 
Under these conditions, the landowners feared the loss of a secure supply of cheap 
labor in the wake of democratization, and they were powerful enough either to resist 
an opening of the political system altogether or at least to keep the rural sector 
excluded." The same goes for El Salvador. When civil war erupted, it was, then, not a 
war against a single, particular dictatorship, but rather a revolution against a political 
system. As such, it had much in common with class wars, which history indicates is 
the bloodiest type of conflict. 
 In a series of interviews with members from the Salvadoran elite, Paige makes 
clear the common view that, if coffee naturally leads to industrial development (as the 
elite believes it has in Brazil and Colombia) and if industrial development is the 
requisite for any improvement in the living standards of all Salvadorans, then 
structural reforms are "not only unnecessary but prejudicial to the future of El 
Salvador. () According to this perspective, Salvadorans of good will understand this 
"truth" and want the country to move ahead, hence revolutionary violence must be the 
work of outside agitators and foreign terrorists".22 None of those interviewed saw any 
need to change the agrarian export model that has dominated El Salvador for a century 
and a half without leading to any significant industrial development. Rather, they 
argued, El Salvador had reached the point of industrial takeoff just when the civil war 
intervened.23 
 The coffee elite ruled the country until 1931, when General Maximiliano 
Hernández Martínez took power in a military coup. The military then held government 
until 1979, backed by, and largely to the benefit of, the landed oligarchy. 
In 1932, the coffee elite formed an alliance with the military due to the threat of 
peasant uprisings. In what is now called La Matanza  the massacre  the army 
brutally put an end to a peasant rebellion. Nobody knows exactly how many people 
died, but most historians estimate the total was close to 30.000 - many times the 
                                                 
22 Paige (1993): "Coffee and Power in El Salvador", Latin American Research Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, p.37. 
23 ibid.:15 
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number who had actually participated in the uprising - and nearly 2% of the 
Salvadoran population at the time (Brauer et.al. 1995:14). The revolt was put down in 
three days, and in the weeks that followed thousands of peasants were rounded up and 
executed. Augustín Farabundo Martí, leader of the Communist Party and organizer of 
the urban workers and Indian peasants, was publicly executed by army troops on 1 
February 1932. The massacre set in place a model for dealing with popular unrest that 
would be followed for decades to come.  
The political disillusionment and daily strives to survive, however, continued to 
convince people that their only alternative was direct action. Reforms failed. The 
electoral fraud of 1972 demoralized some, but convinced others to begin to organize 
themselves in insurrectional groups. Another electoral fraud in 1977, when General 
Carlos Humberto Romero was appointed president, once again illustrated the 
impossibility of changing El Salvador by political means. By now, "any centrist, legal, 
reformist, or peaceful illusion of progress was crushed. The violence which 
accompanied and followed this last opportunity to resolve the legitimacy of political 
rule paved the road to war".24  The Romero government abandoned all pretext of rule 
of law in favour of law and order. Under the November 1977 Law of Defense and 
Guarantee of Public Order, the administration was able to implement a de facto state 
of siege, and the repression increased. In 1979, two events each threatened to be the 
"straw to break the regime's back". In May, National Police opened fire on 
demonstrators in the plaza of the Metropolitan Cathedral, killing 22 civilians. In July 
the Sandinistas ousted the dictator Anastasio Somoza in neighbouring Nicaragua, and 
with him fled his personal guard (Juhn 1998:31). 
At this point, the role of the U.S. must be pointed out. Their role in El Salvador 
had historically been limited, compared to its involvement in other Central American 
countries and the Caribbean. U.S. investments in the country were low and the conduct 
of El Salvador's rulers in running the country had not been a major concern of U.S. 
administrators. However, when the Carter administration took office, with human 
rights formally being an essential element of its foreign policy, the U.S. put pressure 
on El Salvador to improve the human rights condition. As late as the first days of 
                                                 
24 Torres-Rivas, p.214 in Doyle, et.al. (1997). 
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October 1979, when no real changes were forthcoming, the Carter administration was 
still debating whether to continue to pressure General Romero to carry out reforms or 
to play a more active role in supporting coup plots that had been under way for almost 
a year (Byrne 1996:47  citing U.S. Declassified Documents II, Part 2). When the 15 
October reformist coup against Romero was successful, the U.S. moved to provide its 
support. U.S. intelligence documents available to policymakers in the weeks leading 
up to the coup defined its orientations clearly: 
A coup [excised words] will take place no later than the weekend of 13-14 October 1979. [Excised 
words] the governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Panama have already given their approval to the coup 
and have promised their immediate recognition of the new government which will be formed. [Excised words] 
the government will be leftist during its early days, and attempt to destroy the influence of the El Salvadoran 
oligarchy over the government and the economy. This move will be for the purpose of allowing significant social 
and institutional changes which would not be possible as long as the oligarchy is allowed to exist in its present 
form. The military will, however, maintain in control at all times to ensure that the government will not 
become extreme leftist as is expected will be the case in Nicaragua. (ibid.: 53; emphasis added) 
 
CIA cables made clear that the junta would begin by attempting to win the 
support of leftist elements and then move to the right: 
 Initially the coup will be announced as a "people's revolution" and may appear in its first days to be a 
leftist takeover. The rhetoric to be used in initial press releases and speeches has been carefully prepared to 
reinforce this impression. () The political stance of the junta following the takeover will be drastically shifted 
to the left. A prompt and string plea will be made to both moderates and leftists (such as the Popular 
Revolutionary Block, BPR) to join the "revolution". It is believed it would be easier to gain the support of the 
left from the start, then gradually move to the right than to risk an open confrontation with the "popular groups". 
Significant social reforms and political accommodations will be made from the start to gain popular support 
(ibid.:54). 
 
The new government consisted of members or supporters of reformist political parties, 
progressive capitalists, army officers, and people close to the Central American 
University. The mass organizations, however, were not included, and they "continued 
to press their demands (particularly regarding the repression and the freeing of 
political prisoners) to test the bona fides of the junta" (ibid.). The junta attempted some 
reforms, promised democratic elections and invited the emerging guerrilla movement 
to join in talks with the government. Few reforms were, however, initiated and as 
repression persisted and killings increased, the revolutionary groups moved to 
overthrow the government. Civil war erupted, and the U.S. instantly moved in to 
protect the Salvadoran state from "Communism", supporting the Right financially and 
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militarily.25 In the heights of the Cold War, El Salvador became "Vietnam in Spanish". 
The US prolonged the war to the detriment of the suffering Salvadoran people. 
According to a secret 1980 U.S. military intelligence assessment, the Salvadoran 
military "could probably hold out for no more than six weeks without outside 
assistance" (Byrne 1996:56). In retrospect, others have estimated that the army would 
have lost the war within the first eighteen months without U.S. aid. The civil war 
(1980-1992), however, was to become the longest in Latin America during the 
twentieth century.26  
Next follows a presentation of the parties in conflict before a summary is given 
of the events that, in my view, were the most significant ones in the decade before the 
UN was formally requested to mediate. 
 
2.2. PARTIES 
In October 1980, five guerrilla groups joined in creating the strongest and best-
organized guerrilla movement in the history of Latin America: Farabundo Martí 
Liberation Front (FMLN), named after the martyr of La Matanza. These five armed 
groups had two distinct origins. It may be useful to separate the guerrilla groups from 
each other, although most often they are referred to as the collective FMLN and 
treated as a unitary actor.  
Three of the groups were rooted in Marxism-Leninism: FPL (Fuerzas Populares 
de Liberación) was founded in 1970 and was dominated by former members of the 
Communist Party (PCS); PRTC (Partido de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos/ 
Central American Revolutionary Workers Party) was founded in 1976 as a 
Salvadoran branch of a regional guerrilla movement; and FAL (Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberación/Armed Forces of Liberation) was founded in 1980 as the communist 
                                                 
25 El Salvador is one of the countries that sent most soldiers to be "educated" at the School of Americas in USA 
during the 1980s. In 1994 a list of present and former students was obtained. It showed that among the officers 
named in the UN's Truth Commission Report, accused of violating human rights in El Salvador, 2/3 had been 
students of SOA. Three of the five officers who were found guilty of raping and murdering the American nuns 
had received their training there, ten of the twelve responsible for the massacre in El Mozote were former 
students, and 19 of the 26 officers responsible for the murders of six Jesuit priests, their cook and the cook's 
daughter, had received their training at Fort Benning, Georgia. (AmnestyNytt. Special edition: The USA 
campaign 1998-99.) 
26 Colombia has experienced the longest periods of violence and civil strife, and Guatemala's civil war lasted for 
35 years, but the Salvadoran conflict was the longest formal, high-intensity war. 
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partys military branch (Lindholm 1997:36). On the other hand, the ERP (Ejército 
Revolucionario del Pueblo/The Peoples Revolutionary Army), founded in 1971 by 
leftist intellectuals at the university of San Salvador, based in the Eastern parts of the 
country; and FARN (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional/Armed Forces of 
National Resistance), founded in 1975 by defectors from ERP, had their origins in the 
youth movement of the Christian Democratic Party, PDC, and were influenced mainly 
by the teachings of the Catholic Church. These differences apply to the leadership of 
the parties rather than to the base, which was mainly peasant and influenced by the 
religious teachings of progressive elements within the Catholic Church (Byrne 
1996:34). 
The FMLNs most important non-military voice during the 1980s was FDR 
(Frente Democrático Revolucionario/Revolutionary Democratic Front), composed of 
the Social Christian Party (MPSC  Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano), the Social 
Democratic MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario), and the leftist UDN (Unión 
Democrático Nacional). 
On the opposite side of the FMLN were the military, oligarchy and the extreme 
right. Major D'Aubuisson, a populist, anti-communist and extremist, founded the 
ARENA party in 1981.27 ARENA gained 19 out of 60 sixty seats in the assembly in 
the elections in 1982. It managed to form a working coalition with other right-wing 
groups and take control of the assembly. ARENA had paid a US advertising firm 
$200.000 to run its campaign and the investment paid off,28 although the left as a 
whole boycotted the elections  which were pressed for by Washington. A further 
mentioning of persons will be made as the analysis of the UN-mediated peace process 
proceeds (final chapters). 
 Before continuing, I find it useful to illustrate the warring parties' number of 
forces: By the end of 1980, the armed forces numbered 9.850 men, including 750 air 
force personnel, as well as 7.000 paramilitary and intelligence agents. At the beginning 
of 1985, the total was 39.000, and at the end of the war, there were 62.000 men. On the 
                                                 
27 Former U.S. Ambassador Robert White once called D'Aubuisson a "pathological killer". Known as "Major 
Bob" by his admirers, D'Aubuisson summarized his platform with a campaign slogan: "Another '32", meaning 
that it was time for El Salvador to repeat the slaughter of 1932 (Skidmore & Smith, 1992:336). Also see footnote 
4. 
28 Brauer, et.al. (1995): On your own in El Salvador. OYO Publications, USA, p.25. 
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other hand, the FMLN began the general offensive with around 2.000 men with no 
combat experience whatsoever. By 1984 it had 12.000 men in its ranks, a number 
which approximated 15.000 near the end of the conflict.29  
The war itself constitutes the context within which mediation was to take place. 
It is thus crucial to have knowledge of the "basic game" (see chapter 3), although a 
summary  especially within the limits set for this dissertation  is destined to be short. 
Next follows a synopsis of the conflict before UN mediation began. 
 
2.3. SYNOPSIS OF THE WAR FROM 1980-1990 (before UN mediation) 
On 24 March 1980, Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero (no relation to General 
Romero), who days earlier had called on soldiers to disobey their officers when 
ordered to kill, was shot to death while holding mass. A lone gunman shot him, under 
orders by Major D'Aubuisson. Leftist supporters felt that if even the archbishop was 
not safe, all hope for a negotiated peace was lost. His burial attracted over 100.000 
people, who were fired upon, leaving 600 wounded and 50 dead.  
 On 5 December 1980, the bodies of four U.S. churchwomen who had come to 
El Salvador to work with victims of the war were discovered in a shallow grave  
raped and shot to death. As a consequence, the U.S. suspended $25 million in military 
and economic aid pending an official investigation. The aid, though, was resumed just 
two months later when the FMLN launched a series of major attacks, and Ronald 
Reagan had been elected U.S. President. 
The FMLN's "final offensive" on 10 January 1981 helped the guerrilla 
movement gain credibility as a fighting force. Nevertheless, the offensive was forced 
back by government troops. The battle continued in the countryside. Backed by U.S. 
military "trainers" (not called "advisers," to prevent association with Vietnam; 
Skidmore & Smith, 1992:337), the armed forces carried out sweeping search-and-
destroy missions.30 In 1981 alone, 9.825 civilians were assassinated,31 illustrating the 
                                                 
29 Torres-Rivas, p.222 in Doyle, et.al. (1997). 
30 The "Woerner Report," a secret Pentagon document produced in 1981 by Brig. Gen. Fred Woerner, provides 
an early, critical blueprint for U.S. assistance to the Salvadoran armed forces, recommending support for a 
"strategic victory" against the guerrillas. The report was declassified after an eight-year effort, including 
litigation, by the NSA. (www.hfni.gsehd.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/nsa/publications/elsalvador2/esdoc1.html)  
31 Torres-Rivas, p.220 in Doyle, et.al. (1997). 
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magnitude of the war. The UNHCR reported that the total number of refugees had 
passed 1 million. On 17 December, the Atlacátl Brigade, the Salvadoran army's best-
trained and most well-equipped elite soldiers, massacred more than 1.000 persons in El 
Mozote, Morazán. 
32In February 1982, president Duarte (Christian Democrat; center-right) said he 
would not negotiate with armed groups. The statement came as a result of pressure for 
negotiations from various sectors of society. The FDR-FMLN proposed a dialogue 
with the government and army, but this was rejected. In May 1983, FDR repeated its 
willingness to negotiate without conditions with the Salvadoran and U.S. government, 
but in June the army initiated a military operation, deploying 6.000 soldiers. For the 
following years, FDR-FMLN presented various proposals for a negotiated peace, but 
the government still thought it could win the war without negotiations. Not until 8 
October 1984, in front of the UN's General Assembly, did president Duarte invite the 
FMNL to peace talks. The next month, however, the government rejected the peace 
proposal presented by FDR-FMLN, claming it to be unconstitutional. The 
government's willingness to negotiate seemed to be more for looks than for real. The 
following years were characterized by a series of offensives by both sides, with the left 
presenting numerous peace proposals and the right rejecting them. The war was a kind 
of "cat and mouse" game that clarified the parties' capacities and demonstrated their 
strength. On 21 January 1987, FMLN initiated a national transport strike with almost 
full support all over the country. The FMLN's support, however, was weakened by the 
fact that it continuously attacked strategic targets such as bridges and power stations. 
On 29 January, the FDR-FMLN and the government reached an agreement in which 
colonel Napoleon Avalos was released by FMLN in exchange for 57 political 
prisoners and a promise that 42 wounded guerrilla soldiers could leave the country. 
On 7 August 1987, the five Central American presidents signed the Esquipulas 
II Accords (or Arias Plan) in Guatemala. In it, they committed themselves to promote 
peace in the region. A major limitation, however, was that only the governments 
participated, all of whom had a stake in maintaining the political status in their states. 
Therefore, the Guatemala accord "very much reinforced the presumed dominance of 
                                                 
32 The following paragraphs are based on Lindholm, 1997:46-62. 
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existing governments, by allowing opposition groups to participate only after giving 
up their struggle and their arms. Needless to say, these provisions did not generally 
incorporate the interests of insurgents, especially the contras in Nicaragua and the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation front in El Salvador".33 
The change came in 1989 when FMLN proposed to postpone the presidential 
elections for 6 months to make possible its participation. FMLN was to cooperate with 
Convergéncia Democrática (founded in November 1987) and make way for the 
parliamentary left. At the same time FMLN for the first time mentioned the possibility 
of laying down arms. The junta did not concede. FMLN then initiated a series of 
attacks against the transport system in front of the elections. There was still no 
negotiation at sight, but then several events  both internal and external - combined to 
change the bleak picture and pave the way for UN mediation:  
(1) The victory of ARENA's presidential candidate, Alfredo Cristiani, meant 
and important shift in politics. He was a member of the coffee oligarchy, educated in 
the United States. Many believed that Cristiani, "an athletic playboy without political 
experience" (Skidmore and Smith, 1992:337), would be a puppet for D'Aubuisson and 
right-wing forces. He was, however, "sufficiently insensitive to risk and uniquely 
poised" to break the long deadlock between the military and the oligarchy in El 
Salvador (Juhn, 1998:45). He was, in contrast to Duarte and the Christian Democrats, 
trusted to protect the elites' interests (which were his own as well). "If ever a 
Salvadoran President and party could deliver the large landholders and the FAES [The 
Salvadoran Armed Forces], Cristiani and ARENA were the ones." (Coleman, 
1993:14). Cristiani was helped by the fact that the traditional elites were becoming 
increasingly discontent with the war, for at least two reasons: First, the war had 
weakened the economy. Second, the large landholders had come to see the military's 
power and position grow close to its own. In his inaugural speech, Cristiani invited the 
FMLN to pursue talks without calling for their capitulation, to the surprise of many. 
Cristiani was probably the only one who could aspire to isolate and control the 
extremists, and one of the first among the elites to admit that the war was, at least 
partly, due to past injustice and oppression. This announcement caused Bernard 
                                                 
33 Hopmann (1988): "Case Analysis. Negotiating Peace in Central America." Negotiation Journal 4, no. 4:373. 
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Aronson to point out that "Salvadoran leftists had disappeared for making similar 
statements; for an ARENA president to utter such thoughts was unthinkable" (Juhn, 
1998:48). 
(2) On 31 October 1989, the headquarters of the workers' union, FENASTRAS, 
were blown up, killing 10 persons and leaving 35 wounded. Two days later, FMLN 
informed they would redraw from negotiations in protest against the bombing, for 
which they hold the government responsible. The FMLN's November 11 military 
offensive, El Salvador's "Tet", was the turning point on the road to negotiations. It 
launched what press reports described as the largest offensive of the civil war. For the 
first time, the fighting engulfed parts of the capital. Despite the violence, the FMLN 
had now increased its bargaining power vis-à-vis the government in the mediated 
negotiation to come. (At the outset, two of the five guerrilla groups that were part of 
the FMLN, FPL and FAL, maintained that it was possible to take absolute control of 
the country.34) 
(3) When the situation seemed as bad is it could get, six Jesuit priests were 
killed on the campus of the University of Central America on 16 November. Their 
bodies, along with those of their cook and her daughter, were found perforated by 
bullets. Cristiani publicly acknowledged that members of the army were responsible. 
Many consider these murders the most brutal episode of the war. It was to give the 
peace process an impetus (although I strongly disagree with it being the most brutal 
episode). Even parts of the Salvadoran army and oligarchy thought it too much. It also 
undermined the U.S. alliance with the Salvadoran army. "What died with the Jesuit 
priests was a foreign policy consensus based on the twin premises that the army had 
successfully contained the FMLN and that democracy was being constructed. 
Believing that the armed forces had become an open liability on both counts, Congress 
changed the terms of the debate."35 
With (4) the replacement of the ideological Reagan team with a more pragmatic 
and result-oriented government in USA under the Bush administration, and (5) the 
electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, El Salvador's external "structure" had 
                                                 
34 Gibb, T. and Smyth, F. (1990): ¿Es posible la paz en El Salvador? Un informe sobre las perspectivas para las 
negociaciones y la política de Estados Unidos. Washington Office on Latin America, p.255. 
35 Karl, T.L. (1992); "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution". Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, nr. 2, p.153. 
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changed. With the December 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama and the victory of Violetta 
Barrios de Chamorro in Nicaragua, the U.S. administration lost what rationale 
remained for its El Salvador policy. "Anxious to maintain congressional relations and 
to diminish the salience of Central America on the foreign policy agenda  given the 
momentous changes in Europe  the administration worked with President Cristiani 
and his allies to isolate military hard-liners and strengthen support for negotiations: 
"We believe this is the year to end the war through a negotiated settlement which 
guarantees safe political space for all Salvadorans", Secretary of State James A. Baker 
testified before Congress on February 1, 1990".36 
After the November offensive and Jesuit killings, the parties (the FPL and FAL 
included) realized they had reached a mutually hurting stalemate, i.e. they had reached 
the point where they no longer could escalate their way to victory. There was no hope 
that unilateral measures could lead to a satisfactory outcome. The conflict was thus 
ripe for a negotiated solution. This was the only way out. They needed help, however, 
to resolve the conflict by people who could commit both sides to a negotiated 
agreement (valid spokesmen) since they did not trust each other to commit to any 
agreements achieved on their own.  
Since the conflict had its roots in a domestic insurgency unprovoked from the 
outside, changes in US and Soviet policies toward the conflict were not enough to 
bring peace. Internal conditions had to change as well. In order to achieve a peaceful 
settlement, agreement needed to be reached on a vast complex of topics. On 5 
December 1989, FMLN's Salvador Samayoa and Ana Guadalupe Martínez met with 
Alvaro de Soto in Montreal and formally requested UN participation in the peace 
process. On 31 January, 1990, president Cristiani also requested that the UN's 
Secretary General, Pérez de Cuéllar, personally mediate to resolve the conflict.  
We have now reached the point where this case study begins. In order to answer 
the questions posed in the introduction, however, we first have to develop an analytical 
framework, to which we now turn. 
 
 
                                                 
36 ibid. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Analytical Framework 
A compromise is the art of dividing a cake in such 
 a way that everyone believes he has the biggest piece. 
Ludwig Erhard  
 
3.0. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First (3.1), I will present the most 
essential terminology and analytical concepts to be used throughout the thesis. 
Conceptual clarification is important since what we do not have words for, we cannot 
easily think, much less discuss. Second (3.2), I will see what the scholarly literature 
has to offer in terms of models containing assumptions, propositions and conditions 
for reaching a successful outcome. Third (3.3), based on this literature I will  at a 
general level  summarize the expected findings and relate them to the case of El 
Salvador.  
 
3.1.1. We have to make sure that people think of (largely) the same thing when 
discussing a phenomenon. Ambiguity or imprecision makes it harder to communicate. 
The concepts to be defined in this section are chosen for a specific purpose. If asked 
the following questions: "What are you going to use these concepts for? Why should 
we read about this and not something else?", the answer will be that they may help us 
when predicting possible outcomes. The first concepts to be defined are mediation and 
peacemaking:  
Mediation is a requested attempt by an acceptable third party to non-coercively 
create agreement, or minimize conflict, between two or more parties. It is, in principle, 
voluntary and differs from e.g. arbitration in that the third party has no authoritative 
decision-making power. It should be pointed out that a mediator does not always have 
to be impartial, as long as the parties in conflict trust the mediator.37 Bercovitch and 
Schneider (2000) emphasize that the adversaries accept mediators "not because they 
exemplify an antidote to bias, but because of their perceived ability to influence, 
protect, or extend the interests of each party in conflict. () [They] are seen as being 
                                                 
37 E.g., Kissinger was accepted as a mediator between Israel and both Egypt and Syria after the 1973 war in the 
Middle East, even though he was perceived to be pro-Israeli. This made it possible for him to extract concessions 
from Israel that no one else could have obtained, without Israel believing that he would sell out their most 
fundamental interests (Hopmann, 1998:226). 
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capable of promoting an agreement through the use of leverage, power potential, and 
influence, and not because their protestations of neutrality."38 
The UN has defined peacemaking as the action of bringing hostile parties to 
agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of 
the Charter of the United Nations.39 I will use this definition, even though it may be 
natural to view peacemaking in the same way as mediation, i.e., as an action that may 
fail or succeed in bringing the parties to agreement. The fact that peacemaking seems 
to require an agreement as a result is, of course, not to say that the agreement has to be 
"successful". The concept of "success", as will be discussed in chapter 6, entails much 
more than the mere end of armed conflict. Peacemaking can be singled out as one of 
three dimensions of the peaceful settlement of disputes. The other two dimensions are: 
Peacekeeping: the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all 
the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and 
frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the 
prevention of conflict and the making of peace.40 
 
Peacebuilding: a set of physical, social and structural initiatives which can help to prevent and resolve 
the consequences of conflict, and provide post-hostility structural reconstruction and rehabilitation.41  
 
Of the three, peacebuilding has to be dominant. Peacemaking and peacekeeping can 
only be transitory measures. "They have no long-term or lasting effect as long as the 
peacebuilding factor is missing. Peacebuilding is the healing agent which ensures that 
the structural roots to a conflict are removed".42 All dimensions, or phases, of a 
peaceful settlement are, of course, linked. UN peacemakers must always bear in mind 
that, despite "the many pressures of the initial peacemaking phases, issues left 
unresolved at the outset may later require aggressive, high-profile actions by UN 
peace-builders".43 Thus  as written in the introduction  I shall take one step back and 
focus on the peacemaking role of the UN between 1990-92 in El Salvador. What 
issues were resolved (reached agreement) during the negotiation process? Even though 
building (consolidating) peace is paramount, it is doomed to be extremely difficult if 
                                                 
38 Bercovitch, J. and Schneider, G. (2000): "Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict 
Management." Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 2, p. 149. 
39 An Agenda for Peace. At: http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html 
40 ibid. 
41 Harbottle, Michael & Harbottle, Eirwen (1997): "The Two Faces of Peace Building." Peace and Conflict 
Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, July. At http://www.tcnj.edu/~psm/pcs/manuscripts/harbottl.pdf 
42 ibid. 
43 Holiday, D. and Stanley, W. (1993): "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons From El Salvador." Journal of 
International Affairs 46, no. 2, p. 438. 
 28
the negotiation process leading to the final peace accord (peacemaking) is not 
"successful". In short, if peacemaking fails, it may not be so relevant to talk about 
peacebuilding. The peacemaking role overlaps with the peacekeeping role,44 but I shall 
try to separate these phases from each other. 
 A negotiation is a decision-making process that normally seeks to achieve 
consensus between parties having diverging preferences as to what constitutes a good 
agreement on one or several issues. (Serious) negotiations - with or without a mediator 
- presuppose that there exists a bargaining space45, i.e., overlapping interests making 
agreement possible. In order to determine whether or not there exists a bargaining 
space (whether or not there is anything to negotiate at all), a party has to ask itself: 
What is my Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)?46 This is the best 
one can hope to achieve on one's own or with other parties, without an agreement with 
the party in question. After all, people negotiate because they expect to achieve a 
settlement that is better than other available alternatives. BATNA is often equated with 
an actor's status quo, but one's BATNA is rather a more or less qualified assumption 
regarding the future, and can be changed as the negotiation proceeds. Fisher and Ury 
(1991:183) also talk about a party's micro-BATNA: If no agreement is reached at this 
meeting, what is the best outcome? Naturally, to decide one's own BATNA is easier 
than assessing the BATNA of one's opponent. This uncertainty makes room for 
strategic action and manipulation. 
One's BATNA is not necessarily the same as one's reservation point/resistance 
level, i.e. the point below which an actor cannot/will not go for there to be an 
acceptable agreement. As can be seen from figure 1, it may very well be that a party's 
satisfaction level lies above its BATNA, because a party may aspire or expect to 
achieve more than a minimum agreement. Perceptions and cognitive mechanisms are, 
under all conditions, important factors to be taken into consideration when negotiating 
or mediating. Bargaining is, as Bacharach and Lawler point out, impression 
                                                 
44 As an example, Agenda for Peace, produced by the UN Secretary General in 1992, refers to the military 
performing a peacemaking role. As Harbottle correctly points out, the military cannot make peace; that is the role 
of the diplomat or politician. 
45 Putnam (1988) calls this "win-set". See: "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", 
International Organization. Vol. 42, No. 3:427-460. 
46 Fisher & Ury (1991): Getting To Yes. 
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management. "[The] skillful presentation of power, whether real or cognitive, has 
important consequences for the bargaining relationship and process." (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981:51). 
 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of bargaining space, BATNA and satisfaction level. 
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         +     
          
            Pareto frontier (negotiation set) 
          
            
            SL 
                         A 
          BATNA      + 
 
The figure shows the bargaining space of an issue as situated between the parties' 
BATNA (origo) and the Pareto frontier, also called negotiation set or contract curve. 
This line marks where there are no other solutions better to one party without 
simultaneously being worse for the other. An agreement may be reached somewhere 
between the parties' satisfaction level (SL, stippled line) and BATNA, but  as pointed 
out above  agreement is most likely to be reached anywhere northeast of the 
satisfaction level. Ideally, the parties should move as far as possible along the 
integration line (in the northeastern direction), i.e. to create a solution as good as 
possible (through both cooperation and conflict)  tapping as much as possible of the 
integrative potential. Along the Pareto frontier, however, there will be pure conflict 
and the parties will try to get as big a share as possible for himself/herself.  
 In the negotiation literature, there are two different ideal types of negotiation: 
distributive  (conflictual) and integrative (cooperative). In a distributive negotiation, 
the other side is viewed as an opponent with largely conflicting interests, inclined to 
use any tactical ploy (manipulation, coercion or persuasion) to maximize own gains. 
Typical "moves" are the use of rhetoric, selective (dis)information, commitment to 
own positions, warnings/threats or even outbursts of verbal abuse.47 In this type of 
                                                 
47 These concepts are normally associated with Walton & McKersie. 
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negotiation, the negotiator will try to have the opponent moderate its position.48 The 
Salvadoran negotiations display several of these characteristics. Quantitative (tangible) 
issues, such as the size of the armed forces, often make for distributive negotiations. 
(This, however, is not to say that qualitative issues are more easily negotiated). In a 
cooperative negotiation, the other side is viewed as a partner cooperating to solve a 
mutual problem. This type of negotiation is characterized by a tentative and searching 
approach marked by openness. The only appropriate strategy of influence is 
persuasion, and typical "moves" are to ask questions to make sure one has understood 
the other's (underlying) interests, inform the other of one's own preferences, necessities 
and interests, and be open to propositions from the other side. Both types are 
illustrated in the figure above. "Any movement in a northeasterly direction improves 
efficiency  that is, at least one side is better off without hurting the other; the bargain, 
therefore, is termed "integrative". Any movement along or parallel to the curve 
distributes the gains of the northeasterly moves. Consequently, even in an integrative 
bargain, there is always a distributive question." (Princen, 1992:35). If the gain for one 
equals the loss for the other (along the Pareto frontier), the sum is zero and the term 
"zero-sum" is used.  
In this section we should briefly mention five more concepts which will be used 
when analyzing the UN-mediated peace process in El Salvador, namely concessions, 
commitments, process-generated stakes, basic game and negotiation game: 
 A concession is an accommodating move an actor can make to the other party 
during the negotiation. How the other party reacts to a concession, depends on how it 
interprets the concession. A concession can be interpreted in number of ways. For 
example, a concession may make a party seem weak, in which case the other party's 
negotiation position is likely to toughen.49 It can also be seen as a cause of change in a 
party's incentives. Zeuthen postulates that the "bargainer with the smaller critical risk 
(see 3.1.2.) always makes the next concession. He will concede enough, but only 
enough, to reverse the inequality of critical risks, thus inducing a concession from the 
opponent while giving up as little as possible".50 
                                                 
48 Underdal (1973): "Holdningspåvirkning og interne forhandlinger." Oslo. Institutt for Statsvitenskap, p. 23. 
49 Pillar, 1983:95. Pillar gives a total of seven possible interpretations of a concession. 
50 ibid.:94 
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A commitment is "a firm statement or action intended to signal one's minimum 
position beyond which one may not concede. () Commitments work best when the 
other party is convinced that one is physically or in some other way clearly prevented 
from making further concessions. Often a negotiator will reinforce commitments with 
the threat to walk out of a negotiation rather than to concede." (Hopmann, 1996:63). 
Thus, a commitment can be seen as the degree of dedication to a cause and its 
importance to an actor. Its general function is that of "adding credibility to a certain 
message concerning one's preferences and positions".51 
The concept of process-generated stakes is particularly relevant when talking 
about the "success" or "failure" of a negotiation. In short, the concept implies that the 
negotiation (or mediation process) itself "tends to create certain stakes  a pot of 
potential gains and losses  extraneous to those constituted by the explicit negotiation 
issues".52 In other words, the process itself may generate positive and negative effects, 
irrespective of the nature of the issues. For example, any threats and attempts at 
manipulation provoke the other party and are likely to deteriorate the negotiation 
climate.  
Finally, we can draw a line between the basic game and the negotiation game. 
These concepts largely correspond to "context" and "process" in the contingency 
model (3.2). I shall define basic game in concordance with the way Midgaard 
(1971:12) uses the term, namely as the game (or situation) comprising the basis of the 
negotiations, and which the negotiations aim to resolve. The character of the basic 
game is likely to influence the course of the negotiation game (negotiations). A change 
or development in the basic game may affect the players' expectations and attitudes in 
the negotiation game, not to mention how they perceive the nature of the dispute and 
each other. One party may be able to compensate its weak power in the basic game by 
manipulating the relative power of positions in the negotiation game or by appealing to 
internationally recognized norms and objective criteria. Normally, a party's reduction 
in commitments will lead to increased toughness in the negotiation game, since a low 
interest in the outcome makes it easier to withdraw. If B is dependent on reaching an 
                                                 
51 Underdal (1983): "Causes of Negotiation "Failure"". European Journal of Political Research, 11:190. 
52 ibid. 
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agreement with A on some issue  other things being equal  A has the strongest 
bargaining position. The opposite, however, can also occur, i.e. that a great interest in 
the outcome can lead to increased (toughened) negotiation power. If the issues concern 
honour, values or something as essential as continued existence or autonomy, a 
(desperate) party has strong incentives to lead tough negotiations. Also, fractionation 
may increase a position's relative strength in the negotiations, because a party can say: 
"I would like to comply with your demands, but group X will never accept that" (cf. 
Putnam's two-level game (1988)). 
 
3.1.2. Narrowing the settlement range 
Whereas the concepts in the previous section may help us in determining possible 
outcomes, others may be useful in predicting which alternative (out of several 
possible) that is most likely to be chosen, and thus which outcome is most plausible. 
Critical risk, i.e., the highest risk for negotiation breakdown a party is willing to 
accept in an attempt to reach its goal(s), is such a concept. It is frequently applied in 
both negotiation literature and game theory. This term is reserved for pure distributive 
negotiations only, and has to do with the relative strength of bargaining positions.  
When an actor has the last move in a negotiation game, the choice is binary: 
Either one accepts the opponent's offer or one stands put, risking negotiation 
breakdown. How big a risk, then, is an actor likely to accept and still not yield in a 
negotiation?53 Of course, if one does not acquiesce, the solution will either be 
according to one's own proposal (UA - the utility of actor A) or a breakdown (WA) - 
regarded as worst by both/all parties. Likewise, the outcome if one gives in will be the 
opponent's offer (VA). The condition for standing put can be illustrated as follows: 
 
[UA*P] + [WA* (1-P) ] ≥ VA      (1) 
 
This equation is simply a parsimonious way of indicating mathematically that the 
expected value of standing put has to be greater or equal to the acceptance of the 
opponent's offer (P standing for probability) if one decides to stand put. The value of 
(1-P) - whatever this is - is referred to as the critical risk.  
                                                 
53 In game theory, critical risk is normally related to a Chicken game, that is, a contest of nerves. 
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Another way of reasoning which yields the same result is to ask the question: 
What can I win by standing put? Obviously, it will be the value attached to my own 
solution or proposal minus that of the opponent: (UA  VA). The bigger the difference, 
the larger the payoff will be. Similarly, I can ask myself: What can I lose by standing 
put? Generally, this is the value of my opponent's offer minus my BATNA (VA  WA). 
I will then try to assess the relationship between possible gains and losses. The more I 
have to win compared to what I might lose, the larger a risk for breakdown I am 
willing to accept, and the stronger my position will be in the negotiation. In short: 
WaVa
VaUa
−
−  (2) 
The actor for whom the proportion or fraction is largest, will  everything else being 
equal  have the strongest negotiation power. (The weaker party should then make a 
unilateral concession.) Both ways of reasoning leads to the Nash-solution: the 
alternative that maximizes the product of what both parties can win (above their 
respective BATNAs). 
When discussing which alternative that is most likely to be chosen, focal point 
is a concept which may also be useful. Schelling (1960) argued that actors "tend to 
converge on focal points, i.e. solutions that stand out from others as in some 
unambiguous way unique  e.g. a round number, a prominent geographical feature, a 
firmly established convention or practice, etc."54 
To analyze the Salvadoran negotiations and the peace process, we will  in 
addition to concepts from negotiation theory  need to find or develop a model that can 
help us structure the analysis of the mediation process. Where should we look for 
useful guidelines? 
 
3.2. A Contingency Model of Mediation 
The study of the relationship between mediation and its outcome traditionally 
seems to have two diverging "branches": the anecdotal, descriptive single case and the 
normative approach (Bercovitch and Houston, 1995:14f). Those belonging to the 
former emphasize the unique aspects of mediation and the hopelessness of generating 
                                                 
54 In Underdal (1997): Modelling the International Climate Change Negotiations: A Non-Technical Outline of 
Model Architecture. Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo, p. 7. 
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any valuable conclusions about mediation outcomes across a large number of cases. 
To Meyer, for instance, the "task of the mediator is not an easy one. The sea that he 
sails is only roughly charted and its changing contours are not clearly discernible. He 
has no science of navigation, no fund inherited from the experience of others. He is a 
solitary artist recognising at most a few guiding stars and depending on his personal 
powers of divination" (1960:161; cited in Bercovitch and Houston 1995:14). 
The representatives of the normative approach, on the other hand, "offer in a 
fairly generic fashion a set of recommendations that, if pursued, could lead to 
successful outcomes in all types of disputes from the interpersonal to the international" 
(ibid.). Roger Fisher seems to be one of the most-cited representatives of this approach 
(see e.g. Fisher & Ury: Getting To Yes). Intuitively, both approaches seem too 
categorical. For instance, one of the larger problems that many UN officials have 
acknowledged regarding the UN operations, is that there is "no institutional learning 
curve. There is no way for the lessons drawn from each mission to be absorbed, 
disseminated, and incorporated into future [peace] missions".55 As a result, "missions 
have a tendency to repeat many of the mistakes of their predecessors. The United 
Nations, as an organization, must find a way to address this problem because 
reinventing the wheel costs time, money and productivity and, too often, produces 
unnecessary frustration among officials who are working 10-16 hour days".56 Thus, a 
large problem is that of, in practice, having "no science of navigation, no fund 
inherited from the experience of others", but  evidently - it does not have to be this 
way. Without being blue-eyed, giving generic, all-encompassing recommendations for 
conflict resolution irrespective of the conflict's complexity, I believe some general 
recommendations can always be given. The UN can, by actively using its historical 
baggage, extract lessons that may (after careful considerations  being conscious of the 
idiosyncrasies of a new situation) be used in other missions. As Bercovitch and 
Houston (1995:14ff) convincingly argue, we should, then, discard both traditions 
because they do not offer a reliable explanation of when mediation succeeds and why. 
The first tradition is erroneously saying that there is nothing to study at all, and thus 
                                                 
55 Montgomery, TS. (1995): "Getting to peace in El Salvador: The roles of the United Nations secretariat and 
ONUSAL." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 37, nr. 4, p.164. 
56 ibid. (my emphasis) 
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nothing to learn from. The second tradition is erroneously assuming that no problem is 
too difficult for an experienced third party to solve.57  
Without referring to these traditions, Zartman58 distinguishes between 5 
different "families" in the analysis of the negotiation process: structural analysis 
(focusing on power relations), strategic analysis (as portrayed in game theoretic 
matrices), process analysis (explaining outcomes through a series of concessions 
determined by some element inherent in each party's position), behavioural analysis 
(focusing on the negotiators and mediators themselves), and integrative analysis 
(emphasizing "the imprecision of parties' interests in their own minds"). A more 
detailed account of these approaches cannot be given within the boundaries of this 
dissertation. The interested reader is thus recommended to consult Zartman's article. 
Suffice it to say that these approaches display different ways of talking about the same 
phenomenon, and should be regarded as complementary - reinforcing and building on 
each other. Consequently, the analysis of a negotiation or mediation process and its 
outcome should not be an either/or-choice. Rather, an analysis ought to be dependent 
or contingent on all of them, without  of course  becoming eclectic. For that reason, 
I find the contingency model of mediation of Bercovitch and Houston (1995) to be a 
useful guiding star for my study. It incorporates all the necessary elements just 
mentioned that must be considered to understand a mediation outcome. I agree that 
this model (see figure 3.2) "offers a useful framework by which to organize and 
integrate much of the literature on mediation" (p.15). This is so because: 
To identify all the factors that may influence mediation outcomes and mediator behavior, to analyze and 
assess their relative importance, we need to develop a broad conceptual framework that can subsume the 
versatility of mediators' behaviors, guide our research, and allow us to integrate our findings. The approach that 
allows us best to develop theoretical insights and engage in empirical analysis is the contingency approach.59  
 
The contingency approach has its roots in the social-psychological theories of 
negotiation as developed by Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) and modified by Druckman 
                                                 
57 The disagreement between these competing traditions resembles that of the original disagreement between 
agitators of qualitative vs. quantitative methods. Today, most scientists acknowledge that there is no either/or-
choice, and argue that  in order to obtain as valid and reliable results as possible, both should be combined. In 
tradition with Aristoteles, we should always try to find the Golden Middle Way, or (in Hegelian terms) look to 
reconcile in a synthesis the disparity between thesis/anti-thesis. 
58 Zartman, I. William (1988): "Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process." Negotiation 
Journal, vol.4, no. 1, pp.31-43. 
59 Bercovitch and Houston (2000): "Why Do They Do It Like This?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 44, 
no.2, p.172. 
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(1977).60 In the (somewhat repetitive) words of Bercovitch and Houston, their 
combined approach 
provides a framework that permits a systematic analysis of the underlying structures and conditions that 
shape conflict events and the complex relationship of the conflict management process. The framework 
developed takes account of the individual influences of personal, role, situational, goal, interactional, and 
outcome variables and their interactive effects within the context, process, and outcome of conflict management. 
The contingency framework is particularly useful in the study of mediation. It offers a dynamic framework of 
interactive and reciprocal behaviors. It provides a reproducible model of mediation that permits 
operationalization and analysis of individual contextual clusters, their interaction, and relative importance within 
conflict management. This approach also provides a useful tool for scholars by offering a framework within 
which they can diagnose and analyze mediators' behavior and decisions and determine the appropriateness of 
various strategies in their interventions.61 
  
Figure 3.2:  A Contingency Model of Mediation (Based on Bercovitch & Houston 1995:15; 
  2000:173) 
 Antecedent Conditions  Current Conditions Consequent Conditions 
 
         Context           Process            Outcomes 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Their basic model has been the same over the years with three principal stages: the 
antecedent, current, and consequent stages. I have, however, added two context 
(antecedent) variables to the original model, namely the nature of the international 
system and the institutional setting. The role of the US as the main actor in the 
international system during and after the Cold War - in its "Own Backyard" - must in 
our case not be forgotten. Likewise, the institutional setting (i.e. who negotiates what, 
when, where and how) may influence the mediation process. This non-recursive model 
illustrates the dynamic nature of negotiation and mediation. It shows, as was pointed 
out in the introduction (on methodology), that mediation is not a linear cause-and-
effect sequence. It is a reciprocal process. Mediation outcomes (consequent 
conditions), whether successful or not, are logically seen as the result of the interaction 
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of context and process variables. In an article62 from 2000, Bercovitch and Houston 
add an arrow from the outcome back to both process and context variables. It seems 
only natural that the outcome (especially if no final agreement is achieved) may, in 
turn, change or influence the context (such as parties' perceptions) and mediator 
strategies in following rounds of mediation. In their latest article, however, the 
reciprocal relationship between context and process seems to have been graphically 
lost (with an arrow going only from context to process, thus making the model 
recursive). Consequently, the model displayed here is a slightly modified combination 
of the models used by Bercovitch and Houston in 1995 and 2000 respectively. 
Let us, then, take a closer look at the various stages. The model shows 5 context 
variables (not in any hierarchical order). I shall begin with the nature of the mediator, 
since the mediator (together with its actions) is the focus of this dissertation. It can 
easily be thought of as a variable affecting the mediation process, and thereby the 
outcome. Several mediator attributes or values can be of importance, such as mediator 
rank and authority, identity, previous relationship with the parties, knowledge and a 
whole array of other personal characteristics. Mediators have "different ranks and 
possess different resources, both of which they use in different ways in different 
disputes" (Bercovitch and Houston, 1995:27). Mediators can be ranked from 
government leaders and representatives of regional and international organizations to 
private individuals. It is worth to notice that regional organizations have the best 
success rate when it comes to mediation outcome, while the UN has a very poor record 
in the area of mediation. Therefore, taking a closer look at why the UN evidently 
succeeded in El Salvador should be very interesting.63 Furthermore, high-ranking 
mediators often have more legitimacy, and can more easily create an environment of 
credibility and trust. In short, a high-ranking mediator can carry more weight. 
Moreover, "ideological position and cultural similarity"64 can influence both the choice 
of a mediator, mediator strategies and the mediation outcome. Cultural likeness 
                                                 
62 Bercovitch and Houston (2000): "Why Do They Do It Like This?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 44, 
no.2, p.173. 
63 One could argue that regional organizations always mediate within the same cultural system, and that this 
facilitates agreement, whereas the UN normally deals with more intractable conflicts that are not easily 
mediated. The nature of the dispute thus has to be taken into consideration. 
64 Bercovitch and Schneider (2000): "Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict 
Management". Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 2, p. 150. 
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between mediator and adversaries provides a kind of safety net for all participants in 
conflict, and thereby they may be more likely to engage in meaningful negotiations. 
Common bonds, history, values and interest all create a notion of familiarity, trust and 
understanding which is important for the effectiveness of mediation. Bercovitch and 
Houston found that those mediators who came from the same bloc as both parties had 
a significantly higher chance of being successful than mediators from the same bloc as 
one of the parties only (Bercovitch and Houston, 1995:28). 
To bring to bear any degree of influence, mediators need leverage or resources 
to "search for information and move the parties away from rigid positions. Leverage or 
resources buttress the mediator's ability to facilitate a successful outcome through the 
balancing of power discrepancies and enhancing of cooperative behavior. () These 
strategies are most successful, as Touval and Zartman (1985) observe, not when a 
mediator is unbiased or impartial but when he/she possesses resources that either 
disputant values." (ibid.:26). A list of desired personal characteristics would be very 
long, but let us nevertheless mention some: intelligence, stamina, energy, patience, 
active listening, a sense of humour, creativity, sense of timing, communications skills, 
etc.  
The next context variable in the model is the nature of the parties. The parties' 
power relative to each other is normally cited as having a profound effect on the 
effectiveness of the mediation process. The most general conviction (which is also 
supported empirically) is that the more symmetrical power relations are, the more 
effective mediation is. Negotiations under conditions of asymmetry are, according to 
Zartman, a paradox, because "one of the basic findings about the negotiation process is 
that it functions best under conditions of equality, and indeed only takes place when 
the parties have some form of mutual veto over outcomes. That alone explains why so 
few internal wars are settled by negotiation." (Zartman, 1995:8). Previous relations 
between the parties also have to be taken into consideration. Bercovitch and Houston 
(1995:22) distinguish between five categories: friendly, antagonistic (unfriendly but 
without previous conflict), conflictual (previous low-level conflict), one previous 
dispute between the parties, and more than one previous dispute. Not astonishingly, 
they find that where the parties' previous relationship is friendly, the probability of 
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successful mediation is much higher than if the previous relationship is more 
constrained.  
 
When speaking of party characteristics, it seems pertinent to briefly point out the four 
ideal negotiating types or styles identified by Hopmann (1998:136-138), when 
discussing the negotiators' personality. They have been organized in table 1. 
 
Table 3.1: Negotiating styles (from Hopmann, 1998:136-138) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Whether or not the parties in dispute have a different culture or religion, and  
whether or not they are internally disunited, are also factors that influence the 
mediation process and its outcome. Bercovitch and Houston (1995:21) find that where 
one or both parties have no significant cultural minority, the chances of successful 
Negotiators employing the factual style are  
"likely to be historically or past-oriented, claiming that facts speak for themselves. During the course of
negotiations, this kind of person is likely to point to past statements of the other side, perhaps calling
attention to inconsistencies between present statements and prior ones. () They are likely to be perceived
by others as lacking imagination, being unable to see the big picture, relying too heavily on past
experiences, and having difficulty comprehending conceptual arguments and possible solutions to
problems". 
 
The second negotiation style involves intuitive individuals that  
"tend to believe that "imagination can solve any problem". These individuals generally focus on the broad
issues and seek creative and imaginative solutions to problems.  They tend to be future-oriented, often
believing that the historical roots of problems are irrelevant or even a hindrance to problem solving.  ()
They may be perceived by others as imprecise and unrealistic, not very practical, and willing to proceed on
the basis of incomplete or inaccurate information." 
 
Normative individuals, the third style,  
"tend to view negotiations as bargaining. These individuals have a clear sense of personal values  right and
wrong, good and bad, likes and dislikes  through which issues may be evaluated. They may view
negotiations as a contest between these values and are likely to try to steer the outcome toward normative
correct solutions. () These kinds of individuals are likely to be most effective in negotiations that entail
concession-convergence; power-oriented bargaining rather than problem solving. On the other hand, they
are likely to be perceived by other negotiators as highly subjective, as lacking a logical or empirical basis
for their proposed solutions, and as being overly critical of others." 
 
Analytical individuals, the final style, 
"tend to believe fundamentally that "logic leads to the right conclusions". These kinds of individuals tend to
break issues down into their parts and then search for ways to recombine them that will produce
breakthroughs in negotiations. They tend to use an instrumental, linear reasoning process that emphasizes
the analysis of cause and effect, and the relationships between parts and wholes. They like to dissect the
positions of the participants in negotiations to identify underlying interests and the logical structure of their
argument, while criticizing logical error on the part of other participants. These individuals tend to be
especially effective in several roles." 
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mediation are as high as 64.4 percent. Where one or both parties have a significant 
cultural minority, the chances of mediation success are "only" 38.4 percent. Moreover, 
we can assume that the more hostile and numerous the factions, the more difficult the 
peace process will be, and the more international assistance is needed to establish and 
secure peace. (In El Salvador, culture and religion were not of any importance, since 
the parties shared the same customs and beliefs. Internal fractionation may, however, 
have mattered.) Naturally, parties from different political, economic, cultural and 
religious systems may be more likely to distrust each other, which brings us to the next 
"antecedent" variable: 
 The nature of the dispute is probably the most essential factor influencing the 
mediation process and the chances of reaching a peaceful agreement. The duration of a 
conflict and its intensity, as well as the number and complexity of the issues at stake 
largely condition mediation efforts, but do not necessarily predetermine the outcome. 
The intensity of a conflict can be explained by a number of factors, such as 
  the severity of prior conflict, the level of hostilities, the number of fatalities, the level of anger and 
intensity of feeling, the types of issues at stake, and the strength of the parties' negative perceptions (Kressel and 
Pruitt 1989). Many of these dimensions involve subjective interpretations of emotions, anger, hatred, revenge, 
and moral justifications of behavior and influence the parties' negotiating behavior and level of urgency and 
commitment to settling their conflict. As the intensity of a conflict increases, so does the influence of these 
subjective factors on disputant behavior. As a result, many elements in a conflict are open to misinterpretations 
and miscommunication by the parties involved (Fisher and Keashly 1991).65 
 
To begin with, we can make at least two assumptions:  The probability of peacemaking 
is lower the greater the number of deaths because the intensity is likely to increase 
hostility and further polarize the parties. Partly in contrast to this, I posit  ceteris 
paribus - that the likelihood of peacemaking is higher the longer the war lasts because 
at some point the adversaries are likely to get tired, experience fatigue and yearn for 
peace. As Doyle and Sambanis66 state: "Longer wars offer a chance for the parties to 
learn by reflecting on the benefits of peace and by controlling war-related hostility."  
When discussing the issues in dispute, we can separate between tangible and 
intangible issues. The tangible ones can be measured in some way (e.g. money, 
territory, size of the armed forces, etc.), while the intangible ones reflect questions of 
                                                 
65 Bercovitch and Houston (2000): "Why Do They Do It Like This?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 44, 
no.2, p.177. 
66 Doyle and Sambanis (2000): "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." 
American Political Science Review, Vol.94, No.4, p.785. 
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beliefs, values and principles. Their number and complexity affect the mediation 
process and mediation outcome. It seems obvious that the greater the complexity of the 
issues in dispute, the less likely that mediation will be successful. As Sebenius67 shows, 
though, finding ways of adding (or subtracting) issues (current stage) can be desirable, 
necessary and possible. Sebenius illustrates how, theoretically, issues and parties can 
be added or subtracted at the negotiation table. The experienced mediator will see 
common ground and possible linkages where less experienced mediators cannot. To 
link issues together and thus work with a "package" may be advantageous if separate 
interests can be united  either because one has not previously thought of possibilities 
for trade off, or because one can use power to force an issue onto the negotiation table 
by changing/manipulating a party's alternatives,68 or possibly compensate a loss. If 
party A has a strong preference for issue 1 while B has not, and if B has a strong 
preference for issue 2 while A has not, the two issues may be combined  B letting A 
"win" on issue 1 and A letting B "win" on issue 2. Where an agreement seems 
impossible in isolation, linkage of issues may make an agreement attainable. Also, by 
focusing on interests instead of positions in the mediation process (current stage)69, a 
seemingly intractable conflict might be solved. The most-cited example of this is the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed at Camp David in 1978. Israel insisted on keeping 
some of the Sinai, while Egypt insisted that Sinai be returned to them. Looking to their 
interests instead of their positions (which focused on territorial boundaries) revealed 
that Israel's interest lay in security while Egypt's interest lay in sovereignty. Thus the 
parties agreed to demilitarize Sinai. That way Israel did not feel its security so 
threatened and Egypt could put its flag there.   
The nature of the dispute, the nature of the parties and the political context all 
have to be analyzed in order to assess whether or not aggregation - or disaggregation  
of issues is the best way to find a solution. In the next chapter we shall see whether or 
not trade-offs were made in the Salvadoran negotiations; and if so, what the effects 
were. 
                                                 
67 Sebenius, James K. (1983): "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and subtracting issues and parties". International 
Organization, 37: 281-316 
68 Cf. what was said in section 3.1.1 on the relationship between the basic game and the negotiation game. 
69 see Fisher & Ury (1991): Getting To Yes, chapter 3. 
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As we saw in the preceding chapter, the nature of El Salvador's civil war was 
internally one-dimensional, caused by systematic socio-economic polarization. 
Externally, however, the war was propagandized as a war between capitalism and 
communism. Unfortunately, since the latter largely reinforced the former cleavage, the 
ripe moment70 for mediation was postponed for several years. The nature of the 
international system can consequently have an influential effect on the mediation 
situation. The actions of the US formed (and still form) a structure that limits the 
actions of many countries in the world. 
Let us finally mention the institutional setting. As briefly mentioned under 
figure 1, this involves factors such as who negotiates what, when, where and how. 
Diverging preferences regarding each of these questions is likely to affect the 
mediation process as a whole. For one thing, the mandate of the negotiators and the 
mediator influences behaviour and thus potentially the outcome. When one negotiates 
on behalf of others, one is an agent in relation to a principal and can therefore seldom 
do just as one pleases. The mandate needs to be sufficiently embracing to enable the 
parties and the mediator to actively pursue a peaceful settlement. Negotiators and 
mediators have to be empowered to actively solve a conflict, not for the sake of 
agreement per se, but to increase the possibility of inventing options and generating 
creative solutions that a restricted/tied mandate might inhibit. Certainly, a restricted 
mandate may be of strategic value (increasing one's negotiation power) in a 
distributive negotiation, but a "free" mandate provides flexibility. Flexibility, of 
course, is important in complex peace negotiations.    
Who are valid representatives of the parties? How many should be allowed to 
participate in the negotiations? How should the negotiations be organized? Should 
they be open (in public) or secret? Closed-doors diplomacy is often cited as the key to 
successful peace talks because then the parties do not have the same incentives to 
make propagandistic statements in public, and can talk more freely. Where should the 
negotiations take place (a neutral meeting ground is preferable) and when should one 
                                                 
70 Hampson (1996:210ff; 229) argues that "ripeness" should be more accurately viewed as a cultivated condition 
that has to be sustained to prevent the peace process from sliding back into violence. The actors may in fact 
regard a stalemate as a strong reason to keep on fighting because neither side is in imminent danger of defeat. In 
an article, Pruitt (1997) also criticizes the use of  "ripeness" saying that it should be viewed as a variable rather 
than a state. 
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enter into negotiations? The latter question leads us to the second stage of the 
contingency model of mediation  the current condition or mediation process itself. 
Initiation of mediation depends on the expectations of future gains and losses. If a 
warring party expects to strengthen its position on the battlefield, serious negotiations 
will have to wait.71 Likewise, expectations of a weakened position may precipitate a 
party to initiate negotiations right away. In the case of El Salvador, the fact that the 
war resisted more than a decade of negotiations shows that, during this time, at least 
one of the parties thought war was the best option. In the final pages of chapter 2, we 
saw why and when, in the final months of 1989, serious negotiations became possible.  
In the model we have put emphasis on mediation behaviour. Since our focus is 
on the UN as peacemaker, it is natural to elaborate on some of the ways the UN can 
influence the process within the negotiation game. Behaviour obviously matters. In 
distributive negotiations, the "iron law of bargaining" (i.e., the inherent danger in the 
process of blocking or spoiling the integrative potential) is likely to obstruct the 
realization of joint gains (e.g. due to mistrust), making discourse and communicative 
action (cf. Habermas) improbable. Rather than trying to persuade through arguments, 
the parties are inclined to make threats and/or promises. The way these are interpreted 
in the negotiation process largely determines the climate of the negotiations. If, for 
instance, a promise is interpreted as a bribe, the atmosphere will most likely 
deteriorate. The previously mentioned concepts of concessions, commitments and 
process generated incentives, are especially relevant when referring to the negotiation 
game. The mediator has an important task in reducing suspicion. Peace gestures 
(concession) under conditions of great uncertainty and suspicion, for example, will 
probably be rejected as a trick.  
Hopmann (1998:231-242) distinguishes between 5 different roles a mediator 
can play to help the parties reach agreement. These are the roles of (1) process 
facilitator, (2) facilitator of communication, compromise and convergence, (3) 
facilitator of cognitive change, (4) formulator, and (5) manipulator. I believe it is 
valuable to be cognizant of these roles when analyzing the role of the UN in El 
                                                 
71 Negotiations may, of course, be used only as a tactical means of building up one's forces and prepare for 
further offensives. 
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Salvador in the following chapters. Hopmann spends 12 pages giving quite a detailed 
account of them, so I will have to extract the essentials: 
 (1) The process facilitator offers his/her services to the disputants and attempts 
to create an atmosphere conducive to reaching an agreement. This procedure is often 
called the provision of good offices. Providing a place for the parties to meet and the 
logistical support for their negotiations may be an important element in the work of the 
facilitator. If bargaining space does not exist, the facilitator may "suggest ways of 
creating bargaining space, such as possible linkages and tradeoffs between 
nonnegotiable issues that, when combined, may produce negotiable packages of 
issues." If this fails, the facilitator can at least try to find face saving ways of ending 
the negotiation with "as little residual hard feeling as possible". In short, the role of the 
process facilitator is limited to improving the process so that the parties can reach 
agreement and deal with disagreement in as friendly and business-like of an 
atmosphere as possible. 
(2) The facilitator of communication, compromise and convergence is most 
often used in distributive negotiations. In order to avoid seeming weak so as not to be 
a victim of exploitation, each party will normally try to appear firm and unbending, 
often making too rigid commitments to unreasonable positions The role of the 
mediator, then, is to facilitate "mutual and simultaneous flexibility". As in the 
Egyptian-Israeli conflict leading to the Camp David agreement in 1978, the mediator 
may start out with clarifying the basic interests of the parties as well as their BATNAs. 
In other words, the mediator may have to provide the channels to "help the parties to 
communicate basic information that normally needs to be shared for negotiations to be 
successful, but where full and open sharing of information may otherwise produce 
fears of possible exploitation. Once mutual concessions have begun, the mediator tries 
to facilitate a process of reciprocal (or tit-for-tat) changes in positions, leading toward 
convergence." As one strategy, this mediator type can try to pass on concessions by 
one party as if they were the mediator's own proposals. It may be emotionally easier 
for a party to judge a proposal when made by the mediator rather than by that party's 
enemy. 
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(3) The third mediator role is that of facilitator of cognitive change. Rather than 
trying to persuade the parties to change their positions on an issue, in this case the 
mediator can try to have the parties change their preferences themselves through 
seeing the problem in a new light. According to Hopmann, this kind of mediation is 
likely to be most important in those negotiations where stalemate seems to be caused 
"more by different perceptions of the same issues, misunderstandings, or other 
psychological or personality factors, rather than by conflicts of interest." Often, this 
type of mediation is referred to as conciliation. The mediator attempts to modify the 
actors' perceptions of each other and to "influence them to make concessions by 
clarifying to each his opponent's views and the bargaining situation that both face". Of 
course, when the parties are imbued with mistrust, scepticism and anger, this may 
require a substantial cognitive change, something which cannot be achieved in short 
time, but which nevertheless will be necessary to break a vicious cycle. 
(4) A fourth mediating role is the formulator. This is a person who helps the 
parties to invent new solutions to their problems. Redefining the issues in conflict and 
finding a formula for its resolution may be the key to solving the problems. 
 "The mediator as a formulator helps the two parties help themselves, by tactful, sympathetic, accurate, 
straightforward prodding and suggestion." Arthur Lall, an experienced Indian diplomat, has suggested that third-
party intervention is most likely to take the form of proposing solutions to the dispute when the parties find that 
their dispute has become so emotionally charged that face-to-face negotiations are not only doomed to fail, but 
may even enhance mutual hatred. () In those circumstances a mediator, conciliator or good officer becomes 
more than an intermediary. He takes on the substantive function of a maker of proposals or suggestions." 
(Hopmann, 1998:237-238). 
 
In this thesis, it will be relevant to discuss and analyze the ways the UN, as a third 
party mediator, tried to influence and actually influenced the parties' values attached to 
their respective conditions for peace. Consequently, communication must be a key 
word. Subsumed under the formulator role we can consider the single negotiating text 
as a particular means of communication. In the words of the experienced Peruvian 
UN-negotiator, Alvaro de Soto, this technique "consists of consulting with the parties 
on each issue and subsequently submitting a text to them, as far as possible 
simultaneously, and then discussing it with each of them separately and revising it in 
light of their reactions so as to narrow down differences, repeating the exercise as 
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many times as necessary."72 This method has several advantages: It avoids that the 
parties lock themselves into positions because it is easier to make a concession in 
private to the mediator than it is to concede openly to the other side, it focuses on 
solutions, and it reduces the number of decisions the parties have to make during the 
mediation process (Rognes, 1999:88).  
(5) The fifth and final role for the mediator is that of manipulator. This type of 
mediator uses his/her leverage and introduces "resources of power, influence, and 
persuasion that can be brought to bear on the parties to move them to agreement". Of 
course, this is a role that can only be played by a powerful mediator. The manipulating 
mediator may be especially able to "(1) control the timing and sequencing of 
concessions and other negotiating moves; (2) control information available to the 
parties; (3) exert influence to move the negotiations forward in directions favored by 
the mediator; and (4) manipulate the international environment in ways that may affect 
the outcome of the negotiations" (Hopmann, 1998:240). In the empirical case study we 
shall se how target dates (not deadlines!) were used to put pressure on the parties. 
There are, consequently, a number of roles a mediator can play, and often 
he/she will have to play several roles during the mediation process. Bercovitch and 
Houston emphasize the use of matching mediator behaviour to the right type of 
conflict. In his model of a mediator's strategic choices, Carnevale73 makes the 
assumption (one out of five) that the choice of a strategy is dependent on the relative 
strength of two variables: the mediator's perception of common ground, and the value 
that mediators place on the disputants achieving their aspirations (i.e., achieving some 
benefit at least as high as their reservation value). By dichotomising each variable, 
Carnevale's model predicts four main strategies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 de Soto (1999): "Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador". Chapter 14 in Herding Cats, p.359. 
73 Carnevale, Peter J.D. (1986): "Strategic Choice in Mediation." Negotiation Journal, 2: p.53. 
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Figure 3.3: Strategic Choice Model of Mediator Action (Carnevale, 1986:53) 
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Carnevale further assumes that (1) mediators want to see the disputants come to 
agreement, (2) that they have all four strategies available to them, (3) that there is 
economy of action in mediator behaviour, (4) and that the selection of a strategy 
generally rules out selection of another at the same point in time. This model is highly 
related to our general contingency model of mediation (figure 3.2). If we picture 
looking at the mediation process (second stage in the general model) through a 
magnifier, we get, as one possibility, Carnevale's model.  
 Finally, in relation to process variables  and as a natural extension of the 
previous paragraphs - we should mention leadership and coordination. Leadership can 
be defined as an "asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or 
directs the behavior of others toward a certain goal over a certain period of time".74 
The UN being the leader and coordinator of the Salvadoran peace process carried out 
an instrumental type of leadership, i.e. finding means to achieve common ends. 
Leadership (viewed as a function of available resources/capabilities and structural 
positions75) and the way it is exercised, affects how the negotiation game develops. 
We can assume that "clever" leadership reduces the negative effects of e.g. internal 
fractionation and issue complexity.  
Bercovitch and Schneider76 suggest that "quasi-multilateral" attempts to 
mediate tend to be more effective than "single-actor interventions", and argue that a 
multi-actor mediation team has more credibility. This contrasts the opinion of UN-
                                                 
74 Underdal (1994): "Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management". Chapter 8 in Zartman (ed.): 
International Multilateral Negotiation, p.178. 
75 ibid. 
76 Bercovitch and Schneider (2000): "Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict 
Management". Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 157-158. 
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mediator Alvaro de Soto, who argues that collective mediation usually does not work. 
He actually regards it as a contradiction in terms, "like one hand clapping".77 The 
reason for this is that mediators can easily be played off one against the other: 
"Negotiations of a multidisciplinary character  a common feature in complex internal conflict  stand 
the best chance of success if they are unequivocally controlled by a single, clearly identified mediator. 
Second-guessing a mediator is a dangerous game for it can undermine the mediation itself."78 
 
The contradiction can probably be moderated by Bercovitch and Schneider's somewhat 
dubious measure of "effectiveness", and the percentage basis for the most effective 
mediation team size. The effectiveness of a team of 4 mediators (80%) supersedes all 
others, but actual cases only make up 1.38% (10 of 723) of all mediations, so the 
results can hardly be generalized. If, however, one or several states join forces with an 
IGO, then the expected success rate exceeds the average  a finding that de Soto, as is 
seen in the next chapter, surely would agree with.  
 
3.3. Expected findings  
Many scientific works start out with a set of hypotheses, succinctly stating expected 
findings, which the study aims to test. As we have just seen, there are plentiful factors 
(external and internal) influencing the mediation process and its outcome. Several of 
these factors may in turn be influenced by the process itself and by any (partial) 
settlements  thus the non-recursive contingency model of mediation was chosen as 
this study's general model. It is difficult to generalize about the conditions under which 
mediation will succeed and about the extent to which resources spent result in desired 
outcomes. On a general basis, we can only say that the interplay of factors mentioned 
in the preceding section will matter. How the various variables interact is thus an 
empirical question, and a fairly complex one too. As Underdal79 points out, the 
"impact of factors like tactical skill, process-generated stakes, and path-dependency 
are notoriously hard to determine empirically, even though most inside observers 
would agree that they can play a significant role in shaping outcomes." Nonetheless, a 
                                                 
77 de Soto (1999): "Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador" Chapter 14 in Herding Cats. Multiparty Mediation in 
a Complex World, p.382. 
78 ibid.:381. 
79 Underdal (1997): Modelling the International Climate Change Negotiations: A Non-Technical Outline of 
Model Architecture. Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo, p. 21. 
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number of propositions (regarding isolated or "ceteris paribus", direct effects) between 
context variables and the probability for peacemaking (through mediation) were 
specified, and are summarized in figure 3.4 (p.50). 
In section 1.4 (methodology), I justified the use of an empirical case study with 
how and why questions. Questions are more open in nature than hypotheses. Logically, 
this makes it  per se - more difficult to generate expected findings. Our purpose is to 
understand and explain the seemingly deviant Salvadoran case (in terms of the civil 
war's "successful" outcome), as well as to take a closer look at the mediation process. 
The assumptions (or hypotheses  if we consider them well founded) regarding the 
influence of the context variables, however, should be kept in mind when studying the 
peacemaking phase. Of course, we should remain open to findings that may seem to 
contradict these assumptions. A case study may bring about hypotheses on the 
conditions for e.g. a peaceful settlement to a conflict, and make us refine our auxiliary 
hypotheses, so that  in turn  we may aspire to develop a coherent theory. Any 
hypothesis generated by the main findings can then be tested in other studies, thus 
constituting a kind of data.  
We have already pointed out the fortunate combination of factors that made 
negotiations between FMLN and ARENA  with the UN playing a mediating role  
possible. This critical moment was referred to as a mutually hurting stalemate. To infer 
from this "lucky" combination of factors to a "successful" outcome, however, would 
be a short circuit. Any process is, inherently, dynamic. Nevertheless, a mutually 
hurting stalemate could be regarded a necessary condition for entering into serious 
negotiations. This stalemate per se seems to make El Salvador a deviant case. In 
Colombia or Sri Lanka, e.g., the warring parties have not yet perceived any deadlock, 
and thus keep on fighting. If there is no stalemate, the war is likely to go on until one  
of the parties surrender or is eliminated (cf. Pillar 1983). Surely, whether we pose a 
question or formulate a hypothesis, we have to examine empirically what went on in 
El Salvador during the 22 months of mediation before we can reach any conclusion. 
There are no guarantees that an experienced mediator with ample resources will 
succeed in conciliating the parties in conflict. Internal conflict cannot be resolved by 
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Figure 3.4: A specified model positing the relationship between, on the one side, mediator, 
 party and dispute characteristics, institutional variables and the international system 
 and, on the other, the probability for peacemaking.  
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Note: I have only illustrated the bivariate associations. Of course, there may also be interaction. E.g. the 
complexity of issues is likely to reduce the positive effect of relative power symmetry on the mediation process. 
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"some wise judgement on an outstanding issue, such as the location of a boundary, the 
exchange of disarmament quotas, or the terms of a peace treaty. Rather, the outcome 
must provide for the integration of the insurgency into a new body politic [sic] and for 
mechanisms that allow the conflict to shift from violence back to politics. Generally 
this involves creating a new political system in which the parties to the conflict feel 
they have a stake, thus in a very positive sense coopting all parties  government and 
rebels  in a new creation." (Zartman, 1995:21-22). Nevertheless, the mediator can and 
should still follow certain recommendations for behaviour depending on her/his 
perception of common ground, etc. (cf. figure 3.3: Strategic Choice Model of Mediator 
Action).  
Clearly, there is a need for more empirical studies of mediation. We have 
touched upon a series of variables which the mediator has to take into consideration 
when mediating. It is now time to use the concepts defined and the models outlined in 
an analysis of the UN's role as a peacemaker in El Salvador. Our findings may then be 
used as a basis for analytical generalizations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Case study. 
The Role of the UN as a Peacemaker in El Salvador between 1990-1992 
 
    The elimination of war should be the major task of social education. 
          Konrad Lorenz 
 
4.0. Structure of chapter 
This chapter focuses on how the UN contributed to a positive change in El Salvador. 
First  drawing on chapter 2 and 3  table 4.1 illustrates the "malignant" character of 
the Salvadoran conflict (variables whose effects are assumed to reduce the chances of 
peaceful resolution) together with more "benign" variables assumed to work in favour 
of a peace agreement. Although the civil war was ripe for resolution, there were 
several hindrances to be overcome. Second, I study the role of the UN (its actors and 
actions) in the peace process. In this chapter I try to isolate the "causal effects" of the 
UN-mediation, controlling for other relevant actors. By singling out the role of the 
main mediator I hope to lay the basis for determining the extent to which the 
"peacemaking success" can be attributed to the UN, or whether the UN takes/is given 
too much credit. In an empirical case study, a number of pages are necessarily required 
for the description of facts. However, I will of course try to link the empirical findings 
to the theoretical assumptions outlined.  
 
4.1. The chances of peaceful resolution: "malignant" and "benign" features 
The stronger one feels that great injustice has been done, the more difficult it is to 
negotiate a compromise. The FMLN and the government of El Salvador (GOES) had 
obvious diverging positions. The majority of the elite was blind as to the connection 
between social discontent and the civil war. Rather they believed the war had been 
caused by a small group of terrorists because there was no reason for people "who 
wanted the country to move ahead" to resort to revolutionary war (see Introduction and 
chapter 2). Needless to say, horrifying human rights abuses made the civilian  
 
 53
population and the FMLN even more entrenched.80 If a peace settlement were to be 
signed, the GOES had to concede to several reforms, and a means of reconciling 
society had to be found. Empirical studies show that an "injured sense of justice clouds 
judgement, reduces risk-aversion and fear of loss. It also "closes" the mind  "don't 
bother me with the facts"  and renders policy makers less open to persuasion through 
argument, offers of rewards, or threats" (Holsti 1995:337). Table 4.1 shows important 
variables affecting the Salvadoran peace process grouped according to their assumed 
effects: 
 
Table 4.1: Variables affecting the chances of peaceful resolution in El Salvador, grouped 
              according to their assumed effects 
 
+ - 
Mediator: high rank, leadership based on shared values High intensity 
Relative power symmetry /mutually hurting stalemate Previous (continuous) negative relations / 60 years of 
military domination 
Long duration (fatigue) Class war  the bloodiest type of conflict 
International pressure Complex issues (political agreements regarding the 
armed forces, judicial system, electoral system, 
constitutional reform, economic and social issues, 
reintegration of FMLN members) 
Many issues (+/-) 
Internal fractionation (+/-) 
No cultural or religious cleavages  
Election of Cristiani as president, a "moderate" 
business man (war bad for business) 
 
"Group of Friends" mechanism  
 (Closed door-negotiations)  
 
It should be clear that a peaceful outcome by no means was guaranteed even though - 
after 1989  several important changes took place (such as the election of a "moderate" 
president from the business elite, the support of the international community after the 
Cold War, and the November offensive). We have pointed out repeatedly that the 
mutually hurting stalemate per se makes El Salvador an "outlier" (deviating from the 
                                                 
80 According to Rev. Santiago, macabre scenes were common: "People are not just killed by death squads  they 
are decapitated and then their heads are placed on pikes and used to dot the landscape. Men are not just 
disemboweled by the Salvadoran Treasury Police; their severed genitalia are stuffed into their mouths. 
Salvadoran women are not just raped by the National Guard; their wombs are cut from their bodies and used to 
cover their faces. It is not enough to kill children; they are dragged over barbed wire until the flesh falls from 
their bones, while parents are forced to watch." (In Chomsky (1997): What Uncle Sam Really Wants, p.39-40.) 
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general trend), making serious negotiations possible. The type of conflict, its intensity, 
the complexity of issues as well as intra-party differences, however, still made El 
Salvador's situation quite malignant, requiring skilful diplomacy to be solved. The 
legacy of 60 years of military domination was a serious impediment to transforming 
civil-military relations. 
 
4.2.0. The UN as peacemaker  managing the parties and other players. 
The contingency model in practice 
 
Both the Catholic Church as well as the Organization of American States (OAS) had 
tried to mediate prior to the active role of the UN, but did not accomplish much. The 
mediatory efforts of the Church, which was perceived as a Salvadoran actor divided 
into right and left wings, were mostly of a humanitarian character. The OAS, a US-
dominated body, showed more ambition than success.81 In chapter 3 (p. 37) we pointed 
out that regional organizations have the best success rate when it comes to mediation 
outcome. In this case, however, OAS failed because it did not bring the insurgents into 
the peace process - probably due to concerns about insurgencies in their own 
territories. Even if they had tried to include the left, the left would probably not have 
trusted the US-dominated body to mediate.  
The FMLN was initially concerned that even the Secretary General's office was 
too much under Security Council (meaning US) control. Therefore, the Group of 
Friends mechanism was set up to provide the Secretary General, Javier Pérez de 
Cuéllar, with a political base independent of the Security Council. The Group of 
Friends  a key innovation - was composed of delegates from Venezuela, Colombia, 
Mexico and Spain. The friends mechanism served at least two purposes: Firstly, it was 
a precautionary measure. Alvaro de Soto insisted that the Secretary General and he 
have the right to consult with governments that in their view could assist in their 
mediatory efforts. He did not want to expose the UN to criticism by one or the other 
party for consulting with the US, the Soviet Union, or Cuba  as he was convinced 
would be necessary in order to "obtain and retain their support or, at least, to contain 
                                                 
81 de Soto (1999): "Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador" Chapter 14 in Crocker, et al. (eds.): Herding Cats. 
Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, p.352-253. 
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any failure on their part to cooperate" with them. Secondly, the Group of Friends had 
the purpose of preventing "rival initiatives that might confuse the negotiation".82  
Fig. 3.4 and Table 4.1 assume that mediator rank and leadership based on 
shared values have a positive effect on mediation. The arguments were laid out on p. 
38. It was regarded as fortunate that the Secretary General and his personal top envoy, 
Alvaro de Soto, were Latin Americans. Sharing the same culture and religion as the 
parties, and with extensive knowledge and understanding of the conflict, the Secretary 
General and de Soto had a personal interest in ending the war (at least more interest 
than the Secretary General's successor in 1992, the Egyptian Boutros-Ghali, was 
thought to have by the parties themselves). It should therefore be safe to conclude that, 
at least in this case, successful leadership "builds on and cultivates [a] platform  of 
shared values, interests and beliefs".83  
 
4.2.1. Reaching the first of six agreements 
On 4 April 1990, the GOES and the FMLN met in Geneva (Switzerland) and agreed to 
open formal negotiations with the UN serving as a mediator. This first agreement set 
out the fourfold purpose of the negotiations: "The purpose of the process shall be to 
end the armed conflict through political means as speedily as possible, promote the 
democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and 
reunify Salvadorian society."84 Having laid out the goals, the accord stipulated that 
they would be achieved in a two-part process. First would come "political agreements 
for arranging a halt to the armed confrontation and any acts that infringe the rights of 
the civilian population, which will have to be verified by the United Nations, subject to 
the approval of the Security Council". Next, the process would "lead to the 
establishment of the necessary guarantees and conditions for reintegrating the 
members of FMLN, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, institutional and 
political life of the country". The Geneva Agreement also specified that negotiations 
would be carried out by means of "two types of complementary activities: direct 
                                                 
82 ibid.:365-366. 
83 Underdal (1994): "Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management". Chapter 8 in Zartman (ed.): 
International Multilateral Negotiation, p.179. 
84 Geneva Agreement, 4 April 1990 (UN doc. A/45/706  S/21931, annex I). 
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dialogue between the negotiation commissions with the active participation of the 
Secretary General or his Representative, and an intermediary role by the Secretary 
General or his Representative"; that the process should be conducted in the strictest 
confidence; that the Secretary General could maintain confidential contacts with 
governments or groups which might contribute to the success of the process through 
their advice and support; and that the political parties and other representative 
organizations in El Salvador would have an important role to play in achieving peace. 
It was, thus, agreed that the UN would play a central role during the entire process, 
and that the peace process would deal with problems that previously would have been 
considered as internal affairs of El Salvador. Upon signing the accord, de Soto told the 
press that there would be no cease-fire until some specific guarantees demanded by the 
FMLN were fulfilled. This statement provoked Santamaría, minister and part of the 
government negotiating team, who told the Spanish news agency EFE that the 
immediate results of the process should be to establish a cease-fire. Then, everything 
else could be discussed (Juhn 1998:58). de Soto had, however, only conveyed the 
stance of the FMLN, so that Santamaría in reality "shot the messenger". Nevertheless, 
preparations continued for the next round of talks. 
Throughout the entire peace process, FMLN was represented by its leaders, but 
the government was not. Cristiani maintained strict control over the process through a 
delegation without actually ever being present. This was probably a wise move if one 
considers that Cristiani had to be careful not to provoke the hawks back home, 
although the FMLN was not happy because they took this as a sign that the GOES was 
not serious. However, according to de Soto, Cristiani's refusal to speak directly to 
anyone from the FMLN had its drawbacks: "His representatives, in my experience, 
could not always be relied on to convey or explain faithfully the FMLN's views".85  
At Geneva, the government delegation consisted of one minister and three 
ambassadors accredited to Europe (Juhn 1998:58). According to the FMLN, the latter 
ones were not familiar with the negotiation process. In chapter 3 we posited that 
illegitimate/non-authoritative representatives on either side have a negative effect on 
the mediation process. We see that this assumption is confirmed in the Salvadoran 
                                                 
85 de Soto (1999): Chapter 14 in Crocker, et. al.: Herding Cats, p. 376. 
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case. Officially, Cristiani stressed that the FMLN was a group of insurgents in conflict 
with a legitimate government, and that it was not appropriate for a head of state to sit 
down with rebels. As a result, the FMLN became  together with the UN  the initiator 
of all proposals. 
 
4.2.2. Agenda and Timetable 
Immediately after Geneva, UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar sought and elicited 
the support for the peace process from the USA, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. At the 
next face-to-face meeting in Caracas (Venezuela) on 21 May, the GOES and the 
FMLN, with the assistance of Secretary General and his personal representative, 
Alvaro de Soto, drew up a general agenda and timetable for the comprehensive 
negotiation process. The general agenda repeated the words of the Geneva Agreement 
in terms of the peace process' objective, and specified that political agreements were to 
be reached on: 
1. Armed Forces 
2. Human rights 
3. Judicial system 
4. Electoral system 
5. Constitutional reform 
6. Economic and social issues 
7. Reintegration of FMLN members 
8. Verification by the United Nations  
 
The GOES surprised the UN by agreeing to the FMLN's proposal that the initial 
objective would be to reach political agreements on the agenda items before a cease-
fire would be negotiated.86 Only once a cease-fire was in place would the negotiation 
move to the second stage ("establishment of the necessary guarantees and conditions 
for reintegrating the members of FMLN, within a framework of full legality, into the 
civil, institutional and political life of the country").  
In the timetable, the parties agreed that the first objective of the Geneva 
Agreement (i.e. "political agreements which lay the basis for a cessation of the armed 
conflict and of any acts that infringe the rights of the civilian population") should be 
                                                 
86 de Soto (1999): Chapter 14 in Crocker, et.al.: Herding Cats, p. 363. 
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achieved by the middle of September 1990, "provided that agreements are reached 
which are synchronized, have implementation timetables and can be verified where 
appropriate, so as to ensure that all the components of the initial objective are duly 
coordinated". Agreeing in Geneva and Caracas on the procedures, agenda and 
timetable of the subsequent negotiations represented a big step forward. Parties often 
argue for months and even years over the institutional setting. Reaching substantive 
agreements, however, was to be much more difficult than agreeing on the agenda and 
timetable.  
 At Caracas, Cristiani made an important addition to his negotiating team when 
he included, among others, Colonel Mauricio Vargas (and removed the three 
ambassadors accredited to Europe). Vargas was a member of the Tandona, the military 
academy's class of 1966.87 The choice of Vargas to negotiate the future of the armed 
forces was an interesting move because it was reported that de did not enjoy the full 
confidence of the Tandona. For one thing, one of his brothers was aligned with the 
FMLN. 
 But he [Vargas] had political stance, more than Ponce. He said the right things, he had a budget, and he 
 had ties to the PDC [Christian Democratic Party]. Things got better once he was on the team. He arrived 
 prepared, unlike the others. He had a staff and resources, not like Galindo [see 4.2.4] or Santamaría. He 
 would arrive with stacks of paper. The FMLN thought he was bright and capable. He had a real 
 constituency  the armed forces  behind him  a real player with real specific weight. The Army gave 
 him instructions and expected one hundred per cent. He would return with less. As time went on, his 
 position in the armed forces diminished as other civilians thought more of him. The armed forces took a 
 lot of hits.          
 (Walker interview, 5 November 1994  cited in Juhn 1998:66) 
 
 At this point we should point out a translation error in the English version of the 
Caracas Agreement that was to cause the Secretary General's representative, Alvaro de 
Soto, some trouble with the USA. In the paragraph following the one stating that the 
initial objective should be achieved by the middle of September 1990, this date is 
referred to as a deadline. In the original Spanish version88, however, the word is 
"fecha" - simply meaning "date". Nevertheless, the true intention should be clear since 
the next paragraph explicitly says: "It is difficult to set a fixed date for the conclusion 
                                                 
87 "Loyalty to one's tanda [graduating class] often takes priority over one's loyalty to the institution. Not 
surprisingly, throughout the 1980s there were numerous examples of officers protecting fellow tanda members 
implicated in human rights abuses or other crimes despite the potential damage to the credibility of the institution 
as a whole." (Walter and Williams (1993): "The Military and Democratization in El Salvador." Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol.35, no. 1, p 63. 
88 see www.cepaz.org.sv/cepaz98/caracas.htm  
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of the comprehensive process. This will depend on factors such as the extent and scope 
of the political agreements reached (), which are a matter of negotiation." As de 
Soto himself makes clear in his article from 199989, the target date was not meant to 
be more than a psychological device to push the negotiations forward: "It would have 
defied common sense to set a date certain for the conclusion of negotiations, which 
depended on two sides agreeing on mutually acceptable terms." (ibid.). The obligation 
to make decisions in a negotiation may help to structure the debate and discipline the 
participants. It may contribute to increase rationality because attention is sharpened.90 
Nevertheless, Bernard Aronson, assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, 
criticized de Soto and the UN  rather than the FMLN, with which the US would have 
no direct contact at the time  about the FMLN's failure to come to a cease-fire. The 
critics did not understand that, as Pedro Nikken, the drafter of the agreement, put it: 
"Fruit does not ripen by being thrown against the wall."91 
The army was the first topic to be discussed under the Caracas Agreement. It soon 
became apparent, however, that military reform was going to be the most difficult 
topic of the negotiations  the Gordian knot. The FMLN initially took a hard line and 
demanded the army's abolishment, as became the case in Costa Rica in 1948.  The 
army, of course, resisted this. Both sides showed a strong commitment to their 
respective causes. The negotiation was purely distributive. Consequently, the UN 
needed to play the role of the process facilitator as well as that of facilitator of 
communication, compromise and convergence and facilitator of cognitive change. 
Uncertainty is one reason why the parties begin the negotiation with such extreme 
demands. The opening phase of a peace conference is a period of "probing, of 
exploring the disputed territory, of finding the outer limits of the opponent's tolerance" 
(Pillar 1983:102). The first phase of a peace negotiation "serves to weed out bogus or 
unrealistic demands, to educate the parties about each other's intentions and objectives, 
and hence to clarify and define the outstanding issues" (ibid.:112). 
Fortunately, an important note was added in the Caracas Agreement:  
                                                 
89 de Soto (1999): Chapter 14 in Crocker, et.al.: Herding Cats, p. 363-364. 
90 Eriksen, Erik Oddvar (1994): "Kap. 4: Den politiske diskurs  fra konsensus til modus vivendi?", in (eds.) 
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and Grimen, Harald: Den Politiske orden, p.112.  
91 in de Soto (1999): Chapter 14 in Crocker, et.al.: Herding Cats, p.375. 
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The sequence of the items listed for each phase does not imply a strict order of consideration and may 
 be changed by mutual consent. Agreements must be tailored to the nature of the phase involved. 
 Political issues have been placed in their respective phases but, given the complexity of some of them, 
 aspects thereof may be addressed in other phases. All this depends on the dynamic of the 
 negotiations.92 
 
Accordingly, de Soto and his UN team discussed the possibility of moving to the 
second item on the Agenda, human rights, and leave the issue of the armed forces for 
the time being. 
 
4.2.3 Agreement on Human Rights 
After a two-day brainstorming session in Geneva with twenty or so human rights and 
El Salvador experts (but without the parties), the UN decided to introduce the topic, 
and put the draft (single negotiating text) of a human rights agreement on the table 
when the two sides met in San José (Costa Rica) on 26 July 1990. After eleven hours 
of negotiations the parties signed the agreement without any serious changes.93 The 
San José Agreement on Human Rights was the first substantive agreement of the 
peace process. The Agreement, drafted by Pedro Nikken  a Venezuelan jurist, was 
also the first in UN history to give detailed directions the parties would follow to 
ensure respect for human rights. Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar convinced 
President Cristiani to accept human rights monitors by offering to create a mission that 
would verify the Agreement (ONUSAL), train a police force, and take other steps to 
demonstrate both his and the UN's long-term commitment to the peace process.94 
Cristiani even conceded that the GOES was responsible for most of the human rights 
violations  a fact that provoked the hardliners on the government side (cf. 
Przeworski's model of "extrication"95). Yet, Cristiani knew that he (or rather his 
                                                 
92 Caracas Agreement, 21 May 1990 (UN doc. A/45/706  S/21931, annex II). 
93 LeVine (1997): "Peacemaking". Ch. 10 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, p.234. For those interested in 
details, it can be noted that Rafael Moreno says the negotiation lasted for 14 hours, not 11. See his article (1995): 
"Peculiaridades del  proceso de negociación salvadoreño y requisitos para resolver políticamente un conflicto 
armado". At: www.cepaz.org.sv/cepaz98/rafael.htm. 
94 in LeVine (1997): "Peacemaking". Ch. 10 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, p.235. 
95 Adam Przeworski (1991; 1996) has developed a model, called "extrication" of the negotiation process by 
which authoritarian rulers may decide to end their regime and initiate a transition to democracy. He posited that 
in an authoritarian situation there are four relevant categories of actors. Within the regime are (1) hard-liners and 
(2) reformers. The former prefer maintenance of the regime to any change; the latter prefer change to the status 
quo but do not wish to go all the way to democracy. Outside the regime, in the opposition, are (3) moderates and 
(4) radicals. The moderates prefer full democracy but are willing to negotiate with regime reformers to secure 
extrication, even if some guarantees must be given that restrict democracy. The radicals prefer full democracy 
and oppose any negotiation with the regime. (In Peeler 1998:79-80.) 
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delegation) had to a sign a human rights agreement in order to show good faith. He 
also realized that in accepting most of the blame on the human rights issue he would 
gain "considerable negotiating power, taking pressure off the government for the near 
future while forcing the FMLN to make the next major concession".96  
According to a UN official97, the San José Agreement was also a confidence-
building measure, a tangible success early on in the negotiations which helped solidify 
the peace process. I do not believe, however, that the Agreement per se was that 
important. After all, the government did not agree to anything but parts of the treaties 
to which El Salvador already was a signatory, such as the International Bill of Human 
Rights. The gap between rhetoric and reality in Latin America has always been wide. 
Ever since independence, the contents of the countries' constitutions and laws have 
been regarded more as ideals to be reached in the future than as binding laws to be 
complied with right away  thus largely being ignored. At the moment of 
independence, having a constitution was regarded as essential for international 
recognition and respect  a symbol of legitimacy. All states seek to have a good 
reputation. Therefore, appearances matter. In Latin America there has traditionally 
been a gap between de facto and de jure rule. Ever since colonial times, the formula 
obedezco pero no cumplo (I obey but do not fulfil) has from time to time been used to 
indicate that "local conditions would not permit implementation of the order, 
notwithstanding officials' disposition to obey" (Peeler 1998:27). Due to this strong 
tradition, I do not regard the San José Agreement as a milestone or anything of that 
kind. On the rebel side, moreover, many argued that without real reforms to the army 
and judicial system a human rights agreement would be worthless. Most important, in 
my opinion, was article 14, where the parties agreed to a UN human rights verification 
mission (ONUSAL) with a fairly wide mandate: 
14. The Mission's mandate shall include the following powers: 
(a) to verify the observance of human rights in El Salvador; 
(b) to receive communications from any individual, group of individuals or body in El Salvador, 
containing reports of human rights violations; 
(c) to visit any place or establishment freely and without prior notice; 
(d) to hold its meetings freely and anywhere in the national territory; 
(e) to interview freely and privately any individual, group of individuals or members of bodies or 
institutions; 
                                                 
96 in LeVine (1997): "Peacemaking". Ch. 10 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, p.235. 
97 cited in ibid.:234. 
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(f) to collect by any means it deems appropriate such information as it considers relevant; 
(g) to make recommendations to the Parties on the basis of any conclusions it has reached with respect 
to cases or situations it may have been called upon to consider; 
(h) to offer its support to the judicial authorities of El Salvador in order to help improve the judicial 
procedures for the protection of human rights and increase respect for the rules of due process of 
law; 
(i) to consult the Attorney-General of the Republic; 
(j) to plan and carry out an educational and informational campaign on human rights and on the 
functions of the Mission itself; 
(k) to use the media to the extent useful for the fulfilment of its mandate; 
(l) to report regularly to the Secretary General of the United Nations and through him to the General 
Assembly.98 
 
The San José Agreement was criticized by several human rights organizations for 
being inadequate as long as there was no cease-fire. Nevertheless, the three initial 
agreements created optimism regarding the possibilities of a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. It was hoped that agreement on an "easy issue" would have spillover effects 
on the more complex issues. But from mid-1990 to April 1991 (when agreements were 
reached on changes to the Salvadoran constitution covering judicial and electoral 
reform and the role of the armed forces), the two sides got nowhere on the central 
issue of the whole process: the future role of the military.  
 
4.2.4. Deadlock 
The FMLN presented a number of proposals to the UN. De Soto met separately with 
each side before every session and, on one occasion, even asked David Escobar 
Galindo - the country's poet laureate and President Cristiani's personal representative 
on the government team since the second agreement (Caracas) - to "show me 
something", at which Escobar responded that "there were no instructions" from his 
government,99 a situation much to the dislike of de Soto. In June 1990, the FMLN 
presented a draft that called for reducing, purifying, and dissolving the paramilitary 
forces; for ending forced recruitment; for ending impunity; and for punishing the 
perpetrators of the most hideous human rights violations, including those of the 
murders of Archbishop Romero (1980) and the Jesuits (1989). The negotiations 
                                                 
98 San José Agreement, 26 July 1990, article 14 (UN doc. A/44/971  S/21541). 
99 Montgomery (1995): "Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and 
ONUSAL". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 37, nr. 4, p.143. 
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remained at a deadlock.100 In October, the US Congress reduced military aid by 50% 
(the Dodd-Leahy Bill) and threatened to cut the rest unless the Jesuit's murderers were 
brought to justice. For the first time Salvadoran officers realized they could no longer 
rely on the USA.101 Consequently, they began to negotiate more seriously. We see, as 
assumed in figure 3.4 and table 4.1, that international pressure  when aimed at 
resolving the conflict and not just "putting a lid" over it  had a positive, catalytic 
effect on the peacemaking process. 
 On 28 October 1990, the parties agreed to let the UN play a more active role, 
changing de Soto from merely a facilitator of communication to a formulator (cf. p.44-
46). Three days later he presented a working paper on reforms to the military structure 
(Lindholm 1997:66-67), calling for the abolishment of 2 of the 3 state security 
forces102 and the military intelligence apparatus. Distinguishing between public 
security functions and national defense was (and is) problematic. Treatments of the 
police (security function) and the army (defense function) in El Salvador seldom 
differentiated between the two, but they were  and are - separate entities. Control over 
the police was the key to impunity. In the minds of some Salvadorans, the army was 
significantly less corrupt than the police. In fact, de Soto admitted that he did not 
realize right away how critical this point was to the transformation of the armed forces 
and, as a result, the settlement of peace (Juhn 1998:61). 
While the parties were discussing his drafts, the FMLN initiated a new military 
offensive in November  about a year after the great offensive of 1989. The purpose 
was to pressure the government since the disagreement concerning the military's role 
and structure had cornered the negotiations. At the same time, the 5 guerrilla armies 
were organized under the same command in order to better match the government 
army regarding discussions on demobilization. Internal fractionation was thus not 
allowed to spoil the FMLN's negotiating power in the negotiation game. Although 
internal fractionation is likely to have a negative effect on the mediation process 
                                                 
100 Over a year later, in August 1991, the FMLN once again asked for the abolition of the armed forces. This 
proposal did not receive any support from anybody, but the effect was to produce final accords that included all 
of the FMLN's proposals of June 1990! (ibid.:143-144). 
101  Karl (1992): "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution". Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, p.156; and Burgerman 
(2000): "Building Peace by Mandating Reform." Latin American Perspectives. Issue 112, Vol. 27, No. 3, p.67. 
102 The 3 "security forces" were the National Guard, Treasury Police and National Police, all of which were 
under the Ministry of Defense. 
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(making mediation more difficult), it can very well be an advantage vis-à-vis the other 
party in the negotiation game (cf. p. 32 and figure 3.4 and table 4.1). In the Salvadoran 
case, however, I believe it is safe to suggest that the FMLN had more to gain by 
presenting itself as a united block. Otherwise, the GOES might have tried to play the 
factions against each other. Also, since the FMLN wanted to be included in the 
political system, the five guerrilla groups had to show they could agree amongst 
themselves. This is not to say, though, that internal fractionation did not have negative 
effects on the process and outcome. It is possible and probable that intra-party 
differences contributed to a weak agreement on social and economic reform (to which 
I shall return in due time). 
 On 23 November the FMLN shot down one of the air forces' planes. Shortly 
thereafter, both parties requested  irrespective of each other  that the UN implement 
the verification mission on human rights without awaiting a cease-fire. On 2 January 
1991, the FMLN shot down a US helicopter and killed the survivors. This incident 
came as a shock to everyone engaged in the peace talks and threatened the entire 
process. We see, as assumed, that increasing intensity reduces the (short-term) 
likelihood of achieving peace, making the parties more entrenched, focusing on 
positions rather than interests. As a result of the down shooting, President Bush 
restored aid in early 1991, making the Salvadoran military believe once again that it 
could escape reform. In addition to this, in February 1991, there was an apparently 
planned leak in the New York Times. An unnamed source charged that de Soto was 
"less than energetic pursuing the peace process" and that he "accedes to the guerillas' 
delaying tactics".103 The article was publicized the very same day the parties initiated 
new negotiations in Mexico. This seriously undermined the efforts of the UN at a 
crucial point in the negotiations. Alvaro de Soto sometimes felt that Cristiani was 
dealing with him as if he were one of the "Comanches"  Salvadoran elite jargon for 
the FMLN. de Soto writes, however: "Little did he [Cristiani] know that one powerful 
FMLN leader, an intelligent man, was convinced that I was in the employ of the 
CIA".104 If we trust this information, de Soto obviously remained impartial in his 
                                                 
103 in Whitfield (1999): "The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Preliminary 
Comparison", chapter 9, p. 286 in Arnson (ed.): Comparative peace processed in Latin America. 
104 de Soto (1999): Chapter 14 in Crocker, et.al.: Herding Cats, p. 376. 
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actions. In chapter 3 we said that impartiality does not have to be a prerequisite for the 
chose of a mediator, but in El Salvador this was a necessary condition for obvious 
reasons. 
  
4.2.5 Deadline for constitutional reform 
Substantive negotiations were put on hold until the results of the March 1991 
legislative and municipal elections in El Salvador. Even though de Soto was given a 
more active role, the major factor that made serious negotiations urgent was the terms 
of the 1983 Salvadoran constitution, which contained a provision (article 248) 
requiring any changes to the constitution to be ratified by two successive legislative 
assemblies. The term of the outgoing assembly was to expire on 30 April 1991. This 
date was an objective deadline. If the parties did not reach any agreements on 
constitutional reform by that date, agreements reached later on would have to wait 
until 1994 to be ratified. The two sides met for more than three weeks in Mexico in 
April "against a backdrop of intensive organized pressure within El Salvador" (Byrne 
1996:186). Grassroots pressure from the left and the centre advocated a change in 
article 248 to "prevent the negotiations from being held hostage by the constitution" 
(ibid.). Rightist groups protested against any changes and threatened legislators who 
might consider constitutional reforms. In the end, however, the negotiators reached 
agreement on key changes to the constitution regarding judicial and electoral reform, 
limitations on the function and role of the armed forces and their subordination to 
civilian leadership, and on the formation of a Truth Commission to investigate major 
human rights violations. (As to why agreement was reached, see chapter 5.) 
The GOES, as pointed out, merely responded to the proposals of the FMLN and 
the UN. Their choice was thus binary: Either to accept the opponent's offer or stand 
put, in which case the negotiations would break down. By returning to our analytical 
framework for a moment, we can conceive of the distributive negotiation game as a 
Chicken game. The FMLN obviously had more to win compared to what it might lose 
than had the GOES, and would then be willing to accept a larger risk for breakdown. 
Recalling equation 2 (p.33), the actor for whom this proportion or fraction is largest 
has - ceteris paribus  the strongest negotiation power. The weaker party, in this case 
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the GOES, should then make a unilateral concession. By agreeing to reforms, the 
GOES obviously conceded a great deal. But the Salvadoran government did not accept 
the reform of article 248. Consequently, the changes made to the constitution would 
have to be ratified by the new legislative assembly that resulted from the March 
elections. (ARENA winning 39 of 83 seats; PDC 26105). This still left the ARENA 
government with a significant bargaining instrument, being able to hold back 
ratification of the agreements to pressure the FMLN to compromise in the talks. The 
FMLN had, at the outset, only two concessions to make: to stop fighting and to disarm. 
The deadline putting a considerable time pressure on the FMLN might, however, have 
given them incentives to renounce some of their demands for there to be improvement 
at all. On 29 April 1991, the ARENA-dominated National Assembly voted to modify 
35 of 274 articles of the constitution  the first time a Salvadoran constitution had ever 
been amended.106 
Let us stop for a while to reflect on the FMLN's choice of strategy. Even though 
our focus is on the UN, we cannot ignore the triangular relationship. According to 
Rubinstein,107 the parties to a negotiation are typically impatient to reach agreement, 
i.e. they will prefer to reach an agreement sooner than later. With the ARENA party 
being able to hold back ratification, the discount factor (partly an expression of the 
probability that the negotiation game will continue for at least another period, and 
partly an expression of the parties' relative evaluation of future vs. present gains) was 
probably greater for them than for the FMLN. Rubinstein's main conclusion is that if 
one of the parties' discount factor [0,1] increases, that is, if a party becomes more 
patient, this party's negotiation power will be strengthened. This can be explained by 
the fact that the most patient party can easier make a credible threat to wait until a later 
moment in time, unless the opponent shows a will to compromise immediately.108 The 
more patient a party is, the less it costs to postpone agreements. If the issues at stake 
are really important to the party with the smallest discount factor, however, it is 
probably an open question what will happen. The FMLN at this point was confronted 
                                                 
105 For complete election results, see: www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/ElSal/saleg85-91.html  
106 Karl, TL. (1992): "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution." Foreign Affairs. vol. 71, nr. 2,p. 157. 
107 see Hovi's article (1992): "Rubinsteins forhandlingsteori  en innføring". Norsk statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 
pp.47-57. 
108 ibid.:55. 
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with the choice of a partial agreement or none at all. The question then arises: What 
did the FMLN prefer? Most people will probably say that it is "rational" and better to 
accept a partial agreement than risking negotiation breakdown. As Tsebelis (1990:154-
155) concludes, though, it can be rational  in the long run  to play tough. A partial 
agreement is probably better than none, however, as long as the party's aspiration level 
does not lie above its BATNA, and as long as making compromises on certain issues 
does not lead to (foreseeable) negative process-generated stakes.  
With the signing of the Mexico Agreement on 27 April 1991 the parties 
reached partial agreements on the armed forces, the judicial system, the electoral 
system, and agreed on the establishment of a Truth Commission  which was to be 
composed of three individuals appointed by the Secretary General after consultation 
with the parties.109 The FMLN, however, stated for the record that the wording of 
article 211, where the armed forces are described as a "permanent" institution was 
incompatible with its position on the matter. It made it clear that it considered there to 
be "certain constitutional reforms still awaiting negotiation, including demilitarization, 
article 105 on the limit on rural land ownership and the need to open up the 
mechanism for reform of the Constitution, either by amending article 248 or by other 
procedures such as popular referendum."110 
 Let us now briefly take a closer look at the Mexico Agreement and the 
establishment of ONUSAL, as agreed to in San José. Firstly, what were the major 
points of concurrence in the Mexico Agreement, besides that of forming a Truth 
Commission?111 Regarding agreements on constitutional reforms, the parties agreed on 
the creation of a National Civil Police for the  
"maintenance of peace, tranquillity, order and public safety in both urban and rural areas, under the 
 control of civilian authorities. It is expressly understood that the National Civil Police and the armed 
 forces shall be independent and shall be placed under the authority of different ministries." 
 
                                                 
109 In December, after some difficulty getting the parties to agree on three persons who had "sufficient 
international stature, were knowledgeable about the region, and had the acumen to pull off such a sensitive 
assignment" (Johnstone 1995:34), the following were appointed: Belisario Betancur, former president of 
Colombia, Reinaldo Figueredo, former foreign minister of Venezuela, and Thomas Buergenthal, U.S. law 
professor and former president of the Inter-Amerian Court of Human Rights. A staff of 36 - 22 advisers and 
researchers plus 14 forensic and other experts (all foreign)  was recruited to assist the Commission. 
110 Mexico Agreement, 27 April 1991 (UN doc. A/46/553  S/23130). 
111  The Truth Commission was not formally instated until 13 July 1992. I shall take a brief look at the Truth 
Commission's work after reviewing all settlements in the process that lead to the final peace accords of 16 
January 1992. (See chapter 6.) 
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In terms of the judicial system, the parties agreed to reorganize the Supreme Court of 
Justice (one of the most criticized organs, to which I shall return in chapter 6) and to 
establish a new procedure for the election of Supreme Court judges. The amended 
article 186 specified that the Legislative Assembly should elect judges of the Supreme 
Court of Justice (by two-thirds majority) for a term of nine years, with one third of the 
judges coming up for renewal every three years.112 The judiciary would also receive no 
less than 6 per cent from the State budget. A National Counsel for the Defence of 
Human Rights, whose primary function would be to promote and ensure respect for 
human rights was also to be created by 2/3 majority in the Legislative Assembly. 
Other issues raised in the negotiations were referred to secondary legislation and to 
other political agreements. Although the set of political agreements on the judicial 
system envisaged by the parties in the Caracas Agreement was still to be negotiated, 
the parties agreed to restructure the National Council of the Judiciary so that its 
composition guaranteed its independence from state organs and from political parties, 
and to establish a Judicial Training School (Escuela de Capacitación Judicial). Finally, 
a new electoral tribunal was established to replace the Central Board of Elections. The 
members, elected by a qualified majority of the Legislative Assembly, would be 
nonpartisan (without any party affiliation) and would not be vulnerable to political 
manipulation by the executive.  
 
4.2.6. ONUSAL 
The request to deploy ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador) 
came independently from both sides. The FMLN did so largely in response to pressure 
from local NGOs. The GOES was "less enthusiastic but probably felt that opposition 
to early deployment would unnecessarily damage its credibility" (Johnstone 1995:19). 
For the UN, the decision to deploy was not easy. It was worried about the safety of the 
observers and about whether they could fulfil their mission while fighting was still 
going on. More fundamentally, the UN was concerned about the effect the deployment 
of human rights monitors would have on the negotiations. Could the UN function as an 
                                                 
112 According to the 1983 Constitution, Supreme Court Judges would be elected for 5 years. There was no 
provision for how the judges should be elected. See the Spanish version of the 1983 Constitution at:  
www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/ElSal/elsalvador.html 
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impartial mediator while at the same time investigating and publicizing human rights 
violations? Despite these concerns, a mission of 101 international civil servants from 
27 countries, including human rights observers and advisers, legal advisers, educators, 
political affairs officers, military advisers, police advisers and administrative support 
and communications personnel was deployed in July 1991 (UN Blue Book 1995:18). 
Later, ONUSAL was to be composed of more than 1.000 men and women. It was, in 
short, a multi-disciplinary mission. Its success, however, was anything but assured 
when it began, six months before there was a cease-fire. According to Ian Johnstone 
(1995:20), an official in the Executive Office of the Secretary General, the decision to 
deploy proved wise for at least five reasons: First, the level of human rights abuses 
decreased, primarily because the UN's presence and authority to "visit any place freely 
and without prior notice" had a dissuasive effect. Second, the level of violence 
decreased because the parties did not want to risk UN casualties and bring upon 
themselves the wrath of the international community. Third, the presence of police and 
military advisers had a "calming effect". Fourth, the willingness of both sides to accept 
international human rights monitors demonstrated that they had given up on seeking a 
military victory. Also, the early deployment of ONUSAL contributed to the broader 
peace process by raising the political costs to either party of breaking the talks, and 
facilitating negotiations by expanding personal contacts between the UN and the 
parties. Thus, although the San José Agreement cannot be regarded a landmark per se 
(cf. p.60f), the subsequent deployment of ONUSAL was a milestone. ONUSAL 
represented a number of "firsts" for the UN: (1) it was the result of the first UN effort 
to resolve an internal war; (2) it was a "pilot mission", with the goal not just of 
disarmament and military demobilization, but of national reconciliation as well; and 
(3)  as pointed out  it was the first UN mission to be established before a cease-fire 
had taken place.113  
 ONUSAL was not, however, the only UN body present in El Salvador. UNDP 
[United Nations Development Programme] had been in the country for 30 years, and it 
was the UNDP that was expected to help implement certain aspects of the accords, the 
                                                 
113 Montgomery (1995): "Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and 
ONUSAL". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 37, nr. 4, p.146. 
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National Civil Police (PNC) in particular. Unfortunately, it turned out that the UNDP 
was either not willing or able to participate as expected. As an example, the leadership 
of the UNDP in El Salvador was not favourably disposed (in 1992) to cooperate with 
ONUSAL.114 Consequently, ONUSAL had to assume responsibility for most of the 
monitoring of the political reforms and verification of compliance.  
 On 1 October 1991, the Mission began to investigate alleged violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law. By the end of the month, ONUSAL 
had received more than 1.000 complaints of alleged human rights violations (UN Blue 
Book 1995:19). Some extremist groups questioned the Mission's impartiality. Another 
problem was quite different: "the high, in some cases inordinate, expectations awaiting 
the Mission" (ibid.). To many Salvadorans across the political spectrum, ONUSAL's 
mandate was not clear. People expected the Mission to prevent, or at least punish, 
human rights violations. ONUSAL had not, however, come to substitute El Salvador's 
institutions. Their mandate was to observe and verify compliance with all agreements 
reached between the parties. To try to explain the role of ONUSAL to the Salvadoran 
population, ONUSAL published information in the country's major newspapers, went 
on radio and visited communities. The government, however, could have and should 
have helped ONUSAL by informing the population of the mission's task and 
welcoming it. This would have prevented much misunderstanding.  
ONUSAL officials visited every military barracks in the country and 
established regular contacts with their commanders. Most importantly, a program of 
human rights education was initiated among the armed forces, the security forces, the 
FMLN and, ultimately, sectors of the civilian population, including teachers.115  
Montgomery116 notes, however, that during ONUSAL's first period (from July 
1991 to January 1992 - all missions of the UN are given life by a Security Council 
resolution for a renewable period of 6 months), some organizational difficulties 
developed because there was a Chief of Mission who was also the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General, Pakistani Iqbal Riza, in addition to a head 
                                                 
114 Montgomery (1995): "Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and 
ONUSAL". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 37, nr. 4, p. 147. 
115 ibid.:148-149. 
116 ibid. 
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of the Human Rights Division, Philippe Texier of France. A political officer noted that 
"Riza was respectful of the autonomy of the Human Rights Division because he was 
not familiar with human rights and therefore deferred to Texier". Riza focused on 
political issues and the networking among Salvadorans that was crucial to the 
mission's success.117 According to Montgomery, these circumstances created two sets 
of problems. One was that the regional coordinators reported to Riza, not Texier, and 
there were some coordinators who ignored Texier's directives and, instead, waited for 
instructions from Riza. The other problem was that Texier failed either to establish a 
consistent set of criteria for following up on complaints or to develop standardized 
forms for use by officials in the regional offices. In the latter case, the result was that 
each regional office developed its own criteria and forms, which, in turn, contributed 
to difficulties in writing the human rights reports back at headquarters. With the 
danger of being judicious a posteriori, it seems to me that these dysfunctional 
consequences should have and could have been foreseen and thus avoided. 
Montgomery also mentions that  in the opinion of a Chilean human rights officer  
Riza "left [Texier] like an abandoned ship", while Texier "didn't give help but also 
didn't ask for help".118 For obvious reasons, a mission should have a clear 
organizational structure and management. Johnstone (1995:28-29) also makes remarks 
on ONUSAL's organizational defects. The police and human rights divisions of 
ONUSAL had overlapping mandates, causing some confusion, and making it more 
difficult to coordinate. 
 Even though ONUSAL's second period exceeds that of this case study's (1990-
1992), it is worth mentioning that shortly after the signing of the final peace accords, 
over 300 police observers from 8 countries arrived in El Salvador. Many of them 
arrived without having read, or even hearing a lecture on, the peace accords and 
ONUSAL's mandate, or the situation in El Salvador(!). The Italian contingent arrived 
without being able to speak a word of Spanish, and many members of the Mexican 
                                                 
117 ibid. 
118 ibid. It is interesting to note that Riza also receives strong criticism by  among others - Philip Gourevitch, a 
U.S. Institute of Peace grantee, on the UN's role in Rwanda in 1993-1994, when Riza, at the time of the 
genocide, was deputy to Kofi Annan, the current UN Secretary General.  For detailed information, see: 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/pw/1298/profile.html, or read We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be 
Killed with Our Families (Gourevitch 1999). 
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contingent had been "arbitrarily promoted to officers so that they could be sent to El 
Salvador, a situation that provoked contempt and derision among the well-trained and 
well-educated officers from both Europe and South America".119  
 
4.2.7. Resolving the Gordian Knot 
After the Mexico Agreements of April 1991, the GOES and the FMLN held numerous 
meetings without making any significant progress. The army refused to continue 
discussing political issues until a cease-fire had been signed, and the FMLN refused to 
agree to a cease-fire until they had reached final agreement on military reform and 
guarantees on their reintegration into society.120 (After all, the possession and use of 
arms were the FMLN's only leverage.) The stalemate on when to implement a cease-
fire was the Gordian knot. I believe the words of Defense Minister General Humberto 
Larios epitomizes the army's mentality: 
 "We will consider demobilizing the armed forces, as long as the FMLN is finished. What is 
 demobilizing the armed forces? What will it be to demobilize or demilitarize society? Salvadoran 
 society is not militarized as such. Talking this way only de-stabilizes the armed forces." (in Juhn 
 1998:63) 
 
The two sides also fought over the implementation of the Mexico Agreement as well 
as some important issues it did not deal with, such as the purging of the army, land 
reform, and the logistics of a cease-fire.121 To break this impasse, Pérez de Cuéllar 
began to explore the feasibility of compressing the talks into a single phase in order to 
establish, prior to a cease-fire, the necessary conditions and guarantees for the 
integration of FMLN members. (According to Juhn (1998:101) he did so on the behest 
of Baker and Bessmertnykh, the Soviet Foreign Minister. The Four Friends were also 
becoming increasingly impatient.) Under the Geneva and Caracas agreements, this 
issue would have been taken up only during the second, post-cease-fire stage of the 
negotiations. The Secretary General invited President Cristiani and FMLN 
Commanders to meet with him at UN Headquarters in New York on 16 and 17 
September 1991 to resolve the four major areas which still needed to be partially or 
                                                 
119 Montgomery (1995): "Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and 
ONUSAL". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 37, nr. 4, p.150-151. 
120 In off-the-record conversations, however, both US and Salvadoran government officials said military reform 
was the FMLN's strongest and most legitimate point(!) (Byrne 1996:182). 
121 LeVine (1997): "Peacemaking". Ch. 10 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, p.239. 
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completely negotiated: The National Civil Police, the specifics of the reduction of the 
army and land redistribution122, and the guarantees for the FMLN to enter civilian life 
as a political force. The US government, the Four Friends and the UN wanted a final 
agreement before the UN Secretary General's term expired on 31 December 1991.  
During the entire peace process, Cristiani had persistently refused to meet with 
the FMLN. In this round, the UN and the FMLN felt that no agreement could be 
reached without the personal presence of the Salvadoran president. (President Salinas 
of Mexico  one of the "Four Friends"  lent him his official jet to go to New York, 
presumably as an extra safety measure (Juhn 1998:120). There were spoilers123 in the 
army whom Cristiani had to be careful not to provoke too much.) 
 On 25 September the two sides signed the New York Agreement, which was 
praised as a definitive moment in the peace process and a "new victory for democracy 
in El Salvador".124 The agreement's goal was to "give final impetus to the process of 
negotiations".125 The parties agreed to create a "mechanism for the monitoring of and 
participation of civilian society in the process of the changes resulting from the 
negotiation, in relation both to the armed forces, in particular, and to the other items on 
the agenda".126 This mechanism, the National Commission for Peace and 
Reconciliation (COPAZ) was to be composed of two representatives of the 
government, including a member of the armed forces, two representatives of FMLN 
and one representative of each of the parties or coalitions represented in the legislative 
assembly. COPAZ was the first link for the FMLN to the legislative and political 
processes in the country  to the great satisfaction of FMLN leaders. COPAZ was not 
to be dissolved until the implementation of the peace agreements had been completed. 
Both land and police issues were deferred to COPAZ to be taken up after the signing 
                                                 
122 Land as a good has been described as an excludable good (Ondetti (1998): The Exceptionalism of Land: 
Explaining Brazil's Surprising Sem Terra Movement. Paper presented at 1998 meeting of the Latin American 
Studies Association, Chicago Sept. 24-26). Ondetti argues that this is one reason why the Sem Terra movement 
in Brazil has been so successful: it does not suffer from a free-rider problem to the extent that other movements 
do, since land feasibly can by supplied only to those who contribute to the provision of the good. This, then, 
makes collective organization easier. 
123 Spoilers are "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiation threatens their power, 
worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it". Stedman, Stephen J. (1997): 
"Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." International Security, Vo. 22, No. 2, p.5. 
124 New York Times, 26 September 1991. Cited in LeVine (1997): "Peacemaking". Ch. 10 in Doyle et. al.: 
Keeping the peace, p.241. 
125 New York Agreement, 25 September 1991 (UN doc. A/46/502  S/23802) 
126 ibid. 
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of a final peace agreement. Moreover, a process of purification of the armed forces 
was agreed upon, "on the basis of a vetting of all personnel serving in them by an ad 
hoc Commission" (my emphasis).127 The New York agreement also called for the 
disbandment of the National Guard and the Treasury Police as security forces, and the 
process of organizing the new National Civil Police was to begin immediately, i.e. 
without awaiting other political agreements or the cessation of the armed conflict. 
Further, for the first time, economic and social questions were directly addressed. As a 
case in point,  
lands in excess of the constitutional limit of 245 hectares, as well as lands owned by the State which are 
 not currently legally designated forest reserves, shall be used to meet the needs of peasants and small 
 farmers who are without land. To this end, the Government shall also make arrangements to purchase 
 lands offered for sale to the State.128 
 
The New York accords thus became the second breakthrough of the negotiations, 
representing major compromises on both sides. The concessions on the government 
side were obvious: to purge the officer corps and implement a more reformist agrarian 
policy. The FMLN, on the other hand, agreed to drop its demands for broader socio-
economic reforms and participation in the army, and instead accepted COPAZ and the 
UN as guarantors of its security.129 Whether or not agreement was indeed facilitated by 
President Cristiani's personal presence is not easy to say. It is tempting to conclude this 
in order to support our assumption that high-ranking mediators and negotiators more 
easily create an environment of credibility, legitimacy and trust  and because, 
according to de Soto, Cristiani's representatives could not always be relied on to 
convey or explain faithfully the views of FMLN. To draw such a conclusion on the 
basis of the information presented here, however, would be wrong. It is conceivable 
that such a positive bivariate association (between a high-ranking negotiator and the 
conclusion of an agreement) could be partly spurious. First of all, there was a chance 
that agreement could have been reached anyway, although probably at higher 
(transaction) costs than necessary. Second, de Soto maintained close contact with 
Cristiani throughout the process to ensure that the FMLN's views were indeed 
conveyed as faithfully as possible. Even though it probably was time-saving that he 
                                                 
127 ibid. 
128 New York Agreement, VII: Economic and social questions  article 1. 
129 Karl (1992): "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution". Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, p.160. 
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participated directly in New York (him making the final decisions on the government 
side), he never signed any of the agreements reached. This was delegated to his 
government team. For there to be a partly spurious association between negotiator rank 
and agreement, both variables must have a common cause, i.e we must identify 
another independent variable prior to them both which has a direct causal effect on 
both of them - making us exaggerate the total causal effect. Such a variable may be 
pressure  from the FMLN,  the UN, the "Four Friends" as well as the USA. Also, the 
expiration date of the Secretary Generals's tenure put pressure on both sides. 
Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure as the Secretary General of the UN was to end at 
midnight, 31 December. He and his wife were to fly out on a specially chartered 
private flight to the Caribbean (Juhn 1998:120). In the last 30 minutes of his tenure  
perceived as a deadline by all actors (it was unknown when the conflict would reach 
final resolution under Boutros-Ghali) - the parties settled on all substantive issues in 
the New York Act relating to the separation of the warring parties and the cessation of 
the armed conflict, which included the end of the military structure of the FMLN and 
the "reintegration of its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, 
political and institutional life of the country".130 The cessation of the armed conflict 
took effect formally on 1 February 1992. There was not a single violation of the cease-
fire, a situation contributing to the Salvadoran case being called a success. 
A further meeting between the parties was scheduled for 5 January 1992 to 
negotiate the timetable for implementing the agreements and the procedure for ending 
the military structure of the FMLN and reintegrating its members, within a framework 
of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country. If 
differences on these points were not bridged by 10 January, the parties would accept 
formulas proposed by the Secretary General. According to the timetable, the armed 
conflict was to end formally on 31 October 1992. The process through which this goal 
would be attained consisted of four elements: the cease-fire, the separation of forces, 
the dismantling of the military structure of the FMLN and reintegration of its members 
into civilian life, and UN verification of these activities. 
                                                 
130 New York Act, 31 December 1991 (UN doc. A/46/863  S/23504) 
 76
Reaffirming the Geneva Agreement, bearing in mind the San José, Mexico and 
New York Agreements and having concluded negotiations on all the substantive items 
of the Caracas Agenda and of the New York compressed negotiations, the parties 
signed the final peace agreements at Chapultepec Castle, Mexico City, on 16 
January 1992. The peace settlement was close to what is called an elite settlement, 
that is, a pact including all or almost all significant elites and addressing all major 
issues among the elites, either by resolving them or by agreeing to suspend conflict 
over them (Peeler 1998:83).  
The Chapultepec Agreement was divided into 9 "chapters": the armed forces, 
the National Civil Police, the judicial system, the electoral system, economic and 
social questions, political participation by FMLN, the cessation of the armed conflict, 
UN verification and the implementation timetable. (The separate San José Agreement 
dealt with human rights, with the exception of the creation of a National Counsel for 
the Defence of Human Rights called for in the Mexico Agreement.) 
The section of the Chapultepec Agreement relating to the reduction of the 
armed forces only stated that they should be reduced to a "size appropriate to their 
doctrine and to the functions assigned to them by the Constitution within the 
framework of the constitutional reform resulting from the Mexico Agreements". The 
word "appropriate" is used repeatedly without any concrete measures. However, the 
government had already submitted a plan for the reduction of the armed forces to the 
UN, a plan which was approved and initiated shortly after. This plan provided for a 
50,2% reduction of the armed forces, including demobilization of the five rapid 
reaction battalions (known as BIRIs). The reduction began on 1 February 1992 and 
was scheduled to end in January 1994.131 A 50% reduction meant cutting the size from 
62.000 men to some 31.000. As seen in section 2.2, the armed forces numbered 9.850 
men by the end of 1980. Consequently, the military was still to be three times as big as 
when civil war broke out. Whether or not this is an "appropriate" size I am not 
qualified to judge. Further mention of the accords shall be made in chapter 6, when 
evaluating the overall peace agreement. 
                                                 
131 Report of the Secretary-General on all aspects of ONUSAL's operations. (UN doc. S/25812) 
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T.A. Wilkins132 argues that having the "Friends" sign the Accords would have 
created two benefits. First, it would have raised the Friends' commitments to further 
the peace process, in terms of technical training and development assistance, to the 
level of legally binding obligations. Second, the agreements would then fall under the 
definition of a treaty  an agreement between states governed by international law. I 
asked Alvaro de Soto if this at any time was discussed within the UN. His answer was: 
 The idea never came up. It would have been unthinkable. The government would not have 
 countenanced anything that brought the peace accords to a treaty level. They were always meant to be 
 political agreements. Furthermore, it would have been very difficult to persuade the 'friends' to co-sign a 
 treaty between a government and a guerrilla coalition which would have been tantamount to granting 
 the guerrillas recognition of belligerence. Even the Mexicans, who had in the Franco-Mexican 
 declaration of 1981 labelled the FMLN as a valid political interlocutor, would have balked at that. 
 Imagine what Subcomandante Marcos [in Chiapas] would have made of it -- not to mention the FARC 
 [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and the  ELN [National Liberation Army; Marxist insurgent 
 group].133 
 
I believe this fully explains why the "Friends" did not and could not sign the 
agreement. 
According to UN expert Pedro Nikken, in the negotiations, the United Nations 
working document dealing with the judiciary was subject to the greatest change of all: 
To obtain more provisions and stronger language in the constitutional reform related to the military, 
 the FMLN made greater concessions with respect to the judiciary. Therefore, judicial reform was left 
 relatively weak; even if all of the reforms had been implemented they would not be sufficient. (in 
 Bland, G. (1993):Conference Report: El Salvador: Sustaining Peace, Nourishing Democracy, p.33)  
 
During the mediation process the UN prepared working documents suggesting a wide 
range of measures to transform the judiciary, but they can hardly be criticized for not 
imposing their will on the parties. According to Carnevale's model of mediator action 
(fig. 3.3), when the mediator's perception of common ground is low, the mediator can 
press or compensate depending on whether his/her value of the parties' aspirations is 
low or high respectively. The parties obviously had high aspirations and would  
according to the model - need some kind of compensation to lower their demands. 
(Also see 6.2.4.) In the theoretical framework (p.41) I mentioned the possibility of 
issue linkage and trade-offs. As we have seen, the UN decided to compress the talks 
into a single phase after "banging their heads" on the issue of the armed forces. Issue 
                                                 
132 Wilkins, Timothy A. (1997): "The El Salvador Peace Accords: using international and domestic law norms to 
build peace." Ch. 11 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, p.278. 
133 de Soto, Alvaro (2001, July 30). Re.: The UN as peacemaker in El Salvador [E-mail to Rune Baklien] 
[Online]  Available by e-mail at: runeba@student.sv.uio.no. (See Annex II, question 6.) 
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aggregation proved wise in terms of moving the process ahead. To the FMLN, 
reforming the military was so crucial that they made greater concessions with respect 
not only to the judiciary but also relating to economic and social questions. This is 
noteworthy inasmuch as the root cause of the civil war was poverty and 
marginalization. I asked de Soto134 if the UN at any point tried to incorporate 
provisions for addressing the root causes of the socio-economic polarization in 
general, but that were subsequently refused by the GOES. He answered: 
No. At a point in mid-1991, months before the question was even addressed in the negotiation, the 
 FMLN conceded that economic policy should be set by whoever was legitimately elected. Perhaps 
 because they couldn't agree amongst themselves, they never put forward any proposals for systemic 
 change or to address root causes. Their claims boiled down to two areas: minimal conjunctural steps to 
 address social unrest, and steps for reintegration into society of former combatants and their 
 supporters (my emphasis).135 
 
In relation to the judiciary, Pedro Nikken also suggested that it 
would have made more sense if the judicial reforms were part of a separate agreement, as in the case 
 of human rights. This was even a goal of the negotiations, but as to why this was done I will not 
 comment further  because I do not believe it should be publicly discussed. (in Bland, G. 
 (1993):Conference Report: El Salvador: Sustaining Peace, Nourishing Democracy, p.33  my 
 emphasis.) 
 
This last remark raised my curiosity, so I asked Alvaro de Soto136 if he agreed that a 
separate agreement would have been better, and if so, why. And if so, why this was not 
done or possible to do. He answered: 
In preparation for our (the UN's) substantive contribution to the negotiation concerning the judiciary, we 
 had a brainstorming session in 1990 (similar to the one on human rights in the first half of the year) 
 where we concluded that the work to be done was monumental, and that it would take perhaps decades 
 to fix the judiciary. When the constitutional reforms were being negotiated in April 1991, the 
 government persuasively argued that if the judiciary were tampered with excessively, there was a 
 serious risk that the Supreme Court would have declared the whole package unconstitutional, thus 
 endangering the peace accords as a whole. The FMLN agreed, hence the somewhat modest results. 
 However, the Commission on the Truth [see 4.2.8] did its homework and, with its power to lay down 
 binding  recommendations, filled many of the lacunae left in the negotiation (my emphasis).137  
(Also see chapter 6) 
 
Although the FMLN presented itself as a united block, Salvador Samayoa, one 
of the FMLN's main negotiators, reported that debate within the FMLN and its 
constituent parties was far more difficult than negotiating with the government (Byrne 
                                                 
134 See Annex I, question 2. 
135 de Soto, Alvaro (2001, July 30). Re.: The UN as peacemaker in El Salvador [E-mail to Rune Baklien] 
[Online]  Available by e-mail at: runeba@student.sv.uio.no. (See Annex II, answer no. 2) 
136 See Annex I, question 5. 
137 de Soto, Alvaro (2001, July 30). Re.: The UN as peacemaker in El Salvador [E-mail to Rune Baklien] 
[Online]  Available by e-mail at: runeba@student.sv.uio.no. (See Annex II, answer no. 5) 
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1996:189). The government side faced the same problem in selling the proposed 
agreements to its constituency (cf. Putnam's two-level game).  
In chapter 6 I will evaluate the final peace agreements according to a set of 
normative criteria for a comprehensive peacemaking success. I also defer to chapter 6 
to take a closer look at the most important agreements  besides the ones already 
reached during the mediation process and mentioned in the course of this chapter.  
 
4.3 Preliminary summary  
How much closer are we to answering the first question raised in chapter 1: How (by 
what means) the UN contributed to a peaceful settlement? So far in this chapter, I have 
extracted the main actions of the UN vis-à-vis the FMLN and the GOES during the 
process that led to the final peace agreement. Where it seemed most relevant I have 
discussed actions and choices in light of theoretical assumptions, employing a pattern-
matching logic. Several of the variables affecting the chances of peaceful resolution 
(table 4.1) have been referred to  explicitly and implicitly  and their assumed effects 
seem to have been supported by the empirical findings, thus strengthening the case 
study's internal validity (cf. Yin 1994:106).  
UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar elicited support from the two 
superpowers prior to the initiation of formal negotiations. Assuring the support of the 
two most powerful countries in the Security Council was vital. The establishment of 
the Friends mechanism (Spain, Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia) provided further 
support. When one or several states join forces with an IGO, then the expected success 
rate exceeds the average.138  
According to Byrne (1996:188-189), the US accusations that the mediator was 
being partial (see pp. 59; 64) reflected more than anything a frustration on the part of 
the US government that a speedy cease-fire was not being reached; the ultimate 
assessment of the conflicting parties was that the UN mediator and his team played an 
indispensable and impartial role in the peace process. By flexibly performing the 
                                                 
138 Bercovitch and Schneider (2000): "Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict 
Management" Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 2, p. 157. 
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various facilitator roles according to the changing circumstances, the UN displayed 
"clever" leadership  reducing the assumed negative effects of e.g. issue complexity. 
The use of single negotiating texts allowed the parties to make concessions 
without appearing to surrender directly to the demands of the opponent. As pointed out 
in chapter 3 (p. 45-46), this means of communication also has other advantages. Prior 
to the talks, the UN organized brainstorming sessions with El Salvador experts on each 
of the agenda items. Also, as seen, the early deployment of ONUSAL gave an initial 
impetus to the peace process. However, ONUSAL evidently should have and could 
have been better organized.  
The most criticized parts of the peace agreement related to judicial and socio-
economic reforms (see chapter 6). Before assessing the degree of success of the 
peacemaking phase, however, let us now expand our attention by moving on to the 
next problem raised in the Introduction and briefly look at the role played by other 
actors. Attempting to understand and thereby explain why the parties were able to 
shake hands after 12 years of bloody war, we need to examine other context variables 
as well. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Case study continued 
Why was agreement between the parties in conflict achieved? 
 
It is well that war is so terrible, or we should get too fond of it. 
Robert E. Lee 
 
5.0 Purpose of chapter 
Guided by the modified contingency model of mediation (fig. 3.2), this chapter 
searches for other variables (not previously mentioned or accounted for) affecting the 
peace process and thereby the outcome. Combined with chapter 4, this chapter 
therefore sets out to reach a conclusion on why agreement between the parties in 
conflict was achieved. Methodologically, we then need to look at other internal 
conflicts around the world as well since we cannot explain the deviant outcome merely 
by studying El Salvador. This, however, will be done in a general fashion only. I 
identify two factors not previously mentioned that relate to a dispute's nature. I also 
critically examine the end of the Cold War as a causal variable. Did the fall of the 
Soviet Union really help ending the Salvadoran civil war, as the literature frequently 
argues? Finally, I take a brief look at the role played by the Bush Administration and 
integrate the findings with the role performed by the UN. 
 
5.1. Towards a "full" understanding of the peace achievement 
When attempting to understand why peace was achieved in El Salvador, we must 
study a number of different variables, from system (macro) variables to individual 
(micro) variables and their interaction. We have accounted for many of them already 
(the nature of the parties, the mediator, the dispute, the international system and the 
institutional setting) and what the UN did in trying to counter "malignant" features. 
However, there are surely other important variables (or "hidden" values of the 
variables already dealt with) whose effects we have not studied. In the quest for a 
"complete" understanding, therefore, I decided to contact Alvaro de Soto to see if he 
could shed more light on the deviant case of El Salvador. I asked him if he could 
identify any independent variables that set El Salvador off from the general trend (i.e. 
civil wars most often ending in capitulation or extermination)  besides the "mutually 
hurting stalemate", which  as we know - made the conflict "ripe" for resolution. He 
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pointed to a contributing factor: "As opposed to e.g. Colombia or Angola, there was no 
profitable commodity that lent itself to becoming a factor in prolonging the war  i.e. 
the drug trade and diamonds" (emphasis added).139 In El Salvador, this fact, combined 
with the absence of ethnic and religious tensions, could not aggravate the peace 
process since these factors were not present. If we look at Guatemala - in the words of 
Vegard Bye, the most racist country in the world - ethnic cleavages cause severe 
problems despite the peace agreement of 1996.140 In Angola, moreover, the conflict 
obviously has not been perceived as mutually hurting by all parties. Several peace 
accords have been signed since civil war broke out in 1975 (over who to govern when 
Portugal granted the country independence). The latest was signed in 1994, containing 
explicit power-sharing provisions as well as an enlarged role for UN peacekeeping 
forces (Hampson 1996:126). However, fighting resumed in late 1998.  
Another case in point is Sierra Leone, where diamonds also play an important 
role, next to ethnic and religious cleavages. Here, a peace agreement was also signed 
in mid-1999, but has not proved sustainable. Sudan has suffered from the longest civil 
war in Africa's history. From being a classic ethno-religious conflict, it has become 
one mainly over resources. The Southern Blue Nile, a region with immensely fertile 
land containing gold and mineral deposits has been intensely disputed by the 
government of Sudan and African rebels fighting alongside the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA) of southern Sudan.141 In Sri Lanka, ethnic tensions between 
the Sinhalese majority and the Tamils converge with secessionist claims, threatening 
state sovereignty. Here, the legitimacy of the mediator has also been disputed. (To my 
knowledge, the parties have never had a neutral meeting place either, not to say that 
this is a necessary condition for conflict resolution.) In short, when so many cleavages 
are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting, peacemaking obviously becomes increasingly 
                                                 
139 de Soto, Alvaro (2001, July 30). Re.: The UN as peacemaker in El Salvador [E-mail to Rune Baklien] 
[Online]  Available by e-mail at: runeba@student.sv.uio.no. See Annex II, answer no. 1 and Annex 1  
question 1. 
140 "The only solution for Guatemala is to improve the race, import Aryan studs to improve it. For years I had a 
German manager on my estate, and for every Indian Woman he impregnated, I paid him an extra 50 dollars." 
Statement by a member of Guatemala's traditional families. In Vilas (1996): "Prospects for Democratisation in a 
Post-revolutionary Setting: Central America", Journal of Latin American Studies, 28, pp. 476. 
141 see: http://africancultures.about.com/library/weekly/aa032700a.htm?terms=africa%27s+longest+civil+war  
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difficult. Even though El Salvador's conflict was extremely grave, it did not display 
any of these (presumably) exacerbating circumstances.  
Writing in 1990, Tom Gibb and Frank Smith142 claimed that El Salvador, 
together with Lebanon [where Christians, Druse, Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims 
all fought each other], frequently was presented as one of the worst conflicts in the 
world, expected to last indefinitely. Even though there were no divisions along 
nationalist or religious lines, the Salvadoran conflict was very deeply rooted - with 
even family members often finding themselves on different sides. According to Gibb 
and Smith, however, peace seemed more attainable in El Salvador because both parties 
accepted democracy and the electoral process as the only means  at the end of the day 
 of competing over power. Secondly, both parties accepted the institutional 
legitimacy of the armed forces. Thirdly, both sides accepted the legitimacy of the 1983 
Constitution. As we have seen, though, there were many extremists who did not regard 
FMLN as a legitimate actor, and FMLN initially wanted the abolishment of the armed 
forces. It is true, however, that FMLN accepted the legitimacy of the Constitution 
although they wanted constitutional reforms.  
 
5.1.1. The End of the Cold War as a causal variable 
According to LeVine,143 the UN's role in the peace process was pivotal, but in his 
opinion the real key to the "success of the negotiations" was the "will" of both parties 
to finally end the war. He argues that the conflict was mainly ideological, and that this 
made it the kind of conflict whose resolution was made easier with the end of the Cold War, as the 
 combination of "sheer exhaustion" among the belligerents ant the end of superpower sponsorship left 
 the warring parties with little option other than a negotiated settlement.144 (emphasis added) 
 
Basically, a case study involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly 
observed. Therefore, a researcher will "infer" that a particular event resulted from 
some earlier occurrence, based on interview and documentary evidence collected as 
part of the case study (Yin 1994:35). The question, in this case, then arises: Is the 
inference correct? Was the end of the Cold War really an important, contributing cause 
                                                 
142 Gibb, T. and Smyth, F. (1990): ¿Es posible la paz en El Salvador? Un informe sobre las perspectivas para 
las negociaciones y la política de Estados Unidos. Washington Office on Latin America, p.272. 
143 LeVine, M. (1997): "Peacemaking". Ch. 10 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, p.245. 
144 ibid. 
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of the Salvadoran conflict's resolution? Noam Chomsky does not believe so. He finds 
the "End of the Cold War"-rhetoric irrelevant (even ridiculous), candidly saying:  
I doubt that the end of the Cold War was more than a minor factor, probably none at all.  It's worth 
 remembering that the Soviet issue was extremely marginal throughout, as has typically been the case in 
 Central America and the Caribbean; perhaps the sole exception is the missile crisis, which had 
 exceptional features, including (but not limited to) the escalating US terror campaign against Cuba and 
 the very credible invasion threat.  Of course, the Cold War was always invoked as a pretext (as long as 
 that was possible). [emphasis added]  But the internal record makes it quite plain that it was little more 
 than that.  Recall  that it was also invoked from 1918; was there even an imaginable threat to US 
 security from Russia?  In  fact, the whole idea of a Soviet threat to the US in the Western hemisphere is 
 ludicrous.  Suppose the USSR had invaded Denmark (far more of a security threat to them than any 
 place in the Western Hemisphere to the US), or carried out a coup there to overthrow the government, 
 or imposed an embargo (if it were conceivable).  Would anyone have taken the claims seriously? The 
 fact that the rhetorical posture is taken seriously in this case is merely another sign of the subordination 
 of the intellectual classes to state power (in this case, US state power) -- something true of European 
 intellectuals too, far more than their self-image indicates. () The major factor, I think, was that the 
 two sides had plainly reached a stalemate, and the US wars had already succeeded in demolishing most 
 of the region.  Nicaragua had capitulated (and since then, has declined rapidly, now the second poorest 
 country in the hemisphere, after Haiti, the leading beneficiary of US intervention through the 20th 
 century).  Guatemala was devastated.  Honduras was a wreck.  El Salvador had been largely 
 demolished.  The main US enemies, like the Church, were pretty well crushed.  The final US paroxysm 
 of terror in November 1989 had killed plenty of people, including six leading Latin American 
 intellectuals whose brains were blown out by elite US-run forces, fresh from another session of US 
 training. () In any event, it was clear by then that the real threat had been destroyed: there would be 
 no popular movements of social reform in Central America; the countries would be lucky to survive.  
 So there was little point in pursuing the slaughter any further.  Under those conditions, the US was 
 happy to allow the UN to intervene to reach a settlement that would ensure that the US remained in 
 control (emphasis added).145 
 
I tend to agree with Chomsky on this point. With the exception of the Cuban missile 
crisis involving the Soviet Union, communism in Latin America was not a real threat 
to US "national security" (although it certainly was perceived as such by some 
prominent US figures). As Schafik Handal, one of the five FMLN commanders and 
the leader of the Communist Party told Alvaro de Soto, the Soviets had no leverage to 
exert over the guerrillas, to whom they provided no direct assistance.146 Iqbal Riza, 
former chief of ONUSAL, stated: "There are very few who have, shall we say, seen 
the light, or the truth. Many of them [the police and military] feel, perhaps because 
their perspectives were developed such that they felt that they were fighting 
communism, that their actions were justified. And very few have given up on that 
idea."147  The US - and they were well aware of it - was not helping the government to 
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at: vegard.higraff@hfstud.uio.no 
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fight Soviets, but poor people who simply wanted a just society - to be recognized as 
citizens with the entailing social, political and civil rights. The connection between the 
end of the Cold War and the end of the Salvadoran war is thus (mainly) spurious.148 As 
explained at the end of chapter 2 and by Chomsky above, by 1990 the United States 
had no further incentives to obstruct a Salvadoran peace settlement. The Sandinistas 
had lost the elections in Nicaragua, the US had invaded Panama and the Bush 
administration had replaced the ideological Reagan team  all irrespective of 
Gorbatchev's actions in Soviet. Moreover, the FMLN had presented peace proposals 
ever since civil war broke out,149 in which they made it clear that they did not intend to 
take absolute control of the country; they only demanded to be accepted as a legitimate 
actor and integrated into ordinary, democratic politics. In short, even though the end of 
the Cold War is frequently cited as a cause of change in politics all over the world 
(even a source of revival of internal conflicts!), the effects need not be all-
encompassing or universal. Drawing a conclusion from (a change at) the macro level 
to the meso and micro level is a false ecological/aggregative deduction. Generally 
speaking, of course, such a conclusion need not be erroneous  the mistake lies in the 
deduction itself, ignoring regional and national variations and dynamics. In this case, 
invoking the end of the Cold War as a cause of change in Salvadoran politics is 
probably more due to habitual association (cf. Hume) than anything else. There is no 
necessary connection between the two. The end of the Cold War is such a striking 
event that it easily distorts and clouds the mind of observers. 
The analysis has thus shown that a more or less established "truth" adduced when 
explaining the end of the Salvadoran conflict is irrelevant, or  at best  has only a 
weak indirect effect through a change of the international atmosphere. Ruling out one 
of the most conventional independent variables - while not identifying any other to 
replace it (rival explication) - could mean that some or all of the other factors listed 
                                                 
148 Blum (1995:12) states: "To the mind carefully brought to adulthood in the US, the truths of anti-communism 
are self-evident; as self evident as the flatness of the world once was to an earlier mind; as the Russian people 
believed that the victims of Stalin's purges were truly guilty of treason. (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Gorbatchev, when a Gallup poll asked Americans whether they agreed that "There is an international Communist 
conspiracy to rule the world", 60 percent replied in the affirmative; only 28 percent disagreed." 
149 See e.g. page ii. 
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gain explanation power if we consider the causal connections between them and the 
outcome sustained. 
 
5.1.2. The role of the US 
The change in US policy was clearly essential. During Reagan's term, standing policy 
was simply to keep the UN out of the region as a political actor. If the new Bush 
administration had not changed their position from opposition to support of a 
negotiated settlement and pressured the Salvadoran military to accept the reforms 
called for in the agreements, Cristiani would never have had the political space to 
negotiate seriously with the rebels. (The Bush administration did so primarily to make 
peace with Congress150 and because their economic interests in Central America had 
been assured.) The US government made its position on one point clear: that "Cristiani 
cannot be removed neither by decree nor by coup" (Juhn 1998:60). Cristiani would 
finish his term as president with the protection of the US government. Spoilers on any 
side would have to take that into consideration in any plans they might have or make. 
In a visit to Central America in April 1991, General Colin Powell had made it clear 
that US military intervention would not be ruled out if the parties did not reach an 
agreement within the end of the month, a statement much to the dislike of the parties 
and the UN. Also, Bush sent Powell to San Salvador to pressure the armed forces and 
to get the government to sign an agreement on constitutional reform prior to 31 April 
1991, when elections to the legislative assembly were held. On page 65 we saw that 
rightist groups threatened those who "trampled on the constitution", but that the 
negotiators nevertheless reached agreement on key changes to the constitution 
regarding judicial and electoral reform, limitations on the function and role of the 
armed forces and their subordination to civilian leadership, and on the formation of a 
Truth Commission to investigate major human rights violations. This was not so much 
due to the efforts of the UN as to the combined influence of the European Community, 
the Group of Friends, the five Central American presidents, the US Congress, the Bush 
                                                 
150 This has been confirmed by James A. Baker III in his book The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and 
Peaace, 1989-1992. In de Soto (1999): "Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador" Chapter 14 in Crocker, et al. 
(eds.): Herding Cats, p.372/384. 
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administration and last-minute phone calls by the US ambassador.151 (Powell also 
pressured the armed forces to accept the removal of several senior officers tied to 
human rights abuses as a result of the Ad Hoc Commission's investigation.152 ) 
Since purging and reducing the armed forces actually strengthened the power of 
the president vis-à-vis the military, Cristiani was more willing to negotiate the issue of 
the armed forces than risk having to make concessions on economic issues which "ran 
counter to the emerging neo-liberal consensus among the country's business elite".153  
 It is also interesting to note a controversial and surprising meeting which took 
place in the Salvadoran countryside in an attempt to move the peace process ahead: 
One of the representatives of FMLN (FARN) in Mexico, via Dick McCall (member of 
the Senate's Foreign Committee), had invited Ambassador William Walker to Santa 
Marta in Cabañas, where a large group of returning refugees had settled down. This is 
McCall's story (in Lindholm 1997:18-19; my translation from Swedish): 
 When I came to San Salvador I had coffee with Walker and the highest American military supervisor, 
 March Hamilton, and I was a bit surprised to see that the invitation was accepted with such enthusiasm. 
 We went to Santa Marta on 31 August and were initially met with great scepticism. We kept a low 
 profile out of consideration for the population  after all, here was the highest American representative 
 in the country, a man who symbolized the American support to the government, so it wasn't easy to 
 break the ice. But after a while, a relaxed atmosphere was created and we had a meeting with the leader 
 group and its spokesman Carlos Bonilla, in which we discussed the financing of different projects  
 electricity, water and other things. We brought sewing machines and other equipment that Walker had 
 promised a group of women who had visited San Salvador on a previous occasion. In the evening, there 
 was a party with dancing, and the guerrilla soldiers came down from the mountains with their weapons 
 and didn't quite understand what was going on in the beginning. The military commanders of the 
 guerrilla were there, and I had to take them aside to explain what was going on. They thought it OK that 
 we were seeing each other now that the cold war was over. I went back to the plaza where the highest 
 military leader of FARN, Raúl Hércules, had joined group with Marc Hamilton - a bottle of Johnnie 
 Walker had been opened, the atmosphere was very good. A relationship was created between Hamilton 
 and the highest military command of the FMLN which was to be important. Santa Marta got to play the 
 role of "bridge builder". 
 
The meeting was disliked by the FPL faction, but supported by ERP (see. 2.2). 
Cristiani had said "fine with me" as long as there was no publicity around it  the 
                                                 
151 Karl, TL. (1992): "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution." Foreign Affairs. vol. 71, nr. 2, p.157. 
152 O'Shaughnessy and Dodson (1999): "Political Bargaining and Democratic Transitions: A Comparison of 
Nicaragua and El Salvador." Journal of Latin American Studies, 31, p.103. Upon reading the report, issued on 22 
September 1992, President Cristiani felt, and the Secretary General agreed, that confidentiality was necessary. 
Although it was known that many senior members of the military establishment were named, including the 
minister of defense and his deputy, the full list was never made public (Johnstone 1995:45). The Truth 
Commission's report, however, released on 15 March 1993, named some of the same officers, including Minister 
of Defense René Emilio Ponce, who resigned three days prior to publication. 
153 LeVine, M. (1997): "Peacemaking". Ch. 10 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, p.247. 
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reason being that he would face strong criticism by the right wing of the ARENA party 
and the army. 
 
5.2 Peace 
The UN obviously deserves much acclaim for their role in El Salvador. The fact that 
both parties invited the UN and that the United States (according to de Soto, "the most 
difficult non-Salvadoran player"154) allowed the UN to mediate, meant the creation of 
a resourceful mediator. The conflicting parties assisted the UN in many ways, such as 
helping ONUSAL in a UNICEF-led Mine Awareness Project to warn the populations 
in mine-ridden zones of the dangers they faced. By the end of 1992, the project had 
detected and demarcated well over 25.000 land-mines  believed to represent almost 
every one of those still in existence. The Government was seeking international 
assistance for the next phase  deactivating the mines. By the end of 1992, moreover, 
60% of FMLN ex-combatants had been demobilized and handed over their weapons to 
ONUSAL. Reduction of the armed forces was being carried out in accordance with the 
plan submitted to the Secretary General (UN Blue Book 1995:31). 
 ONUSAL's presence reduced the parties' mutual distrust. None of the parties 
violated the cease-fire. Combined with the active role of the UN, the Group of Friends, 
and the more direct pressure from the United States, the government and the armed 
forces felt obligated to comply with many  but not all - of the agreements reached. 
 This chapter has identified two more "benign" variables (or rather absence of 
two "malignant" ones) which we can add to table 4.1: No secessionist claims and no 
commodity that lent itself to becoming a factor in prolonging the war. No 
enumerating table of the combination of present/absent "benign" and "malignant" 
variables alone, of course, can give us an accurate understanding of why peace was 
achieved, since a table is static and does not show the various ways in which the 
variables act and interact. The relative weight of their importance would not be easily 
illustrated either. In sum, peace was achieved due to a combination of both context 
(antecedent) and process (current) variables. In ONUSAL's Human Rights Division 
                                                 
154 de Soto (1999): "Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador". Chapter 14 in Crocker, et.al. (eds.): Herding Cats, 
p.371. 
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report for the period from 1 July 1992 to 31 January 1993, what distinguishes 
peacemaking and peace-keeping in El Salvador from other countries, is "the fact that 
the peace agreements provide for an interrelated series of tasks to be carried out by 
internal actors, and verified by the United Nations, with a view to generating within 
the State and society the necessary institutional and political conditions for the 
effective functioning of democracy in accordance with the rule of law while, at the 
same time, promoting changes in the relationship between the State and society with 
the ultimate goal of achieving national reconciliation and reunification".155 As 
LeVine156 argues, "the continuing inability of the international community to 
contribute to the process of reconciliation in such disparate crises as Bosnia, Haiti, and 
Rwanda attests () to the uniqueness of opportune factors in El Salvador." (emphasis 
added) The fact that the "peculiar spirit of cooperation and international optimism 
which characterized the immediate post-Cold War period recedes further from 
view",157 however, could just as well attest to the exaggerated role ascribed to the end 
of the Cold War in the first place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155 Report of the ONUSAL Human Rights Division for the period from 1 July 1992 to 31 January 1993 (extract), 
art. 14. (Un doc. A/47/912-S/25521, 5 April 1993), pp.417-18 in UN Blue Book. 
156 LeVine, M. (1997): "Peacemaking". Ch. 10 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, pp.253-254. 
157 ibid. 
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CHAPTER SIX: The concept of "success"  discussion and evaluation 
 
          I am the inferior of any man whose rights I trample underfoot. 
Horace Greeley 
 
6.0 Structure of chapter 
An analysis of the negotiation process would not be complete without an evaluation of 
the resulting peace agreement. Having scrutinized a particular case, we should now be 
better equipped to discuss the concept of "success" (what it should include) and, thus, 
assess the degree to which the Salvadoran peacemaking phase really merits such a 
term.158 I will begin with a normative discussion before evaluating the outcome 
according to the criteria outlined. 
 
6.1. How are we to measure and define the "success" of a peacemaking phase? 
6.1.1. Introduction 
Defining success and failure in complex peace operations is far from an exact science. 
First of all, we must make sure that the theoretical definition arrived at can be made 
operational in order to determine empirically whether or not the outcome can be 
regarded a success, thereby assuring definitional validity (cf. Hellevik 1991:43). It 
seems natural to view "success" as an index composed of several dimensions and 
aspects. If only some of the (necessary) dimensions are covered by the negotiation 
outcome, success is not fully achieved. Naturally, we prefer a continuous measure of 
success - i.e. to speak of degrees of success - rather than a crude binary measure of 
success/failure.159 To do this we need to avoid a too general definition. Often we see 
the concept "democracy" being minimally operationalized as "free elections" with the 
reason that it is parsimonious. Most people would probably agree that this is not a 
sufficient criterion. We cannot manipulate reality to achieve parsimony (even though - 
on the other hand - too specific a definition might exclude functional equivalents, i.e. 
states that are "equally democratic" in practice but organized in different  
                                                 
158 I wish to remind the reader of what was said at the end of section 1.4 in the Introduction: that the discussion 
will not include the implementation of the accords/peacebuilding phase. The Success (capital S) of the combined 
peace phases, however, largely depends on the success (with minuscule) of the first phase  the peacemaking and 
the resulting peace accords. Any flaws at the first stage are likely to jeopardize the chances of Success. 
159 cf. Underdal (1983): "Causes of Negotiation "Failure"". European Journal of Political Research, 11:184. 
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ways160). Minimal definitions of complex concepts hollow out their "true" 
significance. After all, one of the purposes of science is to say something about the 
objective world in a valid and reliable a way as possible. Consequently, substantiality 
must be prioritized if definitions are not to be empty words. The way we 
operationalize X in an analysis determines the results we get. Methodology, then, must 
be the basis of all science. As social scientists, we should at least try to give precise 
and meaningful definitions in order not to deceive other people and ourselves (as did 
the literary figure Don Quijote, who could no longer see what was evident to most 
others).  
 
6.1.2. Normative discussion 
Bercovitch and Houston (1995:19) define mediation as successful when it has made a 
"considerable and positive difference to the management of a conflict and the 
subsequent interaction between the parties". This definition is somewhat vague and 
hard to operationalize. How are we to determine which outcomes are included in this 
definition? In their view this is, moreover, a strict definition. In my opinion, though, it 
includes necessities that cannot be relaxed. A success has to be "considerable". Surely 
their definition is stricter than that of Frei (1976), according to which mediation is 
successful when it is offered only (in Bercovitch and Houston 1995:20). Such 
definitions, of course, cannot be taken seriously.  
Success is a multifaceted concept. For one thing it has to be viewed in light of 
the mediation's purpose. Even if agreement is reached on all issues on the agenda, 
however, a mediation outcome should not be regarded a complete success if important 
issues (for whatever reason) have been kept off the agenda.161 If we are to label a 
peace settlement a comprehensive success, all issues and problems relating to the 
conflict need to be addressed, and directions for their resolution have to be given. The 
general purpose of the Salvadoran peace process (agreed upon at Geneva and made 
                                                 
160 In Albert Hirschman's view, laying down strict preconditions for democracy, such as "income distribution 
must be improved,  political parties must show a co-operative spirit" may actually encourage the 
deconsolidation of existing democracies. (In Karl and Schmitter (1991): "Modes of transition in Latin America, 
Southern and Eastern Europe." International Social Science Journal, No. 128, p. 283.) 
161 cf. Schattschneider's much cited phrase: "organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are 
organised into politics while others are organized out." In Østerud 1996:40. 
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more specific/itemized in the Caracas Agreement) was to "end the armed conflict by 
political means as speedily as possible, promote the democratization of the country, 
guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify Salvadorian society".162 
The first objective was obviously accomplished. I will evaluate the fulfillment of the 
other three in the next section.  
Rognes (1999:24) gives 7 criteria for a "good" negotiation outcome (my 
translation): 
1. Are your interests well taken care of? 
2. Are the interests of the other party (parties) being protected in an acceptable 
way? 
3. Will third parties suffer? 
4. Is the agreement better than your alternatives to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA)? 
5. Is this the best possible solution that is attainable with the other party? 
6. Did you have an efficient communication process? 
7. Do the parties want to negotiate with each other in the future? 
 
As criteria for the success of a peacemaking phase these may not be automatically 
applicable. This is so for at least two reasons: First, negotiation is only a part of 
peacemaking and, consequently, does not adequately cover our concept. Second, the 
criteria are for a "good" outcome and do not fulfil the requirements for a "success". 
Nevertheless, I believe we can use these criteria as a starting point for outlining a set 
of criteria for a comprehensive peacemaking success. Some of Rognes' criteria can be 
hard to pin down and the answer may also depend on who one asks. As regards e.g. the 
second criterion, what is meant by "an acceptable way", and is A to judge what is 
acceptable to B? It might be just as well to combine the two first criteria into one, 
stating that the parties must have reason to be content or feel content. If they are not, 
any agreement is likely to be subverted sooner or later (cf. the harsh punitive terms of 
the Versailles treaty which was more or less imposed). At the same time, however, 
negotiation is not  or should not be - a process of winning and losing (cf. Fisher and 
Ury's principled negotiation), so that success must be evaluated against the problem, 
                                                 
162 Geneva Agreement, 4 April 1990. 
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not against the adversary.163 This moves some of the attention away from the parties 
and their subjective preferences, so we need to find a "proper" balance between 
objective needs (real requirements to solve a problem) and individual feelings of 
(dis)content. As a case in point, the Salvadoran army was not very pleased with the 
reduction of its forces, but they had to learn to change their anachronistic cognitive 
maps because their mentality was not compatible with the spirit of democracy. The 
GOES had to make most concessions (or rather satisfy objective needs) for there to be 
any sustainable peace.   
The third criterion is especially interesting and important, and must not be 
forgotten when evaluating whether or not the agreement was successful. The 
Salvadoran peace agreement was an elite pact. Of course, the participants claimed they 
represented the people's interests, but in the end we saw that the FMLN renounced 
some of their socio-economic claims at the people's expense to get land for 
themselves. Compromises, however, are only legitimate when it comes to special 
interests, i.e. when they are not in conflict with an interest that can be made universal. 
Also, all relevant actors whose lives are likely to be affected by the mediation 
outcome must have had the chance to convey their interests to valid spokesmen who 
actively work to satisfy needs and demands. If we combine the first three criteria, the 
agreement should be legitimate and fair. 
The fourth criterion seems redundant as a criterion for peacemaking success 
because signature of an agreement implies per se that the parties expect to be better off 
with the agreement than without it. We are only interested in whether or not the actual 
agreement can be regarded successful. People negotiate because they expect to achieve 
a settlement that is better than other available alternatives, but this does not mean that 
the resulting settlement is "as happy as can be". 
Criterion 5 can be viewed as the equivalent to a Pareto-optimal solution. This 
is, as we remember, a solution where none of the parties can improve their outcome 
without simultaneously making the other party worse off. I believe this is a necessary 
condition for one to talk about success. That the GOES accepted some of the FMLN's 
                                                 
163 Zartman (1988): "Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process", Negotiation Journal, vol. 
4:38-39. 
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demands was obviously much better than to keep on fighting. It was probably optimal 
too in terms of the future for all parties, not to mention the population at large.164 The 
criterion  as spelled out by Rognes  can, however, also be interpreted as a "maximal" 
solution, in which the criterion does not necessarily live up to a "success". It may very 
well be that an agreement is the "best possible" (at a particular time), but if it does not 
make peace sustainable, it cannot be a satisfactory condition for success.  
As regards criterion 6, it is conceivable that an outcome be termed successful 
even though the process has been somewhat ineffective. What matters, at the end of 
the day, is the quality of the outcome. The negotiations have to be thorough. Of 
course, we would prefer them to be effective as well, but in my opinion this could be a 
too strict requirement because effectiveness does not necessarily imply attention to 
details. What they say in some Arab countries may, perhaps, illustrate this point: The 
horse is fast, but the camel always reaches the destination no matter how stormy it is. 
 Finally, I regard criterion 7 a necessary condition  not just for a "good" 
negotiation outcome  but for the success of a peacemaking phase if we interpret 
"want" in the sense that the parties are prepared and able to negotiate with each other 
in the future. (I do not require that the parties wish to do so.) 
Holsti argues that the success or failure of peacemaking efforts in international 
politics is determined by whether or not a peace settlement fulfils a number of separate 
but interrelated functions (in Hampson 1996:19). To apply the general principles for 
success outlined above we must, then, relate them to the prerequisites for peace. 
According to Holsti (ibid.:20), these are: 
1. the provision of a system of governance that embodies certain norms of what 
constitutes acceptable behavior; 
2. legitimacy, based on shared principles of justice that are incorporated into the 
peace settlement; 
3. assimilation, which demonstrates "that the gains of living within the system  
outweigh the potential advantages of seeking to destroy or dominate it"; 
4. a deterrent system powerful enough to prevent defections; 
                                                 
164 In El Salvador one could argue that the ARENA party and the military were "worse off" than when the 
mediation process started  having had to renounce privileges. We have just emphasized, however, that success 
must be evaluated against the problem, not against the adversary.  
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5. conflict-resolving procedures and institutions that "include procedures and 
institutions for identifying, monitoring, managing, and resolving major conflicts 
between members of the system," including the capacity "to impose settlement 
terms where continuation of a conflict poses a threat to the system as a whole"; 
6. consensus on war, that is, the recognition that war is a fundamental problem so 
that the design of new orders develops and fosters explicit norms against the 
use of force; 
7. procedures for peaceful change, including "methods and procedures for 
reviewing settlement terms, for raising grievances, in general for adjusting 
commitments and responsibilities to new social, economic, demographic, and 
diplomatic conditions"; and 
8. anticipation of future issues, that is, a system for anticipating issues that are 
potential sources of new conflict and for monitoring and handling them before 
they erupt into violence. 
 
Peace settlements, then, should be judged according to whether or not they meet these 
prerequisites. As Underdal165 notes, a major obstacle to negotiation (mediation) 
success is a politically inadequate solution design model. Was the Chapultepec 
agreement sufficiently comprehensive and durable? To answer the question, we must 
also add  - as does Hampson (1996:21) - the inclusion of power-sharing provisions in 
the settlement166 as well as the presence (or absence) of ambiguities in the agreement 
that subsequently become (1) major points of contention or (2) a pretext for the parties, 
including third parties, to shirk their responsibilities and obligations (ibid.:238). "If 
specificity is avoided in order to reduce conflict, the interlocution may become so 
disconnected that it can serve no variant of the official purpose in an efficient way."167 
Moreover, peace agreements should not build up expectations about what peace will 
                                                 
165 Underdal (1983): "Causes of Negotiation "Failure"". European Journal of Political Research, 11, p.191. 
166 Arend Lijphart defines power sharing as the "participation of the representatives of all significant groups in 
the government of the country and a high degree of autonomy for these groups". (In Hampson 1996:21.) 
167 Midgaard, Stenstadvold and Underdal (1973): "An Approach to Political Interlocutions", p. 85 in Midgaard: 
STV603  Strategi, politisk kommunikasjon og forhandlinger. Compendium published at Unipub kompendier, 
Spring 2001. 
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bring which are unrealistic and difficult to satisfy168 (cf. Davies' J-curve). 
Consequently, we should emphasize that  in order for a peace settlement to be 
regarded successful  it needs to be stable. An agreement may be considered stable if 
no party has an incentive to defect or to undermine the agreement (Hopmann 1998:29). 
Underdal (in ibid.) abstracts four states of stability in negotiation outcomes: "(1) 
stable, which does not provide incentives to expand cooperation or to defect; (2) 
unstable, which does not provide incentives to expand cooperation but does provide 
incentives to defect; (3) stable and dynamic, which provides incentives to expand 
cooperation but does not provide incentives to defect; (4) empty169, which provides 
incentives to expand cooperation and incentives to defect." If we use his classification, 
we would prefer a peace settlement to fall into the category of stable and dynamic (3), 
or at least stable (1). (Holsti's fourth prerequisite above is equivalent to the latter type 
of stability.) If we conclude that the Chapultepec Accords were none of these, they 
cannot be considered (fully) successful.  
 
6.1.3. Normative conclusion. Definition of a "fully successful peacemaking phase" 
Having briefly discussed some criteria for peacemaking success, let us summarize 
them as follows:  
 A peacemaking phase is considered a complete success to the extent that 
a. the resulting peace agreement fulfils the official purpose of the negotiations; 
and 
b. addresses and resolves other issues or problems that are not part of the 
official agenda, but which are evidently critical to a long-term solution 
(otherwise peace will not be stable); and 
c. the peace agreement is crafted by all relevant parties (to provide legitimacy); 
and 
d. third parties do not suffer (if b-d are fulfilled, one can expect the agreement 
to be fair); and 
                                                 
168 del Castillo, G. (1997): "The arms-for-land deal in El Salvador." Ch. 14 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, 
p.359. 
169 "Empty" is not the way Underdal intended this category to be interpreted. Rather, this is a residual category 
for cases that are empirically difficult to find. 
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e. the final agreement contains provisions for future conflict management -
because "peace settlements, no matter how precisely worded, are not 
comprehensive instruction manuals providing specific (let alone wise) 
answers to hundreds of questions that arise each week" (Hampson 1996:24-
25). 
I define these criteria as necessary conditions for the complete success of 
peacemaking, and sufficient when combined. As to their relative weight, I find it safe 
to assume that this depends on the type of conflict, but c) is perhaps less important 
than the others. It might not matter that much if not all relevant parties actually have 
participated in crafting the agreement, as long as - to paraphrase Kant  it is 
conceivable that all relevant actors can and will give their possible consent. On a basic 
level, naturally, success can be seen as a product of consent,170 but approval does not 
"[demarcate] the safe and acceptable from the dangerous and illegitimate. Peace 
treaties may themselves depend on prior sanctions, threats of sanctions, or loss of aid, 
all imposed by the international community".171 We must, once again, balance the 
need of insistence on objective criteria (of e.g. fairness) with the parties' subjective 
preferences regarding the outcome. This said, the details of the Chapultepec Accords 
can now be critically judged according to our 5 conditions for a complete success.  
 
6.2.0 Evaluation of the Chapultepec Accords 
6.2.1 Armed Forces and National Civil Police 
On the positive side, we must of course mention that the Chapultepec Accords brought 
the armed conflict itself to an end (the first purpose of the talks), and civil war does not 
seem likely to recur. The military was reduced in size and its role redefined:  
As a State institution, the armed forces play an instrumental, non-decision-making role in the political 
 field. Consequently, only the President of the Republic and the basic organs of government may use the 
 armed forces to implement the provisions they have adopted. () The maintenance of internal peace, 
 tranquillity, order and public security lies outside the normal functions of the armed forces as an 
 institution responsible for national defence. The armed forces play a role in this sphere only in very 
 exceptional circumstances, where the normal means have been exhausted, on the terms established in 
 the constitutional reform approved in April 1991. (Chapultepec Accords, Chapter I, art.1D and 1F) 
 
                                                 
170 Doyle, Johnstone and Orr (1997): "Strategies for peace: conclusions and lessons." Ch. 15 in Doyle et. al.: 
Keeping the peace, p.375. 
171 ibid. 
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The amended constitution forbids military courts from trying civilians accused of 
political crimes and having jurisdiction when the victim of a crime is a civilian. 
However, the accords do not mention, for instance, the question of "active-duty 
military officers' heading state enterprises or agencies".172 Therefore, services such as 
telecommunications, water, ports, customs, and the post office continued to operate as 
they had under military leadership.  
Article 9 of chapter 1 (Chapultepec Accords) is titled Subordination to civilian 
authority, and reads: "The President of the Republic, in exercise of the power of 
discretion conferred on him by the Constitution, may appoint civilians to head the 
Ministry of Defence. In any case, appointees must be persons fully committed to 
observing the peace agreements." The Accords do not explicitly call for the 
appointment of a civilian as Minister of Defence, a "key element in insuring civilian 
supremacy".173 Confronted with this criticism, Alvaro de Soto told me that the FMLN 
originally demanded a civilian as Minister of Defence, but that they 
agreed not to press it when a member of the government delegation (David Escobar Galindo, the
 intellectual leader) argued that they wouldn't be gaining much from it -- he pointedly observed 
 that there were civilians who would be candidates for the job who would be far worse than some of the 
 military. The issue became moot with the constitutional and other reforms, including the rewriting of 
 the armed forces doctrine, which effectively transformed the military. It's fair to say that the military are 
 in some  ways the institution that changed the most and that has best implemented the peace accords.174 
 
Furthermore, the abhorred security forces were dissolved and a civilian police 
deployed throughout El Salvador, making human rights abuses decline.  Chapter 2 of 
the Accords provide fairly extensive guidelines for the National Civil Police  both in 
terms of its doctrine, functional and territorial structure and personnel (their profile, 
education and general requirements for admission). It is an unquestionable positive 
consequence of the accords. The country's police were once so poorly trained, corrupt 
and violent that most Salvadorans routinely avoided them, even when they had 
nowhere else to turn. The new National Civil Police ("The New Good Guys"175) are 
not under army command, and their composition  20% former guerrillas, 20% former 
                                                 
172 Kincaid, A. Douglas (2000):  "Demilitarization and security in El Salvador and Guatemala: Convergences of 
success and crisis." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol.42, no. 4, p.44. 
173 Walter, K. and Williams, P.J. (1993): "The Military and Democratization in El Salvador." Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol.35, no. 1, p. 67. 
174 de Soto, Alvaro (2001, July 30). Re.: The UN as peacemaker in El Salvador [E-mail to Rune Baklien] 
[Online]  Available by e-mail at: runeba@student.sv.uio.no. (See Annex II, answer no.4; as well as Annex I, 
question 4) 
175 Brauer, J. et.al. (1995): On your own in El Salvador. OYO Publications, USA, p.70. 
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police members and 60% civilians  helps ensure that they are not partial to any 
special political wing. Members also have to undergo a psychological exam intended 
to weed out those unsuited. 
 Personnel of the National Civil Police must have a vocation of service to the community, a capacity for
 human relations and emotional maturity, and the conduct and physical condition required to serve as a 
 police officer. They must also be suited to serving in a police force which is designed, structured and 
 operated as a civilian institution with the purpose of protecting and guaranteeing the free exercise and 
 combating all types of crimes; and maintaining internal peace, tranquillity, order and public security 
 They must also be able to adjust their conduct satisfactorily to the doctrine and legal regime of the 
 National Civil Police. Both admission to the National Public Security Academy and final admission to 
 the police force shall require checking the profile of candidates. Specific evaluation criteria shall be 
 established for this purpose, with rigorous standards set for each level of responsibility.  (Chapter 2, art. 
 4A, a.) 
 
On the positive side, we must also mention that the FMLN was legalized as a 
(socialist) political party. It quickly became the second political force in the country, 
and in the legislative elections of March 2000,176 FMLN won the plurality of seats 
(31), while ARENA got 29 and Party of National Conciliation (conservative) won 13. 
The accords also established a human rights ombudsman (widely respected by the 
population), the formation of a truth commission and introduced judicial and agrarian 
reforms. The third purpose of the talks (guaranteeing unrestricted respect for human 
rights) is closely related to the second purpose (democratization). The separate San 
José Agreement on human rights, combined with the training and work of the new 
National Civil Police and the human rights ombudsman specifically aim at fulfilling 
this purpose. Before critically evaluating the agrarian and judicial reforms as well as 
the truth commission, and whether or not the fourth purpose was sufficiently 
addressed, however, it is necessary to point to a feature of the institutional setting 
which calls for criticism: 
 
6.2.2 Institutional Setting 
The Geneva Accord stated:  
The Government of El Salvador and FMLN agree that the political parties and other existing 
 representative social organizations in El Salvador have an important role to play in achieving peace. In 
 the same way, they recognize the need for both the Government and FMLN to maintain adequate and 
 standing information and consultation mechanisms with these parties and social organizations in the
  country and that the latter must undertake to ensure the necessary confidentiality for the success of the
  dialogue process (my emphasis). 
                                                 
176 The Legislative Assembly has 84 members, elected for a three-year term, 64 members in multi-seat 
constituencies and 20 by proportional representation. 
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The negotiations, in spite of this, took place in isolation from other actors within the 
country, almost exclusively between the two parties. The lack of participation from 
civil society in the Salvadoran peace process is considered both by analysts and by 
members of Salvadoran society to have been a significant weakness  a weakness 
largely due to the closed nature of the negotiations. In order to assure the 
implementation of the accords, it is necessary to include the majority of the population 
and key governments interested in obtaining a durable peace.177 As such, the process 
does not fulfil criterion c), i.e., all relevant parties should craft the peace agreement (to 
provide legitimacy). According to Susan D. Burgerman,178 the FMLN initially tried to 
install a parallel-negotiating-table system, but the government rejected this. Instead, 
the FMLN took advantage of the "framework accord's provision to create permanent 
mechanisms for indirect participation of political parties and other civil sectors". 
Members of the FMLN delegation held official meetings preceding every round with 
labour leaders, political parties, church representatives, and human rights organizations 
in order both to get their recommendations and to inform them of the results of each 
round. Alvaro de Soto attempted to balance the need to "build constituency" for the 
negotiation process  to give members of society the sense of being involved  with 
the need for confidentiality, by meeting with sectoral representatives. As already 
pointed out, however, issues vital to popular sectors, especially labour rights and land 
reform, were sacrificed to the strategic interests of the parties themselves.  
It is ultimately the interests of civil society that are at stake in settling an internal conflict whose origin 
 lies in the perception of social injustice. Popular involvement in peace talks ensures that relevant 
 sector's substantive proposals are seriously considered, but it is of equal importance that, if ignored 
 during negotiations, organized members of civil society can be either apathetic or downright 
 obstructionist during the implementation process.179 
 
The UN learned from the Salvadoran experience, and cooperated more directly with 
civil actors in Guatemala. 
 
 
                                                 
177 Moreno, Rafael (1994): "El Proceso de Negociación Salvadoreño desde la Perspectiva del FMLN." Paper 
presented at "Seminario Internacional sobre Negociación de Conflictos Armados", 27-29 October. At: 
www.cepaz.org.sv/cepaz98/rafael1.htm 
178 Burgerman (2000): "Building the peace by mandating reform  United Nations-mediated human rights 
agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala." Latin American Perspectives. Vol. 27, no. 3, p.79. 
179 ibid.:80 
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6.2.3 Land reform 
During the talks that led to the Peace Agreement, negotiators had reached only broad 
understandings on land issues, leaving details to be worked out during the 
implementation process. Thus, in mid-1992, the parties were forced to deal with the 
subject again, in an increasingly charged environment (UN Blue Book 1995:27). After 
all, the land issue was one of the main causes of the armed conflict. As such, the 
Chapultepec Agreement does not entirely fulfil criteria a). One purpose of the 
negotiations was to promote the democratization of the country. In terms of 
democratization, not providing for a fair distribution seems like a serious flaw. The 
Accords stated that the land-tenure situation in the "conflict zones" would be respected 
"until a satisfactory legal solution for the definitive land-tenure system" was reached. 
It also said that landholders would not be evicted. The government should seek to 
"acquire and transfer through the Land Bank lands voluntarily offered for sale by their 
owners" to the State. The lands should be "transferred at market prices" (emphasis 
added). From a normative viewpoint, this is clearly inadequate. Even though "a system 
of payments may be established on the basis of a fixed price and long-term financing 
at low, fixed interest rates not subject to interest capitalization", the agreement does 
not aim at effectively removing the main cause of conflict. Of course, forcing 
landowners to hand over lands would not have worked smoothly. In either case, not 
laying a solid foundation for removing the main cause of conflict makes the accords 
unstable per se  thus also violating criteria b) as well as d) (fairness). A U.S. official 
stated in an interview with J.K. Boyce180 that the government made land transfers 
complicated because they did not want to give the opposition a gift. And the U.S. was 
not "in any mood to force the government into a land give-away program" because that 
would "smack of subsidies. And to a lot of people on Capitol Hill, land reform is a 
dirty word." The result was a land transfer program "doomed to failure because, quite 
simply, it is designed to fail". 
As seen in chapter 4, the FMLN agreed that economic policy should be set by 
whoever was legitimately elected. In this case, the best could perhaps be regarded the 
                                                 
180 Boyce, James K. (1995): "External assistance and the peace process in El Salvador." World Development, vol. 
23, no. 12, pp. 2112-2113. 
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enemy of the good. It could be that the FMLN did not want to spend time arguing over 
the issue with the government team if they counted on winning the next elections. 
Irrespective of this, when it is clear that socio-economic issues are going to be part of 
the peace agreement, it is  as various observers and scholars have argued  essential 
to bring into the process the international agencies and organizations that will have 
responsibility for funding reconstruction and reforming or creating new institutions. 
Who will pay should be addressed in the negotiations, and not be left to the 
implementation phase. When the UN got engaged in the peace negotiations, it did not 
think to consult the IMF or the World Bank.181  
Coleman (1993:28), Hampson (1996:155) and Wilkins182 claim that verifying 
implementation of the provisions (stating that the current land-tenure situation would 
be respected in former conflict zones) faced difficulties because the peace agreement 
fails to define "conflict zones". In February and March 1992, tensions rose in the 
countryside after various peasant groups seized properties, only to be evicted by 
security forces. I do not, however, understand this criticism. Should it not be 
intuitively evident to all Salvadorans  after 12 years of war  what "conflict zones" 
meant? Is it not more likely that peasants seized properties because they simply 
thought it fair, because they had expected more, and that they would have done so no 
matter what the accords specified since the poor peasants themselves did not sign the 
agreement? Surely, the design of an agreement is crucial to its implementation. The 
question here is if defining conflict zones really would have made an important 
difference. I asked Alvaro de Soto if he thought this criticism was fair. He answered:  
I don't recall the absence of definition of what constituted the conflict zones having constituted an issue 
 either in the negotiations or in the subsequent implementation of the agreements.183 
 
Alvaro de Soto has personally been in El Salvador several times to oversee 
implementation of the agreements (peacebuilding phase), so he ought to know if this 
was/is a real problem. Of course, there is a slight possibility that he does not want to 
accept any blame, or  perhaps more likely - that he finds the criticism of minor 
                                                 
181 de Soto, Alvaro and del Castillo, G (1994): "Obstacles to Peacebuilding." Foreign Policy 94,  p.76. 
182 Wilkins, Timothy A. (1997): "The El Salvador Peace Accords: using international and domestic law norms to 
build peace." Ch. 11 in Doyle et. al.: Keeping the peace, p.275.  
183 de Soto, Alvaro (2001, July 30). Re.: The UN as peacemaker in El Salvador [E-mail to Rune Baklien] 
[Online]  Available by e-mail at: runeba@student.sv.uio.no. (See Annex II, answer no. 3) 
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importance and therefore does not want to spend time on it. In any case, no matter who 
we believe, this particular criticism does not seem as powerful as that of the peace 
agreement's chapter on judicial reform, to which we now turn. 
 
6.2.4. Judicial reform 
The weakest and most criticized part of the Chapultepec Accords relates to the 
judiciary. Although the Mexico Agreements noted that "the set of political agreements 
on the judicial system envisaged by the Parties in the Caracas Agenda has still to be 
negotiated", further agreements were never discussed. The final peace agreement only 
includes a one-page chapter on the judicial system reaffirming that, as agreed in the 
Mexico Agreements, the composition of the National Council of the Judiciary "shall 
be such as to guarantee its independence from the organs of the State and from 
political parties and its membership shall, as far as possible, include not only judges 
but also sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice". 
No specific procedures are established for the democratization of the judiciary. Far 
more was done to limit the role of the armed forces. As Holiday and Stanley184 
correctly point out, the reforms leave untouched the extremely hierarchical structure of 
the courts that enables the Supreme Court to control the jurisdiction, legal decisions 
and administration of all lower courts. The creation of the National Council of the 
Judiciary was one of the few items agreed upon, but the National Assembly approved 
a council that is elected by the assembly, which thus risks politicizing it.185 In chapter 
4 we saw that when the constitutional reforms were being negotiated in April 1991, the 
FMLN did not want to risk the Supreme Court declaring the package unconstitutional, 
thus lowering their demands. To obtain more provisions and stronger language in the 
constitutional reform related to the military, the FMLN made greater concessions with 
respect to the judiciary. Alvaro de Soto has attributed this to the parties' mutual fear of 
Supreme Court president Gutiérrez Castro, who rejected the possibility of further 
reforms and maintained that the negotiators were trampling on the constitution (Popkin 
                                                 
184 Holiday, D. and Stanley, W. (1993): "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons From El Salvador." Journal of 
International Affairs 46, no. 2 (winter 1993), p. 424. 
185 Bland, Gary (1993): Conference Report: El Salvador: Sustaining Peace, Nourishing  Democracy. 
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. Latin American Program, WOLA, p.33. 
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2000:103). Gutiérrez Castro, who has been linked to individuals active in death 
squads, was named president of the Supreme Court in June 1989. He expressed that 
the peace accords did not apply to the judiciary, since only the executive branch of 
government and the FMLN signed them. In his words, only God could remove him 
from his position. The modest results, then, probably reflect the political realities at the 
time. Bargaining essentially entails compromises. As time passed by, the FMLN had 
realized that they could not fulfil all their aspirations. Wanting to reach a final 
agreement before Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure as Secretary General ended, the FMLN's 
satisfaction level (cf. figure 3.1) had probably moved closer to its BATNA. Needless 
to say, the Chapultepec Agreement does not completely fulfil criterion a). The Truth 
Commission, though, picked up where the negotiations had stopped. 
 
6.2.5 Truth Commission 
The objective of the Truth Commission, as set out in the Mexico Agreements, was to 
investigate "serious acts of violence that ha[d] occurred since 1980 and whose impact 
on society urgently require[d] that the public should know the truth". As such it was 
supposed to assist the transition to national reconciliation, the fourth purpose of the 
peace process. Composed of three foreign individuals (Belisario Betancur, former 
president of Colombia, Reinaldo Figueredo, former foreign minister of Venezuela, and 
Thomas Buergenthal, U.S. law professor and former president of the Inter-Amerian 
Court of Human Rights), the commission could gather information by any means 
deemed appropriate, interview anybody, and visit any place freely. It was authorized to 
recommend "binding" (in the sense that both parties had agreed that they would carry 
them out) legal, political, or administrative measures following its investigations, but it 
was expressly forbidden from functioning as a judicial body. Article 5 (chapter 1) of 
the Chapultepec Agreements also stated that impunity (freedom from punishment) 
needed to be ended, and to that end, the parties referred this issue to the Truth 
Commission for "consideration and resolution". 
 When the Truth Commission began its work in July 1992, it first had to 
establish a methodology. "To alleviate the fears of potential witnesses and consistent 
with its nonjudicial character, the commission decided it was neither necessary nor 
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appropriate to grant full due process rights to each accused wrongdoer." (Johnstone 
1995:35). Nevertheless, the commission felt it had no alternative but to name 
individuals in its report (a document of over 200 pages plus annexes of several 
hundred pages). As such, the Truth Commission went further than the Sábato report on 
disappearances in Argentina and the Rettig report of the Truth Commission in Chile, 
which did not include names. In the words of Carlos Chipoco, who served as director 
of research for the Truth Commission in El Salvador and investigated the Jesuit case:  
Why then reveal the names of people who committed crimes in the case of El Salvador? We discovered 
 that some of these people still held important political and institutional positions and could exercise or 
 were exercising power. Therefore, it was necessary to show this to the Salvadoran society. If this 
 situation was to continue, it had to be sanctioned by Salvadoran society. Salvadorans needed 
 information on which to base such a decision, and one of the pieces of information was the names of the 
 people who had made mistakes. (in Bland, Gary (1993): Conference Report: El Salvador: Sustaining 
 Peace, Nourishing Democracy, p.36) 
 
The Truth Commission's report stated: "Not to name names would be to reinforce the 
very impunity to which the Parties instructed the Commission to put an end."186 The 
commission argued that this approach protected institutions and punished criminals. 
Most of the information the commission obtained was handled confidentially, without 
revealing the source. The commission took this approach in order to reduce the 
likelihood that those responsible for the acts of violence, or their defenders, would be 
able to identify the sources of information.  
The main limitation the commission faced was time. Under the peace accord, 
the commission was to work for only six months on a report covering a period of more 
than a decade. The commission registered over 22.000 complaints of serious acts of 
violence that occurred between January 1980 and July 1991. Over 60% of the 
complaints concerned extra-judicial executions, over 25% concerned forced 
disappearances, and over 20% concerned complaints of torture. Armed forces 
personnel were accused in almost 60% of the complaints, members of the security 
forces in approximately 25%, members of military escorts and civil defence units in 
nearly 20%, and members of the death squads in more than 10% of the cases. The 
complaints registered accused FMLN in approximately 5% of the cases.187 The Truth 
                                                 
186 From Madness to Hope  Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. 15 March 1993. (UN doc. 
S/25500.), p.300 in United Nations (1995): The United Nations and El Salvador 1990-1995. 
187 ibid., p.311. 
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Commission's report described in detail 30 cases, chosen to illustrate the pattern of 
violence on both sides. Given the short period of time for its investigations, the 
commission focused on (1) individual cases that  "outraged Salvadoran society and/or 
international opinion" and (2) series of cases revealing a "systematic pattern of 
violence or ill-treatment".  
Although the report did not shed much new light on the cases (such as the 
murder of Archbishop Romero in 1980, the massacre of 500-1000 people at El Mozote 
in 1981, the murder of the Jesuit priests, their cook, and her daughter in 1989), debate 
on their veracity and who was responsible finally ended, by giving them "the stamp of 
official acknowledgement" (Johnstone 1995:36). More important were the many 
recommendations that the Truth Commission made (chapter V of the report). These 
included: 
• Dismissal from the armed forces or civil service of all persons named 
in the report 
• Disqualification from holding public office for at least 10 years of all 
those named in the report 
• Resignation of all members of the Supreme Court188 
• Deconcentration of the power of the Supreme Court by removing from 
it responsibility for appointing and removing judges, licensing and 
disciplining lawyers, and dismissing members of the National Council 
of the Judiciary (the body responsible for nominating judges) 
• An investigation of "private armed groups" (a euphemism for death 
squads) 
• Institutional reforms to prevent the repetition of such acts the 
commission had investigated 
• Material and moral compensation to all victims of human rights abuses 
• A Forum for Truth and Reconciliation (entrusted primarily to COPAZ) 
• International follow-up 
 
It was not within the commission's power to impose penalties on those responsible 
because it did not have judicial functions. As stated in the report, released on March 15 
1993: 
 [T]he  judiciary is still run by people whose omissions were part of the situation which must now be 
 overcome, and there is nothing to indicate that their customary practices will change in the near future. 
                                                 
188 The Supreme Court was described as a "contributing factor to the tragedy that the country has suffered". As a 
case in point, one judge permitted Lt. Lopez Sibrian  involved in the 1981 killing of Rodolfo Viera, head of the 
Salvadoran agrarian reform agency  to change his appearance to prevent witnesses from identifying him in a 
line-up. Popkin, M. (1993): Justice Impugned: The Salvadoran Peace Accords and the Problem of Impunity, p.3. 
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 These considerations confront the Commission with a serious dilemma. The question is not whether the 
 guilty should be punished, but whether justice can be done. Public morality demands that those 
 responsible for the crimes described here be punished. However, El Salvador has no system for the 
 administration of justice which meets the minimum requirements of objectivity and impartiality so that 
 justice can be rendered reliably (in UN Blue Book, 1995:381).  
 
The government's reaction to the report was generally negative. Two of the principal 
negotiators of the accords called it biased and in excess of the commission's mandate 
(Johnstone 1995:37). Santamaría, who headed the government's negotiating team, 
even termed the report "an insult to Salvadoran society  and very explosive" (Popkin 
2000:121). The members of the Supreme Court said that they did not intend to 
resign.189 President Cristiani also accused the commission of exceeding its authority 
and claimed that the report "[did] not respond to the wishes of the majority of 
Salvadorans who [sought] to forgive and forget everything having to do with that very 
sorrowful past" (ibid.). Five days after the commission's report was issued, the 
government promulgated a general amnesty law calling for the "extinction of both  
criminal and civil liability" (Popkin and Bhuta 1999:105).190 Nor was the FMLN 
entirely satisfied with the report. In a letter to the Secretary General, the coordinator-
general of the FMLN stated that, notwithstanding a number of reservations, the FMLN 
accepted responsibility for the events reported and promised to fulfil the 
recommendations in the report. However, the FMLN conditioned its compliance on 
compliance by the government, and the leader of the one FMLN faction specifically 
named in the report, Joaquín Villalobos of the ERP (see 2.2), called the 10-year ban on 
                                                 
189 In 1994, a new Supreme Court was in deed selected, but as of March 1995 it had only removed or suspended 
11 of the country's 600 judges. The justices themselves defended the slow pace, arguing that in a democracy it is 
important to proceed with due process. They also maintained that the very process of evaluation had led most 
judges to improve their performance out of professional pride. (O'Shaughnessy and Dodson (1999): "Political 
Bargaining and Democratic Transitions: A Comparison of Nicaragua and El Salvador." Journal of Latin 
American Studies, 31, p.108. 
190 "In some circumstances, it may be necessary to sacrifice justice for social peace, but the trade-off must be 
implemented in a way that is acceptable to society as a whole, including the victims of injustice" (Johnstone 
1995:43). For survivors of severe human rights abuses there is an intimate correlation between rehabilitation and 
moral compensation, a central recognition reiterated, among many, by the Chilean human rights organization 
CODEPU and Paz Rojas Baeza, who was granted The University of Oslo's Price for Human Rights in March 
1999.  On 18 March 2000, I had the chance to talk to the present Costa Rican ambassador to Norway, H.E. Dr. 
Manuel A. Constenla. Being a diplomat with considerable knowledge on Latin America, I asked him of his 
opinion regarding the existence of amnesty laws. In general, he meant they were decisive for democratic 
transitions, and that people had to understand - no matter how much it hurt their feelings  that they were the 
only realistic means of achieving a "peaceful" transition. In his view, democracy had to be promoted by other 
means, though he did not state which ones. (see Baklien, R. (2000a): "What is the impact of impunity on 
democracy in Latin America, and  how has the problem of impunity been addressed?" University of Oslo. Paper, 
p. 4f). 
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holding public office "absurd and ridiculous" (Johnstone 1995:37). Dealing with 
impunity, and thereby attempting to reunify society, has consequently been very 
difficult. Without in any way negating the effects that some of the Truth Commission's 
recommendations may have had, Popkin (2000:162) argues that their report did not  
and probably could not  fulfil the ambitious agenda established in the peace accords. 
In this respect, she says, El Salvador offers an example to be avoided: "The refusal to 
come to terms with the past, even in an exemplary fashion, or to provide any redress 
for victims and their families has not helped to end impunity, establish the rule of law, 
or promote reconciliation. Instead it has left victims and their relatives without 
recourse."191 (Also, to the disappointment of many observers, the commissioners 
determined that their mandate did not include addressing US responsibility for training 
and supporting the abusive Salvadoran military.) 
 
6.3. Overall assessment of the Chapultepec Agreement 
The final peace agreement only partially fulfils the first criterion for a peacemaking 
phase. The process ended the civil war. The agreement does not, however, establish 
sufficient mechanisms for democratizing the country and reunifying Salvadoran 
society, a problem that necessarily has repercussions for the peacebuilding phase. On 
the other hand, the accords do guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights. The 
Chapultepec Agreement addresses or mentions all problems, but does not resolve them 
all. Consequently, criterion (b) is not fulfilled entirely either. All relevant parties did 
not craft the agreement (not fulfilling (c)), and since socio-economic and judicial 
reforms are negligible, the agreement cannot be regarded completely fair (d) either. As 
regards the fifth (e) and final criterion, i.e., that the agreement should contain 
provisions for future conflict management, I believe this one is fulfilled. The FMLN is 
incorporated into ordinary politics and disputes are, of course, to be resolved by 
political negotiations. Civil and political rights are granted everyone, thus people are 
                                                 
191 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 1995, managed to go further than 
any other in its work to establish the complete truth. Well funded and initially authorized to operate for two 
years, is held public hearings throughout the country. The provision for amnesty, which required full disclosure 
by those requesting its protection, encouraged many of those involved in violent acts to come forward. In South 
Africa, in contrast to most of Latin America, the carrot of amnesty accompanied the stick of a real possibility of 
prosecution. Those who did not seek amnesty during the relevant period, as well as those who were denied 
amnesty by the Commission, could  at least in theory  face prosecution. (Popkin 2000:116) 
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allowed to state their opinions freely  written as well as orally - without having to 
suffer any consequences. Since the final peace agreement, strictly speaking, does not 
fulfil 4 out of the 5 criteria we are forced to conclude that the peacemaking phase is 
not a complete success. Despite that, I still regard the process more of a success than a 
failure. The criteria are intertwined, and we could ask "how much" of them that are 
fulfilled. Ending the war and completely restructuring the armed forces could be 
regarded a bigger achievement than not adequately laying the foundation for national 
reconciliation. If so, criterion (a) is still "more" fulfilled than not. Nothing said herein 
contradicts Juhn's (1998) wording of "the most successfully negotiated settlement in 
recent history". Compared to the general trend, the Salvadoran peace process is clearly 
more successful. It is a "negotiated revolution" since it ended the war and legitimized 
the FMLN as a political actor  thus opening the system for political opposition. But it 
is a partial success since the process does not change the disproportionate distribution 
of wealth and income  one of the principal causes of the conflict. And, as pointed out, 
the agreement on judicial reforms is almost not any agreement at all.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, 
 a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice. 
- Baruch Spinoza  
 
In this dissertation I have attempted, by means of available data, to (1) answer how the 
UN contributed to a peaceful settlement in El Salvador and, as an extension of this 
question, (2) why agreement between the parties in conflict was achieved. A case study 
of the role of the UN in El Salvador seemed relevant because empirical studies of 
third-party mediation have been very rare, and because the UN helped ending a civil 
war  an outcome too seldom experienced by suffering populations.  
Guided by Bercovitch and Houston's non-recursive contingency model of 
mediation (1995/2000), I explored the interaction between context and process: how 
qualities of the mediator, the parties, the dispute, the international system and the 
institutional setting affected the mediation process, as well as how variables inherent 
to the mediation process affected the context and outcome. For each variable I related 
the empirical findings to theoretical assumptions by means of a pattern-matching logic. 
Peace was achieved in El Salvador due to a combination of opportune factors (hard to 
replicate), "clever" mediation leadership, and external pressure and support. The 
Salvadoran civil war was largely one-dimensional, with few reinforcing cleavages. 
The parties had reached a mutually hurting stalemate that had made them welcome an 
active role by the UN. There were, moreover, no cultural, ethnic or religious cleavages 
to exacerbate the socio-economic dispute. There were no profitable commodities that 
lent themselves to becoming a factor in prolonging the war, such as diamonds have in 
Angola. There were no secessionist claims threatening the state. The rebels, on the 
contrary, only demanded to be accepted as a legitimate actor within the political 
system. Top UN-envoy, Alvaro de Soto, profited from his long experience as a 
mediator. Sharing the same culture and religion as the parties, and with extensive 
knowledge and understanding of the conflict, he also gained high legitimacy. By 1990, 
the United States changed its position from opposing any mediation efforts to 
supporting a negotiated settlement. This happened not as a direct result of the end of 
the Cold War, but because they had no further incentives to obstruct a peace 
settlement. The Sandinistas had lost the elections in Nicaragua, The US had invaded 
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Panama and the Bush administration had replaced the ideological Reagan team  all 
irrespective of Gorbatchev's "glasnost" and "perestroika". Perhaps there was also an 
increasing understanding that, as David Borenstein has expressed: "One cannot subdue 
a man by holding back his hands. Lasting peace comes not from force." 
Having scrutinized a particular case, I then (3) outlined five normative criteria 
for the complete success of a peacemaking phase and evaluated the peace agreement 
according to these. I concluded that the peace agreement could not be regarded a 
complete success. The resulting peace agreement did not fulfil all of the official 
purposes of the negotiations, such as laying a solid foundation for democratizing the 
country (the socio-economic structure remained intact and the lack of judicial reform 
perpetuated impunity). Neither did all relevant parties participate in crafting the peace 
agreement.  Nevertheless, the mediation process and its resulting agreements evidently 
display more "successful" characteristics than many other attempts to resolve internal 
conflicts. 
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ANNEX I: E-MAIL TO UN-MEDIATOR ALVARO DE SOTO (Sent 29 July 2001) 
 
Dear Mr. Alvaro de Soto,  
 
Tricia Juhn was kind enough to forward me your e-mail address, fax and phone number some 
time ago. 
 
I am writing to you from the University of Oslo (Norway), where I am currently working on 
my dissertation in political science  to be kept at the university's library. My working title is: 
"The role of the United Nations as a peacemaker in El Salvador between 1990-1992." I speak 
Spanish and have, as part of my studies, taken courses on Latin America, democratization in 
developing countries, international negotiations as well as debate theory and negotiation 
theory.  
 
Empirical case studies of third-party mediation have been very rare, although increasing. The 
fact that the Chapultepec Accords were called a "negotiated revolution" (Karl) and "the most 
successfully negotiated settlement in recent history" (Tricia Juhn), made me interested in the 
Salvadoran case. Last year I wrote an article (not published) on decentralization and the 
development of "social capital" in El Salvador, which furthered my interest for this tiny 
country. According to Stephen Stedman, out of a total of sixty-five cases of civil war in the 
period from 1900 to 1989, only six were terminated through international mediation. El 
Salvador thus seemingly belongs to a rare category, deviating from the general trend (civil 
wars ending with extermination or capitulation of one side). 
 
I am addressing this letter to you because I would like to ask you, Sir, a few questions relating 
to the negotiation process  if possible. I am aware that you have written articles on the UN's 
role in El Salvador (such as "Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador" (1999), published in 
Herding Cats, and "Obstacles to Peacebuilding." (1994) in Foreign Policy), and that you have 
given several interviews. Of course, your articles were most informative, together with several 
other publications and reports on the role of the UN in El Salvador. Nevertheless, I have taken 
the liberty to ask the following questions: (If you do not have time to write back, then perhaps 
I could call you at a time convenient for you?) 
 
1. Besides the fact that the conflict reached a "mutually hurting stalemate", "ripe" 
for resolution - do you locate any other independent variables that set El 
Salvador off from the general trend (i.e. civil wars most often ending in 
capitulation or extermination)? 
 
2. Relating to the FMLN's handling of economic and social questions, you write in your 
article "Ending Violent Conflict" (p.362): "The FMLN, whether because of 
factional divergences, lack of expertise, or a sober appraisal of political realities, left 
the examination of these root causes for a late stage; () Instead, it substantially 
lowered its sights, and the economic and social question metamorphosed at the 
eleventh hour into a hastily crafted arrangement on reintegration of combatants and 
their supporters." 
Notwithstanding the political difficulties, could you tell me if the UN in any of its 
 single negotiating texts tried to incorporate provisions for addressing/combating
 the root causes of the socio-economic polarization in general, but that were 
 subsequently refused by the GOES? 
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3. The peace accords stipulated that, pending agreements on various issues, the current 
land-tenure situation would be respected in former conflict zones and that current 
landholding occupants would not be evicted. The final peace agreement has been 
criticized for not defining "conflict zones". Do you think this criticism is fair, when 
 after all  this should be intuitively evident after 12 years of war? 
 
4. Also, the accords have been criticized for not calling for the appointment of a civilian 
as Minister of Defense. Do you think this criticism is fair, when the accords 
stipulate that the President may (podrá) appoint civilians, and that, in any case, 
appointees must be persons fully committed to observing the peace agreements? 
 
5. Some say that it would have made more sense if the judicial reforms were part of a 
separate agreement, as in the case of human rights. Do you agree that this would 
have been better? If so, why? And if so, why was this not done or possible to do? 
 
6. T.A. Wilkins (p.278 in Doyle, et.al.: Keeping the Peace) argues that having the 
"Friends" sign the Accords would have created two benefits. First, it would have 
raised the Friends' commitments to further the peace process, in terms of technical 
training and development assistance, to the level of legally binding obligations. 
Second, the agreements would then fall under the definition of a treaty  an agreement 
between states governed by international law. Was this at any time discussed within 
the UN? 
 
7. And just out of curiosity: Approximately how many single negotiating texts were 
needed before the parties signed the Chapultepec Agreement? 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time, Mr. de Soto, and good luck in Cyprus! 
 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Rune Baklien 
Department of Political Science 
University of Oslo, Norway. 
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Annex II: Answer from Mr. Alvaro de Soto (30 July 2001) 
 
Here goes, right off the top of my head: 
 
1. If I understand your question correctly, I suppose the key answer is that the FMLN's  
insurgency was by and large genuinely politically motivated. i.e., they rose up in arms 
because there was no other way to get a hearing for their grievances. Another point is 
that -- as opposed to e.g. Colombia or Angola, there was no profitable commodity that 
lent itself to becoming a factor in prolonging the war -- i.e. the drug trade and 
diamonds. Also, while the guerrillas were motivated, the lives they led were tough, 
and hardly enjoyable over time. 
 
2. (bis). No. At a point in mid-1991, months before the question was even addressed in 
the negotiation, the FMLN conceded that economic policy should be set by whoever 
was legitimately elected. Perhaps because they couldn't agree amongst themselves, 
they never put forward any proposals for systemic change or to address root causes. 
Their claims boiled down to two areas: minimal conjunctural steps to address social 
unrest, and steps for reintegration into society of former combatants and their 
supporters. 
 
3. I don't recall the absence of definition of what constituted the conflict zones having 
constituted an issue either in the negotiations or in the subsequent implementation of 
the agreements. 
 
4. The FMLN originally demanded this, but they agreed not to press it when a member 
of the government delegation (David Escobar Galindo, the intellectual leader) argued 
that they wouldn't be gaining much from it -- he pointedly observed that there were 
civilians who would be candidates for the job who would be far worse than some of 
the military. The issue became moot with the constitutional and other reforms, 
including the rewriting of the armed forces doctrine, which effectively transformed the 
military. It's fair to say that the military are in some ways the institution that changed 
the most and that has best implemented the peace accords. 
 
5. In preparation for our (the UN's) substantive contribution to the negotiation 
concerning the judiciary, we had a brainstorming session in 1990 (similar to the one on 
human rights in the first half of the year) where we concluded that the work to be done 
was monumental, and that it would take perhaps decades to fix the judiciary. When the 
constitutional reforms were being negotiated in April 1991, the government 
persuasively argued that if the judiciary were tampered with excessively, there was a 
serious risk that the Supreme Court would have declared the whole package 
unconstitutional, thus endangering the peace accords as a whole. The FMLN agreed, 
hence the somewhat modest results. However, the Commission on the Truth did its 
homework and, with its power to lay down binding recommendations, filled many of 
the lacunae left in the negotiation. 
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6. The idea never came up. It would have been unthinkable. The government would 
not have countenanced anything that brought the peace accords to a treaty level. They 
were always meant to be political agreements. Furthermore, it would have been very 
difficult to persuade the 'friends' to co-sign a treaty between a government and a 
guerrilla coalition which would have been tantamount to granting the guerrillas 
recognition of belligerence. Even the Mexicans, who had in the Franco-Mexican 
declaration of 1981 labelled the FMLN as a valid political interlocutor, would have 
balked at that. Imagine what Subcomandante Marcos would have made of it -- not to 
mention the FARC and the ELN. 
 
7. It wasn't quite as methodical as that.  The issues were discussed in sequence, and the 
armed forces took up most of the time. There were a good dozen readings -- oral -- of 
the armed forces question before we produced the first working paper in late October 
1990. The first attempt at sewing several issues together was in the April 1990 
constitutional reform negotiation, where we submitted a comprehensive working paper 
before recessing around the middle of the month.  
 
     Terry Karl and I spoke at great length when she was writing her foreign affairs 
article. Actually, I was quoted in print using the expression "negotiated revolution" in 
the New York Times, the day after the accords were initialed, and subsequently in 
James LeMoyne's cover story in the New York Times Magazine about the FMLN, 
both of which preceded Terry's article. 
 
     
 
 Best of luck 
 
     Alvaro de Soto 
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